China’s Underwater Drones in the Indian Ocean

“The PLAN has used more than a decade of such deployments, undertaken as a unilateral effort rather than in conjunction with multinational task forces, to develop its blue- water logistics capabilities and justify its military presence far from Chinese Shores.”[1]

Indian Maritime Doctrine of 2015 emphasizes the priority of establishing a strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean Region[2]. The doctrine underlines the need for a gallant fleet to strengthen the coastal defence and protect sea lines of communication. Admiral Arun Prakash (Retd.), Chief of the Naval Staff (2004-2006), underlined this concern for the Indian Strategic community on the account of increasing Chinese assertions in and around South Asia[3]. China’s aggressive deployment of submarines and vessels in the Indian Ocean Region and the progress of One Belt and Road Initiative is serving the goal of pressurizing New Delhi. Beijing’s occupation of the Paracel Islands in 1974 was a major historical indication of interventionist territorial and maritime policies[4]. Operations of the militarization of the Tibetan Plateau, naval access from the One Belt and Road Initiative, improvement of high-altitude airfields supporting the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force operations and modernization of road and rail networks, contributes to the rising fear of Chinese expansion in the region[5]. China’s interest in the Indian Ocean Region is marked by strategic, military, and geopolitical interest. The idea always revolves around the context to gather information and attract the neighbouring Indian Ocean Region countries. This paradigm shift for Beijing’s interest is marked by increased naval exercises, stiff involvement in the occupation of islands in the South China Sea and oceanographic data collection survey of the island nations. Maritime surveillance stands as the prime technique of maritime advantage adopted by nations. China’s “debt-trap-diplomacy” has been able to attract nations like Sri Lanka, having a former allegiance to New Delhi, to engineer control over the naval activities in the Indian Ocean Region. For example, Beijing’s and Male’s protocol of 2017 enabled a protocol to build a joint ocean observation station at the Makunudhoo allowing the Chinese a vantage point of busy shipping lines and enabling a bilateral free trade agreement[6].

China’s venture into the Indian Ocean Region has been characterized by surveillance. Apart from the naval fleets, strategically, Beijing’s influence on neighbouring states makes it difficult for New Delhi to get away from the Chinese interference in any region. Investment project of USD 2 billion on Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka and setting up a port close to East-West shipping route and building naval and airspace stations contributes to the interference in the region[7]. Submarine ventures and underwater surveillance has also been detected in Colombo. In 2014, a Chinese submarine was found navigating into the seas near the Colombo Port and Indian Navy suspected that it was surveying the ocean floor for resources and minerals[8]. Signing the memorandum of understanding with Seychelles in 2004 and investing in the development of Chinese military and surveillance stations like projects in Colombo. Tantamount port developments and facilities in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma and maritime ties with Maldives, Seychelles, Mauritius are clear indications of String of Pearls being fused with economic and military strength in Indian Ocean Region[9]. This program gives China a substantial advantage over the West and Subcontinent as Beijing has the luxury to expand its investment into Africa and Indo- Pacific nations and this pragmatism of initiating survey projects are allowing this pragmatic approach. A similar approach has been followed since 1990, in terms of rallying African State rallying against the US agenda in the United Nations General Assembly[10]. “One China Policy” gave the leverage of diplomatically breaking off the ties of African states with Taiwan and constructed an international consensus which proved to be a politically and strategic hindrance for Taiwan’s cause for independence. The current endeavours in the Indian Ocean Region, China’s adventure into the Bay of Bengal and near Andaman and Nicobar Islands, is having that parallel resonance of One China Policy[11].

PLAN’s three fleets- North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea fleet- are respectively providing the Chinese with the required economic, political, and strategic strength which has been the collective concern for West and New Delhi[12]. These fleets have shown off the strength to prevent Taiwanese secession and asserting claims over the South China Sea[13]. This has initiated a Cold War in the ocean region on the grounds of the South China Sea and Indian Ocean Region, with conflict over the Paracel Islands being volatile and on the brink of conflict. Since 2008, expansion of the South Sea Fleet and shifting the nuclear submarines from the North Sea fleet to reduce any threats from the Northern borders[14]. With keeping the options open on the South Sea Fleet in case of possible conflict with Taiwan, the focus of East and South Sea fleet for imposing economic blockade and establishing commercial routes with port developments in the region. IOR is the outlet for PLAN as western pacific is currently dominated by the US Navy for reasons for deployment (counter-piracy) and long- term ones (guarding Sea Lines of Communication)[15]. This great Chinese Naval Profile is currently the biggest endeavour in the current realm of strategic and security concerns. A nationalist passion on part of assertive Chinese foreign policy.

Strategic implication of surveying in the Indian Ocean recently got another entrant with Chinese deployment of a fleet of underwater drones known as the Sea Wing (Haiyi) glider in the Indian Ocean[16]. These underwater drones currently stand as one of the most technological advancements in terms of naval intelligence. The first deployment of these drones was done back in Dec 2020, a critical time when both the nations were involved in a standoff at the Eastern Ladakh[17]. Deploying ‘en masse’ of underwater drones, these sea gliders are a type of Unscrewed Underwater Vehicle (UUV). February 2019 saw the similar deployment of gliders by the Chinese and making over 3,400 observations till 2020[18]. These drones also fall under the expansionist activities in the disputed South China Sea and near Andaman Nicobar Islands. The military significance of extensive oceanographic research has been the priority objective for Beijing since 2008 expanded Chinese Naval Fleets[19]. In January 2021, Indonesian fishermen found similar underwater drones of Chinese fleets near Selayar Islands in the Flores Sea[20]. Presence of Beijing’s underwater drones in Indonesia’s Flores Sea points out that the surveying activities are pan out to be more extensive for strategical advantage. Indonesia has no diplomatic concerns in either of the Chinese disputes in the waters. Although the dispute has arisen between the two nations as Beijing was overlapping Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone, the countries per se are not involved in direct conflict regarding economic or political agenda[21]. Underwater drones were also found in the waterways where the oil tankers from the Middle East carry oil to China and from where Singaporean refined fuels flow to Australia. March 2019 UUV was discovered in the world's busiest shipping line of the Strait of Malacca between Indonesia and Singapore, and in January 2020 a drone was found near the Sunda Islands belonging to southern Indonesia and on the Lombok Strait of Indonesia, which connects the Java Sea to the Indian Ocean[22]. What is the meaning of these drones and the location where they are found? A complete reconnaissance activity is being carried out by the Chinese Naval. These cover the main waters of the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, but the evidence of Indonesia and Australia suggests that collection of oceanography is tried to comprehensively engulf the activities of the Indian Ocean. The power of these drones is also quite astonishing. Principle of “Variable-Buoyancy Propulsion” is being applied to these underwater drones[23]. This is a mechanism where a balloon-like device filled with pressurized oil inflates and deflates repeatedly and causes the device to sink and rise rapidly and more ahead with wing-like structures[24]. The dimensions of the structures were released by the Indonesian media—225 cm in length and have 50 cm wingspan and 93 cm long trailing antenna. The resemblance of the Sea Wing (Haiyi) to the Littoral Battlespace Sensing- Glider (LBS-G), used by the US Navy, was obtained by China on 15^th December 2016[25]. LBS-G was found in the international waters in the South China Sea. The glider was recovered by USNS Bowditch when a small boat from a Chinese Vessel retrieved it from the waters and after a minor diplomatic spat later, the glider was given back to the US Navy[26]. Despite the claims that China’s had returned the glider and was not the source of any of their projects, the resemblance of the design is very much visible when released by the Indonesian media. Indian Ocean Mission had already reported in December 2019 that 14 of these UUV drones were employed in the Indian Ocean but the latest report by the Indian Ocean Mission suggests that only 12 were employed and they were launched by the specialist survey ship Xiangyanghona 06, returning to Rizhou, China[27]. The specialist survey was part of the Joint Ocean and Ecology Research Project run by the Ministry of Natural Resources of China and was the primary vessel used for the deployment of these drones[28]. UUV’s have been able to successfully play different roles such as scientific research, dynamic ocean process observation, acoustic detection, comprehensive exploration of the deep-sea environment[29]. Submarine hunters, capable of locating, identifying, following, and photographing and targeting underwater opponents. The implications of these drones are seen to provide a substantial mapping and navigational advantage regarding Indian, Indonesian, and Australian routs. Indonesia’s naval chief Admiral Yudo Margono expressed a certain insight regarding the strategic advantage of these drones[30]. Hydrographic data stands vital for submarine warfare both for friendly submarines to remain hidden and to help locate hostile ones. Identifying the most effective locations to position sea mines and overlooking trade routes, such as Sunda Strait and Lombok Strait, may become important during a possible conflict or wartime if judged from a realist perspective[31]. Extrapolations into the foreign waters have been a repeated instance for Beijing. Indian Navy had evicted a Chinese survey ship Shhiyan- 1 from the waters surrounding the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and sending regular submarine patrols around the waters of Andamans and Bay of Bengal since 2012[32]. Geostrategic competition in Indo- Pacific is going to grow by drones such as SeaWing can carry Conductivity, Temperature, Depth (CTD) sensors as well as turbulence meter, turbidimeter, chlorophyll sensor, dissolved oxygen sector, nitrate and other biochemical, sensors. Xiang Yang Hong 03 has been a regular visitor in the Indian Ocean and surveyed the waters of Indonesia and The Bay of Bengal, being close to the Indian island chain of Andaman and Nicobar[33]. Although countries can explore the ocean floor and water for resources under the United Nations Convention on the Law of Seas, states are required to seek the permission of respective nation-states to explore under their EEZ.

Chinese Navy (PLAN) submarine and drone operations are on a rise. Data gathering objectives by these powerful gliders are an indicator of how China tends to strategically grow in the region. The recovery of the drones now publicly suggests that how Chinese strategy is being panned out in the IOR and despite the usage of actual military assets expeditionary naval capability provides proof of strategic threat that has been on a rise since 2008. The Central Military Commission in 2004 expanded these ideals of national interests and the notion of safeguarding world peace in terms of naval and strategic capabilities. The 2006 defence white paper noted the rise of the security-related issue on energy, which was put forward as global competitiveness in the 2008 white paper[34]. The question that will continue to be pertinent is how New Delhi will respond to these rising survey explorations. 

Indian Ocean Region’s strategic implications are far-reaching if utilized appropriately. The maritime strategy control in the region can dictate the terms of trade routes and control over the territorial sovereignty. The strategy of “Sea-Control” will give the dual advantage of the ability to use the sea as per the desired metrics of defence and economic advantage. Chinese underwater drones have been able to fulfil that strategic knowledge gap when it comes to IOR. If China can secure any success in Sea Control, the advent of “Sea Denial”, denying the adversary use of neighbouring and islands nations as per their discretion and cutting down their advantage for any possible military action, will be much easier for PLAN. This narrative creates strong maritime territorial advantages, prompting the purpose of militarization and development of economic and trade lines in the IOR. This endeavour, coupled with the One Belt and Road Initiative will fulfil its exercises of establishing a strategic foothold in the Indian Ocean Region. Surveillance based navel modernisation is becoming the primary means by which Beijing seems to constantly pressurize the Indian Navy and gradually complete its objective. This gradual development has been the most extensive endeavour taken by PLAN since 2008. New Delhi’s response should be focused on two simultaneous objectives. While increasing its naval presences and naval exercises, along with military and strategic developments in neighbouring countries, India’s diplomatic and strategic presence in IOR and the South China Sea dispute will fulfil its objective of its supporting its bilateral relations and establish a counter-presence to PLAN. A strong, reasonable, and diplomatic presence needs to be established by New Delhi to secure its maritime security in IOR and put a halt to China’s increasing surveillance activities. The multilateral approach can be the answer by which the Chinese narrative in Asia and Southeast Asia can be successfully countered.

Notes

[1] White, T. J. (June 2020). “China’s Indian Ocean Ambitions: Investment, Influence and Military Advantage”. Global China- Assessing China’s Growing Role in the World, Brookings Institution

[2]Ghosh, P (2020). “India’s Indian Ocean Region Strategy”. Journal of Indo- Pacific Affairs.

[3] Mukherjee, T (24^th April 2018). “China’s Maritime Quest in the Indian Ocean: New Delhi’s Options”. The Diplomat, The Pulse.

[4] Mahadevan, P (June 2020).” China in the Indian Ocean: Part of a Larger Plan”. CSS Analyses in Security Policy, No. 156

[5] Ibid.

[6] Op. Cit, ibid.

[7] White, T. J. (June 2020). “China’s Indian Ocean Ambitions: Investment, Influence and Military Advantage”. Global China- Assessing China’s Growing Role in the World, Brookings Institution

[8] Fernando, S (October 2012). “China’s Relations with the Indian Ocean Region: Combining Realist and Constructivist Perspectives”. Institute of Chinese Studies, Occasional Paper, No. 2.

[9] Op. Cit, ibid.

[10] ibid.

[11] Mahadevan, P (June 2020), ibid.

[12] Pakanati, R (March 2019). “India’s Domestic Debate over China’s Growing Strategic Presence in the Indian Ocean”. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol 13 (1), pp. 5-31.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Parthasarathy, G (11^th February 2020). “China tightening its grip on Indian Ocean”. Business Line, Opinion.

[15] (31^st December 2020). “China deploying ‘en masse’ underwater drones in Indian Ocean: Report”. Livemint

[16] Ibid.

[17] (31^st December 2020). “China deployed fleet of underwater drones in Indian Ocean, says report”. Business- Standard, Indian Ocean

[18] Lhamo, C (4^th January 2021). “China deploys underwater drones in Indian Ocean”. Phayul.

[19] Boquerat, G. (2018). “India’s response to China’s assertiveness over the seas”. Defense & Industries, India- China.

[20] Sutton, H. I. (16th January 2021). “Chinese Survey Ship Caught ‘Running Dark’ give clues to Underwater Drone Operations”. USNI News

[21] Ibid.

[22] Davidson, H (31st December 2020). “Indonesian fisher finds drone submarine on possible covert mission”. The Guardian

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] (22nd January 2021). “Explained: Why China is Deploying Underwater Drones Near Indian Ocean Choke Points”. Swarajya

[26] Sutton, H. I. (16th January 2021), ibid.

[27] Ibid

[28] Lhamo, C (4^th January 2021), ibid.

[29] Sutton, H. I. (16th January 2021), ibid.

[30] Pandit, R. (24^th March 2020). “India on alert as “China deploys dozen underwater drones in IOR.” Times of India

[31] (1^st January 2021). “After Predator drone lease, government approves Indian Navy proposal to buy shipborne drones”. The Economic Times

[32] Ibid.

[33] (22nd January 2021), Swarajya, ibid.

[34] Huang, K (10^th January 2021). “China’s underwater drones seized in Indonesia expose tech, routes and potential submarine plans”. South China Morning Post

Pic Courtesy-https://www.news.com.au

(The views expressed are that of the author and does not represent the views of the CESCUBE or its officials.)