“The Commission is determined to defend the rule of law in all our member states as a fundamental principle on which our European Union is built[i].”- Jean-Claude Juncker, 12th president of the European Commission (2014 to 2019)

Introduction:

Jean-Claude Juncker’s statement elaborates on a salient part of the European Union’s identity: protector and promoter of democracy. EU’s institutional mechanism is directed towards functioning as the pillar of democratic order within the global order. (Daniel Halberstam, 2009 ) Therefore, it’s part of the EU mandate to subvert any possible elements which try to threaten the European ideals of good governance and democracy. But in the status quo, the EU has been tackling a persistent objector within its territory, which comes from Viktor Orban’s rule in Hungary. 

It is imperative to note that any attack upon EU’s core fundamental values[2], it translates into an attack on the whole of the EU. EU’s democratic identity is important for its international relevance. Hungary, being a part of the EU since 2004, has taken up the responsibility of challenging the core values of the EU in recent times. This has been visible in turn with Orban’s strict stance on migrants, a questionable legislature which is trying to curtail the independence of judiciary and media in Budapest and enacting policies which reflect his anti-LGBTQIA+ sentiments.

But Hungary is not the only illiberal actor within the European Union. Similar activities have been on the rise from Poland and Italy, and with Robert Fico’s re-election in Slovakia[3], Hungary is certainly not the only actor which has been or will be illiberal within the EU. This leads to the question of why Hungary should be focused on understanding illiberalism with the EU. How beneficial is it to critically analyse Hungary’s activities with the EU? Should the EU change its approach towards Hungary and if yes, what should be adopted measures to curtail the illiberal state agenda within the EU?

The purpose of this article is to critically understand the rising tensions between the EU and Hungary. Special emphasis will be given to Hungary’s actions in juxtaposition to EU policies. This article will argue that the EU needs a special approach when it comes to Viktor Orban’s activities to protect the core fundamental values of the European Union.

Viktor Orban’s Illiberal State:

Viktor Orban, leading his right-wing Fidesz party, has been in power since 2010, and this tenure saw an increasing number of antics which indicates an increasing anti-EU narrative. The moment he rose to power, Orban adopted an agenda in contravention of the EU. Emphasising the importance of conservative views on family, highlighting the precedence of national sovereignty in global politics and national Hungarian culture and a self-proclaimed narrative of “protector of Christian Europe” (Walker, 2019) within the EU, Orban’s tactics have been combined with populist rhetoric with rising reactionary politics[4].

The implementation of Viktor Orban’s illiberal state agenda has been described by critics as having transformed Hungary into a ‘grey zone between democracy and dictatorship’ and a ‘mafia state’ (Zsiros, 2022), leading to tensions between Brussels and Budapest.

Orban’s anti-EU narrative stance functions in two parts. Firstly, his national policies. Since his tenure started, Orban has been enacting legislature which included regulation of media, controlling of opposition’s media outlets, interference in the judiciary and electoral reform, undoing of checks and balances on the executive and unfair legislation against non-governmental organisations, which has received increasing international criticism. One prominent problematic legislation that Orban has brought is known as the “revenge law[5]”. The law functions to punish any teachers who act against Orban’s regime. (Simon, 2023) The idea is based on the oppression of the society and to extend his control over the education. The primary reason for this clam down was to curtail elements of social protests against Orban and his governance. The revenge law functions as Orban’s primary tool to threaten the basic precedence of the democratic rule of law.

After he secured his position, Orban’s narrative was much clearer, the idea of a “Hungary first” within the union. In 2012, Orban’s illiberalism caught the eye of the European Commission, when he forcefully changed the state personnel under his leadership. (Hockenos, 2022) These moves were certainly not under the rule of law, but from the government’s perspective, they appeared justified because the positions in question had previously been occupied by socialist party supporters. For Orban, it has been imperative that any move against the EU norms should have a justification which is based on national importance. The success of Orban’s illiberalism has been reliant on this tactic whereby he continued to gain popular support. As long as Orban continued to retain national support, he was able to further his anti-EU agenda.

In 2015, Hungary, along with the rest of Visegrad 4 (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia), fundamentally started arguing against the migrant policy adopted by the European Union. Orban’s claim was based on the fact that the individual sovereign states should ultimately decide who resides within its borders (Scott, 2021), thereby in clear defiance of the EU’s supranational functioning. Certainly, migrants continue to be a major part of Orban’s policy contention against the Europeans. Furthermore, Orban has been forcing the NGOs to disclose their foreign funding[vi], which proved to be another step towards curtailing the independence of institutions within Orban’s regime. Any institution which has the capability of criticising the government or functioning independently has been restricted under Orban’s gaze.

The second perspective can be analysed by his changing foreign policy and extensive interest towards the other external actors, especially in the East, by introducing his revamped foreign policy ‘Global Opening’ (Kugiel, 2020). The goal was to diversify the foreign interest in Hungary, by engaging with more external actors, primarily the East, and change the perception of Hungary being EU-centric. Within this policy, ‘Eastern Opening’ aimed at strengthening relations with countries East of Hungary, especially with actors like Russia and China (Kugiel, 2020), giving more reason for the West and EU to be worried when it comes to Hungary.

Orban has been developing a closer relationship with Russia, given the fact that Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy firm[vii] has been awarded multiple contracts to build energy reactors in Hungary. Orban also implemented reforms which focused on independent Hungarian security and strategic cooperation with Russia (Kugiel, 2020), signalling a departure from the EU’s common defence foreign policy. Along with these developments, Hungary has focused itself on increased funding relations with Russia, particularly increased borrowing of loans from Russia, and promoting Hungarian exports to emerging and developing economies. ‘Global Opening’ has allowed Hungary to create alternative options for its sovereign land on the militaristic and economic front. Along with Russia, relations with China have been constructive for Budapest. Beijing is now Budapest’s largest trading partner outside of the EU and its number-one investor for the year 2022 (Gilchrist, 2023), making China a significant partner for Hungary’s independent economic development.

Even though nations can formulate independent foreign policies, the majority effect of this partnership has been visible during the Ukraine-Russia war. Viktor Orban has displayed open support for Putin’s war on Ukraine, stating that Ukraine doesn’t stand a real chance against Putin’s army. This relation has been visible in terms of Hungary’s opposition to the EU’s funding aid to Ukraine, demanding transparency from Zelensky on the distribution of funds.

It’s interesting to see how Viktor Orban is trying to hold the EU hostage when it comes to vetoing funding programmes for Ukraine. Similar illiberal tendencies can be seen from the Polish government but Poland continues to support Ukraine during this war in multiple ways. It’s only Viktor Orban (within the EU) who continues to be illiberal when it comes to the EU’s support of Ukraine. Orban has successfully transformed the issue of war into a point of leverage against the EU Commission. These pose considerable problems especially when similar sentiments are also stemming from Italy and Slovakia. Even when it comes to Serbia, which is not an EU state, also harbours pro-Russian sentiments. Therefore, Hungary’s support for Vladimir Putin becomes more problematic for the EU as there exists the possibility of a collective emerging out of the EU, proclaiming anti- EU agenda under the banner of supporting Russia. But what has been the EU’s reaction to this situation and whether these elements are grounds for a special approach from the EU towards Hungary?

Effect of Orban’s Illiberalism on EU:

Hungary and the EU have been entangled in a diplomatic row since Orban’s official accession to the government but the complications between the two sides have been visible since the Ukraine- Russia war. Not only there has been contentions over policy agreements but the issue of the Ukraine-Russia war has provided for Hungary to engage in diplomatic confrontation with the EU institutions. As stated earlier, illiberalism is a major cause for concern for the EU. The democratic rule of law forms the foundation of the EU’s institutional mechanism. To compel Hungary to follow the EU’s norms of democracy and the rule of law, the EU has used various means to make Hungary comply with its measures.

One of the means has been to launch legal action against Orban by referring his violations to the European Court of Justice, which was done when Hungary was propagating anti-LGBTQIA+ laws in the country[viii]. Along with that, Orban’s government refused to renew the license of the Klubradio broadcasting channel[ix] which was responsible for showing news coverage, critical of the government. Even though Hungary has been referred to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for violations based on cultural rights and freedom of speech and expression, Hungary continues to work in defiance of EU laws and norms. (Kim Lane Scheppele, 2020) Not only being limited to disobeying the norms, Budapest has been making further criticisms of ECJ’s decisions, stating that the EU is using its institutions as instruments to forcefully implement its identity upon other sovereign nations and follow the essence of the original treaties. (Isabel Muttreja, 2023) This becomes especially problematic as the EU tends to mandate other countries to uphold the idea of democratic ruling, which should function under a particular EU framework. Viktor Orban is working to carve out his place within the global politics. For him, this interplay of reactionary politics benefits him in terms of retaining the popular vote and attaining power when it comes to policy decisions and voting within the EU[x]. If Orban’s work is limited to being pro-Russia or anti-EU, then it presents an oversimplified and false point of analysis as to why Orban has been causing trouble within the EU. Orban’s actions supersede the notions of migration policy or democratic rule. Implications of Orban’s democratic backsliding within the EU allow his government and Hungarian identity to carve out bigger foreign policy dynamics by creating new bilateral relations.

This is visible, especially concerning the Ukraine-Russia War. Orban has been trying to balance between the two alliances his country is part of the EU and NATO (Dempsey, 2023), acting similarly to how Serbian President Vucic navigated and balanced between different national interests and alliances. But Orban's strong stance for being anti-EU comes from his propaganda involved with national interests against Ukraine. He has brought up the issue of protection of ethnic minorities, around 150,000 Hungarian speakers living in Western Ukraine, which Orban suggests are being threatened when Kyiv passed a law in 2017 which was curbing minority languages. (Court, 2023) By making this an identity and ethnic issue, Orban continues to have national support. Furthermore, Hungary puts all the blame upon the EU for prolonging an ‘isolated war’ and transporting the issue on a global level. (Spike, 2023)

One of the biggest actions that the EU has taken against Hungary’s antics has been the freezing of funds, on the grounds of rule of law concern[xi]. Post the sanctioning of funds, Orban has refused to vote for further financial assistance to Ukraine from the EU’s new budgetary allocations. But this can be reverted as the EU plans to release some of the funds to Hungary by the end of November if Orban is ready to vote in favour of sending further financial assistance to Ukraine. But what is the likelihood of this strategy to succeed? EU diplomats believe that Hungary requires its cohesion funds[xii] to strengthen its economy and to tackle the increased cost of living crisis due to the Ukraine-Russia war. But this is not exclusively based on the promise of not vetoing. Since June 2023, Orban’s government has introduced laws to increase the judiciary’s independence within the country. (Riegert, 2023) But the condition of releasing the funds is also based on a formal assessment by the EU Commission on the state of democratic rule of order in Hungary. If the commission finds acceptable grounds for improvement of democratic norms in the country, then the said funds will be released for Hungary. Therefore, there exist multiple layers of complexity when it comes to the issue of funding between Hungary and the EU.

The situation is further complicated as Hungary is set to take the rotating presidency of the Council of EU 2024, which will be followed by Poland. (Zsiros j. L., 2023) The presidency will put the character of the EU in question if an actor like Hungary heads one of its institutions. Questions will be raised if the EU is to be represented by a country which continues to restrict freedom of speech and expression within its territory. Is there a possibility of suspending Hungary’s presidency for the sake of the EU’s image as the pillar of democracy and rule of order? By either a qualified majority or by amendments to alter the agenda of the next presidency, Hungary’s representation can be controlled by the EU. This presents quite a conundrum for the EU as the government is currently subject to Article 7 procedure (Alemanno, 2023), which has been started precisely on the fact of violating EU’s fundamental values and has been trying to hold the EU hostage with its position of Ukraine- Russia war, this presidency will be extremely important for EU’s reputation on a global level.

EU’s response to Hungary has been a textbook response as per the EU mandate. The instances of illiberalism were countered by invoking relevant articles and referring the cases to the ECJ. But it sets to be that Viktor Orban’s policies are directed per se towards the dismantling of the EU institution. The disruption caused by Orban can be considered as a by-product of his populist and reactionary politics, to carve out a separate identity for Hungarian politics and sovereignty. Therefore, here arises the need to look towards the situation from a different lens. Hungary’s actions cannot be solved via institutional means per se. Even though the EU functions and maintains itself as a supranational institution, the solution to Hungary’s increasing antics involves the usage of bilateral relations and agreements. Influencing EU states e.g., Germany, and France, need to step into this issue and create constructive relations on a bilateral basis. Because Orban’s effect is not a response to any international phenomenon e.g., the Ukraine-Russia War. Viktor Orban has been persistent with his agenda since his leadership of Hungary. But it’s imperative to recognise that Orban operates in a state where he can only pressurize not over-exert the situation. His actions somewhat fall between being an anti-EU or pro-EU. Neither Hungary is in a position, political or economic, to initiate any public referendum to get out of the EU. Hungary relies on EU funds for its economic strength. Despite the fact Orban might have made certain progress when it comes to creating economic relations with the likes Russia, China but still Hungary is reliant on a lot of EU funds which makes it lucrative for other countries. Therefore, the EU needs to consider a different way/approach to reaching Hungary and resolving the majority of issues with Viktor Orban. Because both parties cannot sustain this diplomatic confrontation for a prolonged period.

Conclusion:

In 2016, Brexit fundamentally shocked the foundations of the EU. The institution, which was earlier believed to be one of the strongest, close-knit supranational institutions in the world, had one of its biggest economies and political units separated from its union. And the effect of Brexit is still visible to the EU when it comes to an unstable economy and rising anti-EU narratives amongst many countries. The meta effect of these sentiments is the threat of increasing democratic backsliding in the union. EU’s reputation is now increasingly being questioned and with conflicts raging around Europe, the EU needs to understand that any sentiment is as big as the threat of a country leaving the union and repeating the effects of Brexit. For the EU, this issue can have prolonged consequences for the identity of the EU on a global level and whether the fact that institutions continue to influence its member states.

Hungary is in a crucial position within the EU. It has an upcoming presidency; it has its funds on the table when it comes to discussion of the Ukraine-Russia war, and it has a responsibility to uphold the democratic rule of law within the EU. Viktor Orban needs to realize that it may have been able to influence EU politics and institutions till now, but it cannot sustain anti-EU sentiments for a prolonged period as Hungary relies on the EU’s finances. But it’s not only limited to the financial aspect between the two parties, there also exists a possibility that this diplomatic confrontation between the two parties will be detrimental to the whole of the EU. Since the breakdown of the Soviet Union, Hungary has maintained a close reputation with the West and is not only limited to the EU, but Hungary’s actions also have the potential to trigger reactions from the likes of NATO or the USA. It’s clear that Viktor Orban is trying to create a separate identity for Hungary, but it should not be done at the cost of long-term relations with the West. Even if Orban can create further ties with Russia or China, Hungary’s benefits come from its ideological inclinations toward the EU and West. Hungary’s reconstruction since the end of the Cold War has been because of its association with the EU and Orban won’t be able to handle the long-term repercussions of its exit from the EU. And is important for the EU and its member states, to enact a different bilateral approach towards Hungary as prolonged use of only institutional mechanisms can lead to further increased hostility from Orban’s government, thereby prolonging the complications between Brussels and Budapest.

Bibliography

1. Alemanno, A. (2023). Suspending Hungary’s EU presidency isn’t a sanction — it’s a precaution. POLITICO, Link- https://www.politico.eu/article/suspend-hungary-eu-presidency-sanction-precaution/.
2. Court, E. (2023). Orban: Hungary to only support Ukraine if it restores minority laws. The Kyiv Independent, Link- https://kyivindependent.com/orban-claims-hungary-will-support-ukraine-only-if-minority-rights-are-restored/.
3. Daniel Halberstam, E. S. (2009 ). The United Nations, the European Union, and the King of Sweden: Economic sanctions and individual rights in a plural world order . Common Market Law Review, Vol. 46(1), 13-72.
4. Dempsey, J. (2023). Judy Asks: Is Hungary a Reliable EU and NATO Member? Carnegie Europe, Link- https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/89416.
5. Gilchrist, K. (2023). China decoupling would be an act of ‘suicide’ for Europe, Hungary’s foreign minister says. CNBC News (Link- https://www.cnbc.com/2023/06/27/china-decoupling-would-be-suicide-for-europe-hungarys-pter-szijjrt.html).
6. Hockenos, P. (2022). The Secrets to Viktor Orban’s Success. Foreign Policy (Link- https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/01/viktor-orbans-hungary-populism-election-nationalism/).
7. Isabel Muttreja, S. A. (2023). The EU must face up to its rule of law crisis. Chatam House, (Link- https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/05/eu-must-face-its-rule-law-crisis).
8. Kim Lane Scheppele, D. V.-M. (2020). EU Values Are Law, after All: Enforcing EU Values through Systemic Infringement Actions by the European Commission and the Member States of the European Union . Yearbook of European Law, Vol. 39, 3-121.
9. Kugiel, B. S.-I. (2020). The Challenge from within: EU development cooperation and the rise of illiberalism in Hungary and Poland. Journal of Contemporary European Research. Vol. 16 (2), 120-138.
10. Riegert, B. (2023). Rule of law: EU reprimands Poland and Hungary . DW News, Link- https://www.dw.com/en/rule-of-law-eu-reprimands-poland-and-hungary/a-66165982.
11. Scott, J. W. (2021). Post- Millennial Visegrad Four Geopolitics: Illiberalism and Positionality within the EU. . The Central European Journal of Regional Development and Tourism, Vol. 13 (2), 13-33.
12. Simon, Z. (2023). Hungary Braces for Teacher Exodus After ‘Vengeance’ Law Approved . Bloomberg Opinion. (Link- https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-04/hungary-braces-for-teacher-exodus-after-vengeance-law-approved?leadSource=uverify%20wall).
13. Spike, J. (2023). Hungary's Orban accuses EU of prolonging war in Ukraine. The Independent, Link- https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/viktor-orban-ap-hungary-russia-europe-b2285056.html.
14. Toomey, M. (2018). History, Nationalism and Democracy: Myth and Narrative in Viktor Orbán's 'Illiberal Hungary'. New Perspective, Vol. 26 (1), 87-108.
15. Walker, S. (2019). Orbán deploys Christianity with a twist to tighten grip in Hungary. The Guardian. Link- https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/14/viktor-orban-budapest-hungary-christianity-with-a-twist.
16. Zsiros, J. L. (2022). Hungary is no longer a full democracy but an 'electoral autocracy,' MEPs declare in new report . Euronews. (Link- https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/09/15/hungary-is-no-longer-a-full-democracy-but-an-electoral-autocracy-meps-declare-in-new-repor).
17. Zsiros, j. L. (2023). Hungary might not 'credibly fulfil' tasks of EU Council presidency, MEPs say in critical resolution . Euronews, LInk- https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/06/01/hungary-might-not-credibly-fulfil-tasks-of-eu-council-presidency-meps-say-in-critical-reso.

Notes

[i] Laurent Pech and Kim Lane Scheppele. Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU (Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, Vol. 19. 2017).

[2] EU’s fundamental values are mentioned within the aims of EU, which are laid out within the article 3 of the Lisbon Treaty. Values include human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law and human rights. For further values, refer to Article 3 of the Lisbon Treaty. (Link- https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12016ME/TXT&from=EN#d1e79-47-1)

[3] Jon Henley. Robert Fico doubles down on pro-Russia stance after Slovakia election win. (The Guardian, Link-  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/01/robert-fico-doubles-down-on-pro-russia-stance-after-slovakia-election-win , 2023).

[4] For further clarification between the concepts of reactionary politics and populism, refer to  Aram Ziai (2004) The ambivalence of post?development: between reactionary populism and radical democracy, Third World Quarterly, 25:6, 1045-1060, DOI: 10.1080/0143659042000256887.

[5] Orban’s revenge law is also referred as “Vengeance Law”, Zoltan Simon. More than 1,000 Hungarian Teachers Quit on Orban “Vengeance Law” (Bloomberg Screentime, Link- https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-05/more-than-1-000-hungarian-teachers-quit-on-orban-vengeance-law?leadSource=uverify%20wall , 2023).  

[vi] BBC News. Hungary 'broke EU law with foreign funding rules' (BBC News- Hungary 'broke EU law with foreign funding rules' - BBC News, 2020).

[vii] Rosatom, the Russian state-owned nuclear energy company, operates in Hungary and its engineering division Atomstroyexport JSC, has been working on development on multiple energy units. (Gokhan Ergocun. Russian nuclear energy firm begins work on main phase of Paks-II nuclear plant in Hungary {AA.com, Link- https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/russian-nuclear-energy-firm-begins-work-on-main-phase-of-paks-ii-nuclear-plant-in-hungary/2973547 , 2023).  

[viii] Paola Tamma. Germany, France join EU lawsuit against Hungary’s anti-LGBTQI+ law (POLITICO EU, Link- Germany, France join EU lawsuit against Hungary’s anti-LGBTQI+ law – POLITICO , 2023)

[ix] FRANCE24. Hungary's leading independent radio station loses broadcast licence (FRANCE24, Link- Hungary's leading independent radio station loses broadcast licence (france24.com), 2021)

[x] For further reading, Michael Toomey. History, Nationalism and Democracy: Myth and Narrative in Viktor Orbán's 'Illiberal Hungary' (New Perspectives, Vol. 26 (1), pp. 87-108,2018).

[xi] Alice Tidey. Brussels recommends freezing €7.5 billion in EU funds to Hungary over rule of law concerns (EURONEWS, Link- Brussels recommends freezing €7.5 billion in EU funds to Hungary over rule of law concerns | Euronews, 2022)

[xii] The Cohesion Fund provides support to EU Member States with a gross national income per capita below 90% (EU-27 average) to strengthen the economic, social and territorial cohesion of the EU. It supports investments through dedicated national or regional programmes. (Link- Cohesion Fund (CF)

(europa.eu) )

Pic Courtsey-Jacek Dylag at unsplash.com

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)