National Security Concerns: Signs of Religious Radicalization in Sri Lanka

National Security Concerns:  Signs of Religious Radicalization in Sri Lanka

The suicide attacks on Easter Sunday a year ago by the nine suicide bombers belonging to National Thawheeth Jama'ath (NTJ), linked to Islamic State (ISIS), killing over 270 people and injuring several others, appears to be more closely linked to a complex politico-religious extremist group, specifically exploiting religious beliefs in Sri Lanka. In this situation it is particularly evident that Imam Zahran Hashim, the founder of National Thawheed Jamath (NTJ), recruited and radicalized youngsters and masterminded the plots. In fact, the Muslim-dominated sea side town of Kattankudy on the eastern coast of Sri Lanka, that has around 60 mosques, produced the radical preacher Hashim, the suspected ring leader behind Easter Sunday bombings. 

Over the past few years, the sword-wielding radical preacher from Kattankudy advocated Wahabbist teachings, which is an ultra-conservative form of Islam, to radicalize a small segment of Muslim youth. The radical preacher Hashim had a significant number of faithful followers from his native town, and from other parts of the country. Five years prior to the Easter Sunday bombings, a group called the “Peace Loving Moderate Muslims in Sri Lanka” published a statement in a local newspaper in Sri Lanka, condemning National Towheed Jamaat (NTJ), and alerting the authorities that NTJ was “fast becoming a cancer” within the Muslim community in the country. Moreover, the radical preacher Zahran Hashim is accountable for the spreading of hate speech and pursuing activities against other forms of Islamic sects.

Eastern Province: Ethnicities and Grievances

A vast majority of the Sri Lankan Muslims are Sunnis. Moreover, the current estimates suggest that the Muslim population in Sri Lanka increased from 1,121,700 in 1981 to 1,967,227 in 2012. Moreover, the new estimates show that the Tamil population in the Eastern Province has been reduced to a half in the last 40 years (Swarajyamag, 2020). Currently, the Eastern Province has the highest concentration of Muslims than any other province of  Sri Lanka. Obviously, in reality, the Eastern province Muslim community  constitute  majority over the Tamil and Sinhalese communities. This ethnic composition in the area determines an ethno-political power struggle, along the ethnic lines. In some Muslim‐dominated areas of the North and Eastern provinces, Sinhalese and Tamil communities have genuine deeply felt grievances (Defence forum India, 2020). In other words, as a part of ethno-politically biased  groups use specific non-normative tactics, such as vandalizing Sinhalese Buddhist archaeological sites, and deliberately revising old Tamil Hindu street names to new names as a systematic ethnic cleansing process in the region (Swarajyamag, 2020). At the same time, unfairly targeting innocent Catholic worshippers on Easter Sunday bombings   by home grown jihadi fanatics have created a negative perception about Islamic extremism throughout the world, and has triggered strained relationship between the Christian-Muslim communities.

 Muslim Politics in Sri Lanka

Of the 225 Sri Lankan Parliamentary Members (MPs), the number of Muslim lawmakers in both the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress and the All Ceylon Makkal Congress has increased to a two decade high of 12. In addition, at the Provincial level, both parties have secured a significant vote and seat share in the Muslim-majority constituencies of North-East and western provinces. To build a loyal following with a deep perception of religio-political ideology in certain Muslim dominated constituencies, political party symbols are associated with religious symbols. Andreas Johansson, who wrote a highly readable book about the Case of Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, explains the use of religious terms and symbols in Muslim politics. (Pragmatic Muslim Politics: The Case of Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, Johansson 2019). Following the Easter Sunday bombings in the most recent report, Johansson states he found speeches by Osama bin Laden translated into Tamil language in a mosque in Colombo, and related types of material in the East coast, on visits between 2006 and 2013 (US News, April 2019). Undeniably, religio-political symbols are vital descriptions of packaging religious fundamentalism particularly in Muslim-majority constituencies.

Probing the Easter Sunday Attacks

Soon after the attacks of April 21, 2019, the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) began detaining suspects for having connections with the proscribed outfit National Thowheed Jamath (NTJ). Since the bombing, Sri Lankan security forces arrested over 290 suspects in connection with the suicide bombers. Most likely suspects arrested in the past year were linked to the terror cells, or closely associated to complex politico-religious extremist groups. A few weeks after the Easter Sunday bombings, the Sri Lankan government banned three local jihadist groups—National Thowheed Jamath (NTJ), Jammiyathul Willayath-As-Seylani (WAS) and Millathu Ibrahim (JMI). After the terrorist attacks last year, the Sri Lankan Government took various steps to combat terror financing. More than US $ 30 million in terrorists' assets and accounts belonging to  least 40 detainees have been frozen across the nation (Colombo page, September 2019). In yet another twist, the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) arrested a prominent Muslim lawmaker’s brother in Sri Lanka in connection with the bombers (Tamil Guardian, 2020). Ultimately, all these evidences show the seriousness of the vulnerability faced by the innocent Muslim youth, of becoming radicalized due to selfish personal goals of a few individuals. Local policy makers must step forward to find solutions to de-radicalize these Muslim youths.


Promoting more promising opportunities for these Muslim  youths will more likely create a conducive environment for them to pursue a meaningful way of life, with self respect and dignity. In recognition of the hard realities as a nation, Sri Lanka will have to practice a policy of coexistence among the communities to de-radicalize youth in the coming years.



(Pic Courtesy-Srimal Fernando)


(Srimal Fernando is a Doctoral Fellow at Jindal School of International Affairs (JSIA), India and Advisor / Global Editor of Diplomatic Society for South Africa. He is the winner of the 2018/2019 ‘Best Journalist of the Year’ award in South Africa, and has been the recipient of GCA Media Award for 2016.The views expressed are personal)