Rajaram Panda posits that Trump's transactional attitude with its allies might hamper security ties. Like other foreign policy changes after coming to power and with ‘America First’ at the fulcrum of his foreign policy doctrine, President Donald Trump started reviewing the terms and conditions of America’s long-lasting allies. In this rubric of foreign policy recast, two important allies of the US in Asia, Japan and South Korea found themselves in a tricky situation when Trump raised the issue of cost-sharing of the security burden for the two Asian allies. The Trump administration making an exorbitant demand has put the fragile Japan-Korea-US security alliance at risk.
How did all this start? In October 2017 Trump had a working lunch with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and South Korean President Moon Jae-in at the United Nations General Assembly. It soon transpired that Trump was trying to extract greater financial support for the requirements of stationing troops in US bases in Japan and South Korea. Earlier, Trump had made similar demands from NATO counterparts to increase their own defence spending and accused them of freeloading. No wonder, the Trump administration renegotiated with South Korea for its financial commitments to American basing, and convinced Seoul to pay an extra 8 per cent. This analysis covers only the American demand on South Korea for the enhanced security burden and leaves Japan for another analysis.
Background
The manner in which South Korea coped with the American demand is worth analysing. A look at the history of the security treaties that the US has maintained since the end of the World War II is a reflection of the US foreign policy priorities since then. More recently, the changing security environment in the world and geopolitical considerations demand a review of old alliances that do not match with the present times.
The US has alliances in various regions of the world since the end of the World War II. It then believed that forming networks would enable forward deployment of US forces and secure regional peace and stability that are linked to American interests. Such a perception changed under the Trump administration. It started interpreting that forward deployment of US forces was an excessive burden on the US to defend its allies and therefore started demanding the allies to increase their share of the burden related to spending on US forces stationed to defend them. With his emphasis on “America Firstâ€, he was determined to prioritise the rebuilding of the US over providing security overseas.
Burden-sharing
The demand made by Trump was to raise South Korea’s share by 500 per cent, exorbitant by any standard. What it entailed was either both parties negotiate for a mutually acceptable decision or Trump keeps his commitment to remove the troops from the bases in South Korea if negotiations fail. The latter could have proved near fatal to the US security commitments and threaten an already fragile US security alliance system. Normally, such negotiations occur every five years among diplomats from either side. But since Trump made an open demand, the natural response from the people of the host government is to resist capitulation. Both in Japan and South Korea, popular support to the presence of US troops in bases has remained consistently weak. This time around, opposition to increased basing support rose to 96 per cent. The fear was that should Trump not bend to reduce his demand, it could have resulted in reduced access of US naval ships to the territorial waters for patrols or intelligence gathering at a time when Japan-South Korea relations showed increasing fragility. Further, accelerated by the perceived threat from North Korea, reduction of military-to-military interactions could have severe detrimental effects on cooperative response abilities between the US and two Asian allies in the event of overall tension flaring up.
Possible scenarios
Trump strongly felt in the theory that US allies routinely take advantage of the US guarantee of their security and therefore considered removing troops as a punishment for insufficient reparations. Such a possibility could emerge if Trump quietly accepted defeat and fail to negotiate a reasonable settlement. Both the options were fraught with serious consequences.
Had Trump struck to his pressure on the allies and pulled out troops that would have been an unprecedented move. In such a scenario, the message to the world would have been that, for the US, the security of its allies is less important than a few extra dollars. In that case, both Japan and South Korea would have been left with no other option than to cope with countering Chinese military build-up and North Korean threat all by themselves and without the US assistance. Both Japan and South Korea would see compelling reason also to revisit their nuclear options as surrounded by two nuclear-armed nations in the neighbourhood could have given ready public endorsement.
Apart from providing security to the two Asian allies, US troops also provided cover to deter North Korean and Chinese threats. In the event of removal of troops, the US would have risked other deployments. For example, South Korea would have implemented with its threat of asking the US to remove Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile defense system. Japan would have considered purchasing the same system, further complicating the security dynamics of the region.
There are talks in certain political quarters in South Korea, if the time is opportune to renew past pursuits of nuclear weapons. Such a view is gaining currency in view of Trump’s pressure. It may be recalled South Korea had toyed with the idea of developing a nuclear weapons program in the past but was thwarted by former US President Gerald Ford. The situation then was that North Korea had not even developed the nuclear bomb. Now the reasons are strong for South Korea to develop its own nuclear weapons as the deterrence provided by the US does not seem to be effective. Similarly, Japan might as well perceive that the US extended deterrence was no longer viable and consider pursuing its own nuclear weapons. If indeed both Japan and South Korea decided to pursue the bomb, both would be violating their adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Such a possibility makes compelling reason for Trump to reconsider his stance.
Breakdown of talks
After Trump made exorbitant demands to raise contribution five-fold, both sides started negotiations in November 2019. The talks ended abruptly. Each side blamed each other. While South Korea expected to discuss “an acceptable range for both counterparts†based on past cost-sharing discussions, the US took the position that Seoul was “not responsive†to its request for “fair and equitable burden-sharingâ€. South Korea took the position that talks “should be within the mutually acceptable Special Measures Agreement (SMA) framework that has been agreed upon by South Korea and the U.S. for the past 28 yearsâ€. The US countered saying that “the share of defence spending should be increased significantly by creating a new categoryâ€. The US negotiator said that he cut short the talks to “give the Korean side some time to reconsiderâ€. Talks collapsed despite that the US side hinted after two days of talks ended that it will no longer stick to its $5 billion demand.
Trump has accused South Korea of being a rich nation that is profiting off the US military forces, stationed in the country as a legacy of the 1950-53 Korean War. South Korea at present hosts some 28,500 US troops. Currently South Korea pays about $1 billion but the US officials justified by saying that South Korea would indeed incur costs of around $5 billion if it takes operational control of combined US-South Korean forces in the event of a conflict. The wide spectrum of political parties in South Korea felt that the US demand was excessive. Under South Korean law, the military cost-sharing deal must be approved by the parliament. Ruling party lawmakers made it clear that they will “refuse to ratify any excessive outcome of the current negotiations†that deviate from the established principle and structure of previous agreements.
It was not clear what new cost category the US meant while asking for a five-fold increase in Korean contribution. But it was perceived in Korean media that the demand included labour costs for the US troops in South Korea, military personnel and family support costs, costs of rotational deployment of US troops to the Korean Peninsula and offshore training expenses.
In past cost-sharing agreements, South Korea only paid for three categories — personnel costs of South Korean workers hired by US troops, military construction costs such as building facilities within US bases, and military assistance expenses, such as for services and materials.
President Trump expressed his frustration by saying that the US gets "nothing" from the current arrangements. He even threatened to use North Korea tensions as leverage in his negotiations with Seoul. It did not work and Seoul did not succumb to the US pressure. Even in the previous year, the US and South Korea failed to reach a defence cost-sharing agreement until February 2019. South Korea eventually agreed to pay $925 million – an 8% increase from the previous year. A similar arrangement could serve the interests of both the sides.
In 1966, Seoul agreed to provide “all facilities†to the US military at no cost. Pentagon picked up “all expenditures†for keeping troops there. But in 1991, after the South Korean economy had grown into one of the world’s largest, Seoul agreed to start picking up more of the expenses of the US military presence. The most recent agreement, signed in 2014, increased South Korea’s contribution to more than $800 million a year. That is equal to about half the annual cost of the 28,500 US troops stationed there, not including personnel costs that the Defense Department would have to pay no matter where the troops were posted. The money does not go to Washington, however.
South Korea used to pay salaries of Koreans working on US bases or in the form of non-cash contributions of services and construction at the installations. South Korea is also funding most of a $10.8-billion construction project that will allow US troops to move from bases near Seoul and the Demilitarized Zone along the border with North Korea to new installations farther south.
Though a review of the US-ROK alliance is now underway in Korea, there is an increasing perception among opinion leaders amid North Korean nuclear and missile advancement and China’s expanding military footprint that the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella has considerably diminished. Those taking this position feel that the US demands for enhanced financial contributions from allies and partners is unjustified. The present circumstances have triggered debate in South Korea over how to reduce dependence on the US and whether and how to engineer its own nuclear armament.
So, given the importance of stationing troops, both need to find a mutually acceptable arrangement so that neither side is burdened excessively while at the same time each side’s strategic interests are fulfilled, thereby contributing to the peace and stability in the region. If South Korea is pushed hard, it could find compelling reason to enhance its own security, including having its own nuclear weapons. That scenario could unfold the domino effect and Japan could follow suit, leaving Northeast Asia as the most nuclearised region in the world.
(Pic Courtesy –Vietnam News Agency)
Professor Rajaram Panda, a leading scholar on Indo-Pacific affairs, is currently Lok Sabha Research Fellow, Parliament of India, and a Member of Governing Council, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi. E-mail: rajaram.panda@gmail.com