Taiwan’s Missile Defense Capabilities

Missile defense systems are a major component for Taiwan securing the credibility of its defensive capability since the odds fall in favor of China in an event of armed conflict [1].

China has made significant investments in missiles and antiradiation weapons while simultaneously enhancing the sophistication of its fighter aircraft threatening Taiwan’s air defenses. As a result, Taiwan has lost its qualitative advantage over the PLA in the air. With precision weapons, aircraft not only face threats while flying but also on the ground. Additionally, aerial attacks are also targeted toward air bases. Aircraft operators that can range an air base if know the attributes of each airbase can have a diversity of systems available to target those key attributes. For instance, targeting the runways to hinder flights or targeting fuel storage to limit the fuel requirements that an airbase needs to be operational.

Due to the accuracy of PLA’s air-to-ground weapons, Taiwan will need a strong surface-to-air missiles (SAM) system in defending itself against air threats. However, SAMs have certain vulnerabilities that China has made investments to exploit. A SAM requires radars to identify, trace, and engage air threats which is like a bright neon sign that quickly draws the attention of attacking systems. Here, China has numerous options for engaging located targets like the Loitering antiradiation missile (ARM) weapons, such as the Harpy, and Fixed-wing aircraft in the area capable of detecting and engaging SAMs with air-to-ground ARM weapons.  

In case, Taiwan deploys its air defenses defending a fixed area in a stalwart defense, the radars will not last long in an actual battle and without radars, the batteries would be non-operational. However, Taiwan could adopt concepts to use SAMs to make them more survivable so that it can make operational contributions to Taiwan’s air defense. Thus, a vital component of Taiwan’s air defense is SAMs survivability [2].

Taiwan’s vulnerabilities to Chinese missile attacks are similar to the security dilemma faced by other countries in Northeast Asia which has U.S. forces in the region or Israel. On varying capacities, these nations have enhanced their infrastructure, acquired relevant equipment, and trained their forces accordingly to best utilize it. Although Taiwan cannot overtly adopt a posture of pre-emptive strike, it has undertaken alternative and rational steps to counter the threat presented by China, at least to the point of which is permissible under a structure of the balanced defensive force [3].

Taiwan Theater Missile Defense System (TMD):

Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems can defend territory or military forces by tracking any incoming ballistic missiles with radar and launching interceptor missiles to neutralize them. These systems can be ground, sea, or air-based and can with the assistance of surveillance satellites use the information of the incoming missiles to increase their effectiveness [4]. In 2003, upon receiving Richard Bush, director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution and former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), former Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian made a public statement regarding Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan to actively respond to the TMD system initiated by the USA. Chen highlighted the significance of TMD commenting on the abrupt missile test by North Korea before the inauguration of President Roh Moo-hyun. He further stated that China has deployed missiles along its southeast coast and therefore, Taiwan along with Japan and South Korea must respond to this actively and effectively. The government of Taiwan then took an ambiguous stand as the TMD system faced opposition from the military community due to the possibility of its expense crowding out the budget for other systems with former minister of national defense Chiang Chung-ling portraying a TMD system as a "money pit." Here, it should be noted that a TMD system is not just an anti-missile system as it has four major components: It can strengthen Taiwan's early-warning system and C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) functions, the nation's passive defense capabilities, its active defense capabilities and can help Taiwan to develop deterrent and offensive weapons [5].

Taiwan is blessed with a natural geographic barrier called the Taiwan Strait due to which China is required to maintain maritime assets for the transportation of its armed forces in case of staging an amphibious invasion with success. Additionally, due to the water barrier, China will also have to provide appropriate air cover for troops in the amphibious assault. However, the biggest concern for Taiwan is China’s missile systems. With its missiles, China has strike capabilities across the Taiwan Strait with launch sites located in the coastal regions, avoiding pre-emptive strikes by Taiwan. For Taiwan, a missile launch on a massive scale from China would pose a serious challenge to its air defenses even if Taiwan has all its missiles armed [6].

From the Chinese perspective, the TMD system raises certain concerns. China believes that a Japan with a strong military would be able to operate under the protection of a TMD, operational TMDs can wipe out the possibility of China’s second-strike capabilities, and that it would weaken China’s claims on Taiwan. In a TMD system, over any part of its flight trajectory, the velocity of the interceptor missile, and the velocity of the target missile should not exceed 3 km/sec and 5 km/sec respectively. Further, the range of the target missile cannot exceed 3,500 km. Other than the silo-based Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), whose velocity has the capability of outstripping anti-ballistic missiles, a TMD system can successfully block all Chinese land or sea-based missiles. As per simulations to study TMD’s impact on its strategic missile capabilities conducted by Chinese analysts, TMD systems’ capabilities can extend to strategic ballistic missiles. In an event of armed conflict between China and Taiwan, the possibility of China relying on the conventionally armed cruise of ballistic missiles is an accepted military view. However, this plan of action can be countered by an advanced TMD system particularly if it is supported by space-based early warning. Therefore, China was particularly disturbed by former President Lee Teng Hui's plea regarding the participation of Taiwan in the TMD. China, on the other hand, reiterating Taiwan being its "internal matter" has said that the supply of any weapons system to Taiwan including TMD will be considered hostile towards China's sovereignty and territorial integrity [7].

Patriot Missile Defense System:

The Patriot system can be traced back to 1965 when Robert McNamara authorized the development of SAM-D, a new air-defense missile. This system was developed as a new generation missile system with the capability to incorporate new technologies including multiple target engagement, computer control, and the ability to operate in an electronic-countermeasures-heavy environment. This system has been deployed across the world including Turkey, Israel, Yemen, South Korea, and Taiwan. In application, Saudi Arabia has intercepted missiles that were aimed at the Houthi rebels, Israel shot down drones operated by Hamas, and Japan deployed the system to protect key strategic locations from North Korea [8]. This system can track and intercept an incoming ballistic missile and multiple maneuvering targets at once but lacks the equipment for interception of fighter jets [9].

On 4 August, the PLA launched its 11 Dongfeng ballistic missiles into the water bodies in the eastern, northern, and southern parts of Taiwan. In response, Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense called out the PLA’s irrational action jeopardizing peace in the region stating that it had “activated” defense systems and was on high alert. This incident led to speculation about why Taiwan did not use the Patriot System to neutralize those missiles. Later, on 05 August, the Wang Li Second World War Research Institute on their Facebook community page put up an illustrated article that described the reason for not using the Patriot system. The article mentioned that missiles fly into space and then return to strike their target. Taiwan’s defense ministry also mentioned that the primary flight path of the Dongfeng ballistic missiles was outside the atmosphere. The article post said that the missiles despite flying over Taiwan were not considered inside the Taiwanese airspace as they were in space. The article further suggested that the Patriot III anti-ballistic missile defense system should not be used to neutralize the Dongfeng missiles as it is designed to prevent enemy missiles from entering Taiwan’s airspace rather than space-bound missiles [10].

Wary of increasing missile threats from China, Taiwan and USA has renewed a missile engineering contract under which the Patriots would receive necessary upgrades. The USD 83 million contract signed by the American Institute in Taiwan and Taiwan’s armed forces would facilitate assistance in the assessment and upgrading of the performance of the missile batteries for a period of four and a half years. Further, the contract aims to maintain the original combat capabilities of the system without increasing the number of missiles in Taiwan’s possession [11].

Sky Bow Missile System:

Developed indigenously by the Taiwan-based National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST), the Tien-Kung III (TK III) surface-to-air missile system also known as the Sky Bow III is made to engage long-and medium-range aerial threats including shot-range tactical ballistic missiles, fighter aircraft, anti-radiation missiles, and cruise missiles. It can operate autonomously or with a higher echelon group and can simultaneously engage multiple targets. The development of this system was intended as a replacement for the nation’s older Hawk SAM system. Developed as a third in the Tien Kung SAM series, the validation of the system started in 1996. In 2001, it made its first test flight and was unveiled in 2007 with test firings in 2008. The system showcased interception of tactical ballistic missiles and air-breathing targets with single-shot kill probability and engagement with multiple air targets simultaneously [12].

The previous Tien Kung I and Tien Kung II missile system are responsible for medium- and high-altitude targets for Taiwan's air defense architecture. The first test firings for them were undertaken with limited deployment on September 1989. In October 1996, the Sky Bow II came as an official replacement for the Nike Hercules. The Tien-Kung II SAM is 9.1 meters in length, 0.57 meters in diameter, and weighs 1,100 kilograms. It has a top velocity of Mach 4.0, a maximum range of 100 km, and a warhead with a weight of 90 kgs. The Tien Kung II can also be understood as the Tien Kung I round equipped with a second-stage solid propellant rocket booster motor section. In 1994, the Sky Bow II was revealed to have an anti-tactical ballistic missile capability but in 1997, this capability was dropped due to the acquisition of the Patriot system. Later in 1998, a radar-guided interceptor variant of its Tien Kung missile was successfully test-fired which was reported to have intercepted a target missile in southern Pingtung. This interceptor was meant to be used against the M-type missiles of China.  In mid-September 1998, to pace up its efforts to build its anti-missile weaponry, Taiwan test-fired a missile and successfully intercepted another target missile. Further, from a base in the southern county of Pingtung, an updated version of the locally designed Tien Kung II was launched hitting another missile that was launched from Chengkung in southeastern Taiwan [13].

On 23 September 2019, the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) began tests for the integration of the Sky Bow III surface-to-air missile with a new class of patrol vessels. This navalized Sky Bow, designated as the Sea Bow has folding fins installed to fit the Mk 41 naval vertical launch system (VLS). The Sea Bow was tested from a ground-based Mk 41 earlier in 2019 with an estimated range of 200 km [14].

Conclusion:

Threats of missile attacks from a hostile neighbor are a concern faced by many countries globally. Taiwan has a certain edge geographically due to the Strait of Taiwan where in order to mount a full invasion, China will have to maintain and train an amphibious expeditionary force with adequate air support to back the ground troops. Therefore, China has invested in the development of its missile technology that can hit Taiwan without deploying any troops. Here, Taiwan faces vulnerabilities that can easily be exploited by China. China has the capability to neutralize Taiwanese SAMs systems reducing their air defense capabilities. This poses a serious threat to Taiwan and therefore continuously upgrades its systems to increase the survivability of its SAMs. Taiwan is aware of the quantitative advantage that China has over them and has therefore focused a lot on the development and enhancement of its air defense capabilities simultaneously developing its infrastructure.

Endnotes:

1.       John Dotson, “Taiwan Pursues Upgrades to Its Tactical Missile Systems”, Global Taiwan Brief, Global Taiwan Institute, 2021 https://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/GTB-PDF-6.9.pdf

2.      Michael J. Lostumbo, David R. Frelinger, James Wiliams and Barry Wilson, “Air Defense Options for Taiwan: An Assessment of Relative Costs and Operational Benefits”, RAND Corporation, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1000/RR1051/RAND_RR1051.pdf

3.      “The Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait”, US-Taiwan Business Council, May 2010 https://www.us-taiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2010_may11_balance_of_air_power_taiwan_strait.pdf

4.     Evan Medeiros and Phillip Saunders, “Theater Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security”, The Nuclear Threat Initiative, 31 July 2001 https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/theater-missile-defense-asian-security/

5.      Parris Chang, “Taiwan should join TMD system”, Taipei Times, 12 March 2003 https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2003/03/12/0000197730

6.     WEI-CHIN LEE, “Thunder in the Air: Taiwan and Theater Missile Defense”, The Nonproliferation Review, 2001https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/83lee.pdf

7.      Ritu Mathur, “TMD in the Asia-Pacific: A View From China”, Strategic Analysis:

A Monthly Journal of the IDSA https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/sa/sa_nov00mar01.html

8.     Kyle Mizokami, “Why America's Enemies Fear the Patriot Missile Defense System (Even After Almost 40 Years)”, The National Interest, 20 March 2017 https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-americas-enemies-fear-the-patriot-missile-defense-system-19833

9.     Kris Osborn, “The Case for More Taiwanese Missile Defense Systems”, The National Interest, 06 August 2022 https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/case-more-taiwanese-missile-defense-systems-204050

10.  Ashish Dangwal, “Chinese Missiles ‘Zoom Over’ US Patriot Defense Systems; Experts Decode Why Taiwan Could Not Intercept Them”, The Eurasian Times, 07 August 2022 https://eurasiantimes.com/chinese-missiles-zoom-over-us-patriot-air-defense-system-taiwan/

11.     Gabriel Honrada, “Taiwan’s Patriot missiles to get massive US upgrade”, Asia Times, 14 August 2022 https://asiatimes.com/2022/08/taiwans-patriot-missiles-to-get-massive-us-upgrade/

12.    “Tien-Kung III (Sky Bow III) Surface-to-Air Missile System”, Army Technology, 23 March 2016 https://www.army-technology.com/projects/tien-kung-iii-sky-bow-iii-surface-to-air-missile-system/

13.    Sky Bow II / Tien Kung II, Global Security https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/taiwan/skybow-2.htm

14.Masao Dahlgren, “Taiwan Modifies Sky Bow for Ship Deployment”, Missile Threat CSIS Missile Defense Project, 26 September 2019 https://missilethreat.csis.org/taiwan-modifies-sky-bow-for-ship-deployment/

Pic Courtsey-John Torcaso at unsplash.com

(The views expressed are of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)