Japan’s Urge to increase Defence Expenditure to 2 Percent of the GDP

As per the data from the ministry of defence of Japan, Japan's military expenditure touched a whooping high of $51 billion for 2021, making it the seventh biggest defence spender in 2022. However, it constitutes only about 1% of the GDP in absolute terms. In 2018 Japan adopted a 10-year defence plan and a midterm procurement plan to realize its objective of the military overhaul.

 Among other things Abe did, one of his critical decisions was to reinterpret Article 9 of Japan's constitution to allow Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to cooperate with foreign militaries to protect the nation. Japan which has long been following a pacifist constitution, was under a self-imposed moratorium since 1976, when the then-ruling party liberal democratic party (LDP) was rocked by a bunch of scams involving defence procurements. The revelations of then PM Kakuei Tanaka that he had accepted bribes from Lockheed Martin led to a Takeo Miki, who replaced Tanaka announcing and pledging clean politics and declaring in the Japanese parliament- Diet- that Japan would not spend more than 1 per cent of the GDP on defence. Ever since then, this has remained a de facto threshold.

Burgeoning Defence Budget

Shinzo Abe, who commenced the process of military modernization and upgradation, was carried forward by the Liberal Democratic Party in the upcoming elections, most notably the 2021 general election. Among the election manifestos was the promise to increase defence spending to 2% of the GDP, amounting to $100 billion. This move by Japan to announce a steep hike in its defence spending has brought Japan full circle since it underwent military neutralization following a shattering defeat in world war 2. These debates over Japan rethinking its security postures and a possible remilitarisation of Japan are not entirely new. The process of Japan’s militarisation started as soon as the second world war got over. However, the recent yearning to increase its military expenditure has an interesting rationale, and its timing also holds a particular significance.

Threatening Geostrategic Environment and Geopolitical Tepidity in Japan

The 2022 Japan's defence white paper serves as an introductory guide to understanding Japan's official position on critical ongoing strategic, geopolitical, and security issues. Triad of the aggressive rise of belligerent China causing militarisation of the sea and land as a fait accompli, nuclear sabre-rattling by North Korea and the expansionism of Russia as well as China- North Korea nexus on the one hand and China Russia nexus on the other, have posed a formidable challenge for security and stability of immediate Japanese environment. It is in response to these critical threats and other compulsions from the USA and NATO that Japan has embarked upon a lofty goal of maintaining modern, agile and lethal military and defence capabilities. Each of these factors warrants serious attention to comprehend the eminent rationale behind Japan's urge.

a. China's Belligerence

The most apparent manifestation of China's belligerence was the fourth Taiwan strait crisis which created a nervousness not seen in the recent past. Coming at a time when the Russian aggression is underway in Ukraine, it set the alarm bell ringing in Japan as regards Japan's security and stability. 2022 defence white paper of Japan identifies China as a power seeking to alter the status quo unilaterally in the south and east China sea. China's growing ties with Russia and joint patrolling both in the air and sea space surrounding japan and the Chinese resolve to unify Taiwan even by force have further deteriorated the security environment of Japan. China's quest to build a world-class military at par with the USA and its manifestation in terms of civil-military fusion and military "intelligentization" by use of AI in the military domain has upset the overall balance of power, having significant ramifications for a country like Japan.

Additionally, Japan also has an outstanding territorial dispute over the sovereignty of the far-flung Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Recently the disagreement has intensified further due to the PLA's swift operational capability expansion and coercion to alter the status quo unilaterally. Rising strategic competition between USA and China also has serious repercussions for a country like Japan which is a crucial ally of the USA in the region. The recent Taiwan crisis and the proximity of Japan to Taiwan have cautioned Japan further to look at the overall security scenario in the area with a sense of urgency. Japan, which shares robust ties with Taiwan in terms of foundational values of democracy and freedom, thus has a significant stake in the stability of the Taiwan strait for economic and political reasons.

b. Nuclear Sabre Rattling by North Korea

North Korea's nuclear browbeating through its seemingly unending missile test has caused deep concerns within Japan. The problem has got further complicated by the fact that China and north Korea, if needed, could act as hand-in gloves to target Japan. The Korean peninsula has witnessed an immensely perturbed geopolitical environment owing to military advances done by north Korea. Since Japan is under assurance and hosts US military bases, the US is bound to contribute to efforts against North Korea in cases of conflict. Also, the likelihood of nuclear-armed cruise missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles cannot be ruled out completely. Therefore, unilateral provocations from North Korea, which has sided with the Russian position in the Ukrainian crisis and blamed the USA, jeopardize the regional and international security environment. As regards Japan, it poses a grave and imminent threat as Japan doesn't have very cordial relations with North Korea.

c. Russian Expansionism

The Ukraine crisis has been the most immediate crisis that has led to a significant churn within the Japanese security and defence establishment and political elites. Japan has unequivocally condemned Russia for Russian aggression on Ukraine, a sovereign country. Japan's defence white paper poignantly notes that unilateral changes to the status quo have shaken the foundations of international order, including Asia. Adopting a "strong state" model in Russia and forming a China Russian "strategic alliance" displaying strategic coordination surrounding Japanese land, maritime, and air space have been a deep cause of concern and warrant an earnest look. Japan's anxieties are further compounded by its outstanding dispute with Russia over the far-flung Kuril Islands, which remain under Russian possession. While Japan has shown interest in a permanent resolution of the disagreement, experts have warned that Russia, on its part, is unlikely to give any concessions to Japan.

Sheila A. Smith, a senior fellow for Japan studies at the Council for Foreign Relations, has very aptly captured the rethinking in Japan about remilitarization in her recent book titled Japan Rearmed: The Politics of Military Power. Former US President Donald Trump questioned the continuing reliance of Europe, Japan and its other allies and blamed the countries for taking advantage as free riders and thus tried to reduce the aid and assistance to them and instead focused on USA's national capabilities. The signals from the United States were quite clear on the issue of burden sharing, and the Japan’s overall reliability on the USA for its security tested Tokyo's approach to military power. Japan which had adopted the pacifist constitution in the post-war period and denounced the use of force to settle international disputes, had for long relied on USA nuclear umbrella for deterring war. However, in response to the clear signals from the USA, Japan, under former prime minister Shinzo Abe, started greater participation in collective security endeavours. As a result, Japan's military has increasingly abandoned its defensive outlook and gained international prominence through its involvement in various international coalition opportunities ranging from UN-led peacekeeping to post-war reconstruction, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Smith further notes that Japan has come to this informed realization that it is no longer in its interest to pursue the kind of approach it had followed until now. With northeast Asia turning into a nuclear flashpoint, Japan could no longer rely on the USA for its core and vital national security interests in the face of strains experienced by a declining hegemon.

The pressure from the United States on Japan to increase its spending to share the security bill in the Asia-Pacific region could also lead to Japan possibly breaching its limit of 1 per cent soon. Japan doubling its defence expenditure also aligns it with the NATO benchmark and positions Japan more as a genuine ally than a dependent country- a position it has held since American forces drafted a pacifist constitution to rule out any recurrence of imperialistic ambitions. The Biden administration has emphasized reinforced competitiveness and cooperation with allies and partners. Japan-US alliance is considered one of the consequential ones in taking forward the idea of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Therefore, Japan's aim to carve out a more visible role in the security and political sphere not only burnishes its credentials as a reliable partner in the region but also positions itself as a formidable bulwark against the aggressive Chinese stance in the east and south China sea.

Roadblocks In Realizing the Potential

Japan has adopted a three-pronged approach to realize its vision. Strengthening deterrence by boosting Japan’s defence capabilities, bolstering the US-Japan alliance and pushing for greater cooperation with other like-minded countries for a free and open Indo-Pacific constitutes the indispensable elements of Japan's approach. Japan aims to build robust deterrence capabilities to prevent changes in the status quo backed by force. Strengthening Japan's national architecture for national defence through capabilities would deter threats from reaching Japan by making opponents realize that harming Japan would be complicated and consequential.

Notwithstanding the lofty goals that Japan had set for itself, the economic fragilities caused by covid might make it an uphill task for Japan to realize its objectives. Japan's economy plummeted by 29 per cent due to the pandemic. In addition to economic constraints, it also faces internal and external political opposition to its move. Its debt-laden public finances might not allow the fiscal room to carry out such radical reforms at this stage. The domestic debate over the possible reinterpretation or scrapping of article 9 has also got further intensified and has met with stiff opposition from Japan’s former Asian conquests, such as China. This article 9 ductile reinterpretation has created a Catch-22 situation for Japan. The problem has further got complicated by the political fickleness of prime minister Kishida, whose foreign policy has become almost as hawkish as his conservative predecessors. The risk of Japan getting entrapped in American proxy wars and increasing economic involvement in the US military-industrial complex has limited Japan's options. 

Conclusion

There is no denying that Japan has undertaken a slew of radical measures to strengthen its defence capabilities. In the wake of current geopolitical tensions and rising instability, Japan has pursued a realist policy and embarked on an ambitious plan of doubling its defence expenditure. Although an election promise, the target of 2 per cent spending on defence still seems unlikely to be achieved given the peculiar economic scenario that Japan currently faces. Japan still adheres to its pacifist outlook, and its alliance with the USA and other like-minded countries in the region is only likely to grow in the future. Japan is also steadfastly committed to its three non-nuclear principles. Therefore, while the urge to attain 2 per cent spending on defence may be well founded, if examined objectively is unlikely to fructify anytime soon.

References:

1.       https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/japan-begins-rethinking-security/

2.      https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Indo-Pacific/Abe-leads-charge-for-Japan-to-boost-defense-spending-to-2-of-GDP

3.      https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-japan-upgrading-its-military

4.     https://www.cfr.org/book/japan-rearmed

5.      https://www.orfonline.org/research/japans-defence-and-security-policy/#_edn1

6.     https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/07/30/the-jury-is-still-out-on-japans-defence-spending/

7.      https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-russia-will-not-return-kuril-islands-japan

Pic Courtesy-PM Office website Japan

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)