LIVE DISPATCH
Loss and Damage Finance: From COP28 Pledges to Policy Architecture Extended Deterrence Under Strain: Credibility, Assurance, and the Stability-Instability Paradox in the Indo-Pacific Beyond Consultation: BIMSTEC's Emerging Role in Regional Intelligence and Security Cooperation Maritime India: Security, Trade, and Great Power Competition Between the Desert and the Savannah: Conflict and the Political Economy of Instability in the Sahel Beyond Ukraine: Understanding Putin's Vision of Russian Power The Politics of Ali Khamenei's Funeral Silicon Sovereignty: How Semiconductors Are Redrawing Global Power Hierarchies Operation Sindoor and the Changing Dynamics of India–Pakistan Security The Negative Impact of US–Iran War on the Pacific Region Generative AI, Labour Sovereignty, and the Geoeconomics of India's Service Economy BRICS Expansion and the Multipolar Moment: Opportunity or Strategic Contradiction? India's AI Diplomacy and the Future of Strategic Technologies Foot-Dragging as Feminism: Iran, South Korea, and the Ungovernable Body Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Governance Deficit: Challenges to International Humanitarian Law and Accountability Beyond Proximity: Why the UAE Occupies a Growing Place in Iran’s Strategic Calculus Great Power Rivalry and the Crisis of the United Nations Why Fiji Matters: The New Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific Islands Ten Years After Brexit: Regret, Reform, or Reversal? The Long Shadow of 1953: Understanding the Iran–US Conflict Sports, Strategy and Statecraft of Mega Sporting Events as Geoeconomic Instruments: Qatar 2022 to Saudi Arabia 2034 Border Fencing and National security: India’s Strategy along the Bangladesh Border Hardening the Quad: From Strategic Dialogue to Operational Cooperation Lingering Effects of the Bush Doctrine on Contemporary US Foreign Policy The Maghreb of States: Identity, Sovereignty, and the Limits of Non-Interference India’s BRICS 2026 Chairmanship Navigating a tightrope Amidst the Chinese Geopolitical Rise Beyond the Battlefield: Understanding Unconventional Security Challenges in Contemporary Geopolitics The Control Paradox: How Proxy Warfare Enables Strategic Deniability While Constraining Strategic Control Trapped in Deterrence: Nuclear Stability and the Persistence of Conflict in South Asia The Return of Unipolarity? U.S Strategic Primacy and the Future of the Global Order Supply Chains and Complicity: The Role of Global Corporations in Forced Labour in Xinjiang The Distant Threat: Is Israel Constructing a Strategic Rival in Pakistan Island Militarisation and Techno-Diplomacy: Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean Fault Lines Amid India-Greece Alignment India’s Security Scenario: An Assessment of its Continental and Maritime Challenges The Geopolitical Architecture of European Defence: Navigating NATO Synergies, Transatlantic Retrenchment, and the Hybrid Threat Landscape The Artemis Accords and the Future of Global Space Governance AI and the Securitization of Critical Infrastructure: Implications of India's AI Summit Beyond Rhetoric: Evaluating the Effectiveness of International Sanctions on China’s Treatment of Uyghur Muslims The Emerging Maritime Rivalry in the Western Indian Ocean: India’s Response to Extra-Regional Powers India's Maritime Grand Strategy on Trial : The IRIS Dena Incident and the Indian Ocean Question Loss and Damage Finance: From COP28 Pledges to Policy Architecture Extended Deterrence Under Strain: Credibility, Assurance, and the Stability-Instability Paradox in the Indo-Pacific Beyond Consultation: BIMSTEC's Emerging Role in Regional Intelligence and Security Cooperation Maritime India: Security, Trade, and Great Power Competition Between the Desert and the Savannah: Conflict and the Political Economy of Instability in the Sahel Beyond Ukraine: Understanding Putin's Vision of Russian Power The Politics of Ali Khamenei's Funeral Silicon Sovereignty: How Semiconductors Are Redrawing Global Power Hierarchies Operation Sindoor and the Changing Dynamics of India–Pakistan Security The Negative Impact of US–Iran War on the Pacific Region Generative AI, Labour Sovereignty, and the Geoeconomics of India's Service Economy BRICS Expansion and the Multipolar Moment: Opportunity or Strategic Contradiction? India's AI Diplomacy and the Future of Strategic Technologies Foot-Dragging as Feminism: Iran, South Korea, and the Ungovernable Body Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Governance Deficit: Challenges to International Humanitarian Law and Accountability Beyond Proximity: Why the UAE Occupies a Growing Place in Iran’s Strategic Calculus Great Power Rivalry and the Crisis of the United Nations Why Fiji Matters: The New Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific Islands Ten Years After Brexit: Regret, Reform, or Reversal? The Long Shadow of 1953: Understanding the Iran–US Conflict Sports, Strategy and Statecraft of Mega Sporting Events as Geoeconomic Instruments: Qatar 2022 to Saudi Arabia 2034 Border Fencing and National security: India’s Strategy along the Bangladesh Border Hardening the Quad: From Strategic Dialogue to Operational Cooperation Lingering Effects of the Bush Doctrine on Contemporary US Foreign Policy The Maghreb of States: Identity, Sovereignty, and the Limits of Non-Interference India’s BRICS 2026 Chairmanship Navigating a tightrope Amidst the Chinese Geopolitical Rise Beyond the Battlefield: Understanding Unconventional Security Challenges in Contemporary Geopolitics The Control Paradox: How Proxy Warfare Enables Strategic Deniability While Constraining Strategic Control Trapped in Deterrence: Nuclear Stability and the Persistence of Conflict in South Asia The Return of Unipolarity? U.S Strategic Primacy and the Future of the Global Order Supply Chains and Complicity: The Role of Global Corporations in Forced Labour in Xinjiang The Distant Threat: Is Israel Constructing a Strategic Rival in Pakistan Island Militarisation and Techno-Diplomacy: Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean Fault Lines Amid India-Greece Alignment India’s Security Scenario: An Assessment of its Continental and Maritime Challenges The Geopolitical Architecture of European Defence: Navigating NATO Synergies, Transatlantic Retrenchment, and the Hybrid Threat Landscape The Artemis Accords and the Future of Global Space Governance AI and the Securitization of Critical Infrastructure: Implications of India's AI Summit Beyond Rhetoric: Evaluating the Effectiveness of International Sanctions on China’s Treatment of Uyghur Muslims The Emerging Maritime Rivalry in the Western Indian Ocean: India’s Response to Extra-Regional Powers India's Maritime Grand Strategy on Trial : The IRIS Dena Incident and the Indian Ocean Question
ADVERTISEMENT
Security December 6, 2021 5138 Reads

Chinese infrastructure development in Tibet: A Long term Strategy

M
By Mahima Ghildiyal
Author • Centre for Security & Strategic Studies
Chinese infrastructure development in Tibet: A Long term Strategy
Share Analysis:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS

China has been expanding its transportation networks to connect each and every corner of the country to mainland China. Achieving the vision of One China and a moderately prosperous society by 2020, Xi Jinping has been laying stress on inte...

ADVERTISEMENT

Giving modern economy and development as an option for these regions to forget their ethnic past and identity and become Communist Party approved Chinese. Which makes transport and telecommunication connectivity an essential job. According to Human Rights Watch report for China 2021, the government launched the promotion of “Nationality Unity Model Area”, these policies encourage economic migration from other parts of China and phasing out Tibetan-medium instruction in primary schools. Intensified surveillance and intimidation in neighbourhoods, workplaces, and homes has prevented public protest, a goal emphasized repeatedly by leading officials.[1]

Tibet has been on the agenda of Xi Jinping ever since he came to power in 2013. That year, he ordered officials to implement a new policy for Tibet, saying, “To govern the country well, we must first govern the borders well.” China has resolved its border issues with all other countries except India. India-China border conflict and the Belt and Road Initiative has brought urgency to the project. In July 2020 India and China clashed with each other in the Galwan valley incident, killing twenty Indian soldiers and three Chinese soldiers as reported by the media of respective countries. Also in 2018, both countries were at a standoff with each other at the Doklam plateau. This has put both the countries on alert of a possible conflict and has been working towards building their border infrastructure to increase the mobility of goods and soldiers.  

Belt and Road Initiative launched in 2013, has been expanding at a quick pace with almost 47 billion dollars of investment. The infrastructure and transportation project in Tibet is the outcome of a plan to open a corridor to connect China with the region of South Asia. The third plenary session of the 10th Tibet People’s Congress announced the launch of the “Himalayan Economic Rim project” although the precise route is not yet known. According to Chinese media reports, the “Himalayan Economic Rim refers to [land] ports in Tibet including Zham, Kyirong, and Purang economically supported by Shigatse and Lhasa.”[2] Additionally, China and Nepal, BRI partners, have planned a trans-Himalayan new era connectivity network running through China’s Tibet and other countries. This connectivity network is a strategic link between the two countries which will contribute to deeper bilateral relations as both of them are working toward expanding border ports, railway, road, aviation and telecommunication networks.

 In its 14 five year, plan China also announced to promote high-quality Belt and Road development. The development of inter-connectivity and building linkages with South-Asian nations to promote trade and exchange and assimilate the growth of the region makes it crucial for China to invest in the region. According to the Chinese 14 five-year old plan, the government is planning to spend about 30 billion dollars in the period from 2021 to 2025 for improving infrastructure in the Tibet region.[3]  

For which there have been three new airports that are in construction with the expansion of the Lhasa Gonggar Airport, the others being located in Lhunze County, Tingri County and Burang County respectively. Gonggar Airport is the largest in the region with a capacity of 9 million passenger trips by 2025.

In addition to that, China is also integrating the region with the mainland through the construction of highways and railways. On June 25, China’s most advanced Fuxing bullet train started operation running along the Qinghai-Tibet plateau for the first time. The railway’s annual freight transport capacity is 10 million tons and also provides strong support for the flow of goods.[4] Preparing itself for any kind of border hostilities that might develop due to the ongoing conflict with India. 

The construction of strategic highways is also underway. On May 20, 2021, it completed the construction of a significant highway along the Brahmaputra River, providing access to remote areas along the disputed border with Arunachal Pradesh in India. This highway that took seven years to complete passes through the Grand Canyon of the Yarlung Zangbo River (As the Brahmaputra is called in Tibet), the world’s deepest canyon. The highway will reduce the distance between Nyingchi city and Medog from 346 km to 180 km and will cut the travel time by eight hours.[5]

Not just that, according to Arunachal Times, it has also been building new civilian settlements along with the border areas in line with the recently announced plan to build ‘628 first and second line moderately well off villages along China’s border with India, Bhutan and Nepal. As investigated by Robert Barnett, China has also taken over certain pockets of Beyul, a village situated in the western borders of Bhutan. China aimed to obtain certain pockets of territory on Bhutan’s western borders that would give China a military advantage over India, and it had told Bhutan from as early as 1990 that it would renounce the claim to the Beyul if Bhutan would give China those western areas.[6] Bhutan which is under treaty obligations with India cannot accept such offers. India needs to react strongly against such kind of coercion. One can also view these build-ups as China strategy of ‘subduing the enemy without fighting’. India with China’s ever-growing military power might prefer a compromise rather than an all-out war. Up till now more than twenty rounds of negotiation comprising the third tier of diplomacy have occurred between the two countries without any scope of reaching an agreement. But for India losing the 1962 conflict to China might mean that it is ready for redemption. Also, as many Indian political analysts have pointed out India is better at high altitude military warfare. Advantages and disadvantages are there on both sides as is the military preparedness.

What are the major developments taking place in the region?

01 Border cities and towns

China will improve the functions of border towns and focus on supporting the border towns of Manzhouli, Kuandian, Hunchun, Suifenhe, Dongxing, Tengchong, Milin, Tayu, and Kokdala to increase their carrying capacity.

02 Border villages

China will improve infrastructure and public service facilities in border villages, build about 200 new villages, and achieve universal coverage of road access, electricity, communications,postal services, and radio and television in natural villages along borders.

03 Highways along and across borders

China will build highways along and across borders from Ji'an to Huanren, Hunchun to Quanhe,Lushui to Tengchong, Medog to the Yunnan-Tibet boundary via Chayu, Qinghe to Altay via Fuyun, Bulungkol to Khunjerab Pass, Barkol to Laoye Temple, and Erenhot to Saihan Tara.

04 Border airports

China will build airports in Tashkurgan, Longzi, Suifenhe, and other airports, relocate Yanji Airport, and build about 20 general border airports.

05 Border ports

China will construct ports at Lizi, Heihe, Tongjiang, and Heixiazi Island and transform and upgrade the ports at Jizha, Zhangmu, Mohan, Khorgas, Alashankou, Manzhouli, Erlianhot,Ruili, Youyiguan, Hongqilap, Ganqimaodu, Ceke, Turgat, and Irkeshtam.


Figure 1 Proposed developments along the border[7]

Conclusion

From establishing settlements on the Tibet border to increasing connectivity through the construction of highways, railways and airports, China is not keeping any stone unturned in securing its borders. China only military adversary in South-East Asia is India, with whom it still has lagging border territory issues. Although the peace and tranquillity agreement of 1993 ensured that relations can be run smoothly but China’s continuous transgression on the border area leading to the Galwan incident has thrown everything into the water. And relations are nowhere towards becoming better. Militaries are on high alert both sides of the border and relations are, as S. Jaishankar, India’s external affairs minister put it is going through a “rough patch”.


Notes

[1] Human Rights Watch (2021) China: Events of 2020, China. URL:https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/china-and-tibet

[2] Bhutia, Tshering C (2016), “Tibet and China’s ‘Belt and Road’”, The Diplomat, 30 August 2016. URL: https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/tibet-and-chinas-belt-and-road/

[3]Pao, Panging M (2021), “Chinese border infrastructure”, The Arunachal Times, 31 October 2021, Arunachal Pradesh. URL: https://arunachaltimes.in/index.php/2021/10/31/chinese-border-infrastructure/

[4] GT Staff Reporters (2021), “China’s infrastructure plan in Tibet to benefit regional economy beyond border”, 5 July 2021, Beijing. URL: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202107/1227853.shtml

[5] Krishnan, Ananth (2021), “China completes strategic Tibet highway near Arunachal border”, The Hindu, 21 May 2021, Chennai. URL: https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/china-completes-strategic-tibet-highway-near-arunachal-border/article34607474.ece

[6] Barnett, Robert (2021), “China Is Using Tibetans as Agents of Empire in the Himalayas”, Foreign Policy, 28 July 2021, Washington DC. URL: https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/28/china-tibet-bhutan-empire-borders-villages/

[7]Center for Security and Emerging Technology, “Outline of the People’s Republic of China 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives for 2035”, Georgetown University.  URL: https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/china-14th-five-year-plan/

 

Pic Courtesy-Evgeny Nelmin at unsplash.com

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)

Mahima Ghildiyal
About Mahima Ghildiyal →

Mahima has studied politics with specialization in international politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University. Research interests include security studies, Chinese history and politics and international political economy.

ADVERTISEMENT

Related Strategic Analysis