Decoding Joint Vision Statement on India-Vietnam Defence Partnership
During a three-day visit to Vietnam, India’s Minister of Defence Rajnath Singh and his counterpart in the Vietnamese government General Phan Van Giang signed the Joint Vision Statement on India-Vietnam Defence Partnership towards 2030. This agreement seeks to enhance the bilateral defence partnership between the two countries. This Joint Vision Statement included USD 500 million in Defence Line of Credit finalized towards Vietnam. This would significantly boost Vietnam’s armed forces capabilities as well as further contribute to the “Make in India, Make for the World” vision of the Government of India.
The meeting also discussed the older issue of India supplying Vietnam with its state-of-the-art supersonic cruise missiles named BrahMos and short-range ground-to-air missiles named Akash. This proposal occurred earlier when India’s former defence minister Manohar Parrikar initiated a $100 million line of credit which facilitated the supply of defence equipment. The same line of credit is now being expanded to $ 500 million. The vision statement also included a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for Mutual Logistics Support which would simplify the procedure of acquiring logistical equipment and support between the two nations. While India has similar agreements based on logistical support already signed with multiple nations like France, Singapore, South Korea, and all the Quad members, for Vietnam, this is the first-ever such agreement signed with any other country. The statement further includes monetary grants to set up language and Information Technology laboratories for the Air Force Training School of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, along with two simulators presented as gifts to Vietnam to enable capacity building [1].
Evolving India-Vietnam Defence Cooperation:
Defence cooperation is a significant component of India-Vietnam bilateral relations. A major milestone here was the signing of the Defence Protocol in March 2000 which laid out a framework for the sale of military helicopters, training of Vietnamese Armed Forces' personnel and repairing equipment for Vietnamese aircraft. This signed protocol paved the way for cooperation in other areas like training in counter-insurgency, jungle warfare, anti-piracy, and intelligence sharing.
In July 2007, a "strategic partnership" agreement was signed, which provided a framework for defence and security cooperation. This was followed by the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in March 2008 between the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs and the Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security (MPS), which focused on security cooperation, specifically in the context of counter-terrorism. In November 2009, defence ministers of both nations signed another MoU on defence cooperation, building upon the bilateral defence agreements signed in 1994 and 2000. The same MoU got an extension of five years from 2014 – 2019. Later in May 2015, defence ministers of both countries signed a ‘Joint Vision Statement on India–Vietnam Defence Relations for the period of 2015–2020’, which updated further development of bilateral defence relations followed by an additional MoU to increase cooperation between the coast guards. The air forces of both countries signed a “program of cooperation” in December 2016. Following Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Vietnam in 2016, these agreements were institutionalized into a “comprehensive strategic partnership” in September 2016. In December 2020, after the India-Vietnam Prime Minister’s Virtual Summit, a “Plan of Action for the period 2021-2023” was formulated to guide partnership in all areas [2].
Relevance in the South China Sea:
On 30 May 2022, India and Vietnam conducted their 12th round of political consultations and the 9th round of strategic dialogue. The meeting between the two nations' foreign ministers included reviewing the progress of the Joint Vision for Peace, Prosperity, and People, which was signed by the Prime Ministers of both countries. The review showed positive "sustained momentum" results in the India-Vietnam bilateral relations [3]. China's assertiveness in the South China Sea (SCS) contributes to adding more strength to the India -Vietnam bilateral relations. The first-ever naval confrontation between India and China occurred in September 2012 when a Chinese warship confronted INS Airavat on passage from Vietnam. This was a deliberate provocation from the Chinese side which led to India extending efforts to enhance defence cooperation and interoperability with Vietnam. Just as Pakistan has acted as a counterweight to India for China, Vietnam can also play the same role for India [4]. India’s Act East Policy acquired maritime elements citing concerns about ensuring secure sea lanes, which added impetus to the India-Vietnam defence collaboration. For India, the bilateral defence cooperation is about preserving the rules-based order at sea and facilitating weapons and defence systems to Vietnam. Therefore, it can be said that apart from the Act East Policy, India-Vietnam defence cooperation also has an added imperative of countering China in the South China Sea.
Relevance in the Indo-Pacific:
The shared concern of growing Chinese influence in the South China Sea also makes the bilateral defence cooperation relevant in the Indo-Pacific. China's String of Pearls strategy not only affects the strategic interests of India but of Vietnam as well. The Chinese influence in the sea is credited to the construction of naval facilities in Djibouti and Solomon Islands, leased ports in Gwadar and Hambantota, and exploring similar opportunities further in South Asia, particularly in Bangladesh and Myanmar. The construction of similar facilities in Cambodia is said to be carried out by China discreetly, although such claims have officially been denied by China and Cambodia [5]. Such circumstances create a shared concern for Vietnam and add imperative to cooperate further with India for ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific.
The Larger Picture:
India’s Act East Policy and the Indo-Pacific strategy encourage more engagement for India in the SCS in order to secure its interests and counterbalance the Chinese influence. In 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping promised former US President Barack Obama that there would be no militarization of SCS. Clearly, this promise has not been true. China’s willingness to display its hard power in the oceans is one of the major factors that drive the India-Vietnam defence cooperation. This bilateral relationship can largely be seen as a security framework for the SCS [6]. This security arrangement can be enhanced if similar strides of cooperation are taken towards like-minded powers who share similar concerns, i.e., the Quad nations. India is a traditional middle power, and Vietnam is a rising middle power. Bilateral defence cooperation with increased emphasis on a long-term approach to maritime security is likely to serve the interests of both India and Vietnam. Naval exercises and maritime dialogues between both countries would establish sea route connectivity and trust-based regional decision-making and would ensure the larger vision of maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific. India facilitating the modernization of the Vietnamese armed forces would augment their military capabilities without incurring the expenditures solely on Vietnam [6]. Strong and sustainable defence cooperation between India and Vietnam sends a strong message to China and displays India’s willingness to foster partnerships with other like-minded nations to secure its national interests.
Conclusion:
The trade policies under former US President Donald Trump were not very well received by Vietnam and therefore had reservations regarding the long-term approach of the US in the SCS. Thus, Vietnam had to reach out to potential partners other than the US. Here, India being a blue-water navy with a shared concern of Chinese assertiveness and a vision of a robust security framework in the Indo-Pacific, becomes an ideal partner for Vietnam. India, in the past, has sought to explore blocks of SCS that are disputed by China and shows a commitment to counter Chinese claims in the SCS [7]. In 2016, Prime Minister Narendra Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister ever to visit India. The visit marking a historic moment was more of a subtle hint to the world that India is no longer reluctant to extend its reach further into Southeast Asia, especially in China’s sphere of influence [8].
India and Vietnam would benefit from a strong strategic partnership given their geographical location in the Indo-Pacific and its growing significance as a theatre for great power competition. On the one hand, China and Russia are trying to grow their influence in the region, while on the other hand, the Quad grouping seeks to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific. The current foreign policy and strategic vision of India envisions a deep engagement with Southeast Asian nations fostering peace and stability. To achieve the said set of objectives, Indian engagement with Vietnam will play a crucial role. A strong defence partnership under the broader India-Vietnam cooperation framework will contribute value to the Act East Policy, which seeks to engage with the Southeast Asian nations to ensure inclusive growth for all countries in the region. Beyond the Act East Policy, the bilateral cooperation will also lead to the fulfillment of SAGAR, i.e., Security and Growth for All in the Region as envisioned by Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
Endnotes:
1. Ministry of Defence, PIB Delhi, 8 June 2022, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1831981
2. Viraj Solanki, “India-Vietnam Defence and Security Cooperation”, 2021 http://www.viet-studies.net/kinhte/VNIndia_June21.pdf
3. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “India-Vietnam Ties Deepen in Dynamic Indo-Pacific”, 7 June 2022 https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-vietnam-ties-deepen-in-dynamic-indo-pacific/
4. Harsh V. Pant, “Why Vietnam Is at the Centre of India’s Policy to Counter China,” Observer Research Foundation, 24 Aug 2017, https://www.orfonline.org/research/why-vietnam-centre-india-policy-counter-china/
5. Swaran Singh, “Novel India-Vietnam axis emerging in Indo-Pacific”, 10 June 2022, https://asiatimes.com/2022/06/novel-india-vietnam-axis-emerging-in-indo-pacific/
6. Dr. Huynh Tam Sang, “The Growing Importance of Vietnam to India’s South China Policy”, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 1 April 2022, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2980923/the-growing-importance-of-vietnam-to-indias-south-china-sea-policy/
7. Joshua Kurlantzick, “Vietnam and India Cement an Increasingly Vital Relationship in Southeast Asia”, Council on Foreign Relations, 9 March 2018, https://www.cfr.org/blog/vietnam-and-india-cement-increasingly-vital-relationship-southeast-asia
8. Harsh V. Pant, “India and Vietnam: A “Strategic Partnership” in the Making”, April 2018, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/PB180409_-India-and-Vietnam.pdf
Pic Courtsey- Andrea Popa ta unsplash.com
(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)