Growing Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia

Decades of communist atheism has restricted all formal and public role of religion; sharia law was banned, thousands of mosques were destroyed, religious practices were criminalized. However, despite the attempts of Soviet’s anti-religious practices, Islam never left this region. There were hundreds of underground mosques and religious schools that influenced the traditional Hanafi Islamic education in Central Asia. These underground study groups were attended by a lot of scholars who then influenced the religious thinking there. After a while, the Soviet authorities acknowledged their futile efforts of limiting religious expression, and understood the significance of religious freedom for their survival. Thus, to institutionalize Islamic practices they created SADUM (Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan) in 1943. With this, the Islamic thoughts and practices began to flourish publicly in Central Asia and broadened its scope to influence people from far off places. Furthermore, the foreign policies of Gorbachev provided new possibilities for the religious beliefs and institutions.

Along with the moderate Islamic beliefs and practices, there was a gradual emergence of Salafi Wahabi thought. Wahhabism has been described as ‘orthodox’, or as Islamic extremism which seeks to ‘purify’ Islam by advocating early Islamic values. The focus of such Islamic radicalization and ‘fundamentalism’ was found in specific localities within the region. The densely populated and ethnically rich area of Ferghana Valley became the epicenter of Islamic radicalism. This interaction of radical and violent Islamic views with Hanafi values and tribal practices led to the development of unique characteristics of Islam in Central Asia. Such characteristics show a different picture of Islam than that which is seen in West Asia.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Central Asian countries began to experience a resurgence of Islam in the public domain. Construction of new mosques, establishment of religious institutes, restoration of Hajj pilgrimage and most importantly, the beginning of religious learning and practices. Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran financed this religious development and influenced the local Islamic practices and beliefs. Due to this, the Central Asian countries were opened up to a greater Muslim world, experiencing a revival of the Islamic values. Now, with foreign imams coming to preach the conservative Wahhabi philosophy more seriously, it has made a rapid and intense inroad in Central Asia.

Several radical Islamist movements and organisations existed in Central Asia since the Tsarist era. The most prominent radical Islamist movement occurred in 1980s with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Growing interaction between the Central Asia’s Muslims and the Mujahideen fighters intensified the wave of radicalism in the region. Emergence of Islamic movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in 1992 further spread the radical message through madrassas and mosques. This movement was inspired by Wahhabism and Deobandism and was mostly operated in the Namangan region of Uzbekistan. Tahir Yuldashev, founder of IMU had once said in the only interview he has ever given that “The goal of IMU activities is the creation of an Islamic State. We declared a jihad in order to create a religious system and government. We want the model of Islam which is nothing like in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan or Saudi Arabia.” It has a close relationship with Al Qaeda and Taliban and carried out its first major violent suppression in 1999 in Tashkent. Since then, it is active in various terrorist operations in Central Asia and even abroad. It seeks to establish an Islamic state of Uzbekistan and impose the Sharia law. Various scholars have tried to club all the Islamic movements of these regions in one chain, however the nature and characteristics of it are not uniform and there is a need to look at the specificities of each, as the indigenous nomadic population of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan accepted radical Islam more slowly and differently, and the sedentary people of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan converted more readily.

Despite the fact that the rise of Islamic radicalism in Central Asia is related to external influences, it has been bolstered by domestic events in the region. The repressive form of government, poverty, rampant corruption, unemployment, interethnic crisis and most importantly the politicization of religion has deteriorated socio-economic conditions, which have triggered a regrouping of forces for Islamist resurgence in Central Asia. Thus, the autocratic policies of government along with the fundamentalist thinking is considered conducive for the intensification of extremist activities. It must be noted that the socio economic crisis is not a sufficient and necessary condition for the spread of radical thought. Radical Islamic groups have emerged within the well-educated class as well. For example, the suicide killings in Central Asia were conducted by educated ladies who belonged to upper class and affluent families. The political figures of Central Asia utilized Islam as both an oppositional force and to legitimize their political regimes. As the very first President of independent Uzbekistan, Karimov was seen as holding Quran in one hand and constitution in the other on his first day of inauguration. Later, in mid 1990s, Uzbekistan resorted to harsh repressive policies by curtailing religious freedom. And by the turn of 21^st century almost all other states restricted religious and political freedoms by tightening controls over spiritual places and practices. The reason for such transformation is complex and various factors were discussed extensively by scholars ranging from the concept of securitization, struggle against ‘early political Islam’ to the legitimization of regime.

To say that the central Asian regime would be a hub of radicalism and extremism is still doubtful. Though the jihadis and radical group have made inroads, they are still less in number. A large number of Central Asian Muslims perceive themselves as the ‘indigenous and traditional Muslims’, with strong ties to their local practices and beliefs rather than adopting an extremist position. The state has also managed to keep the marginal clandestine groups at bay by foreign as well as regional assistance. How long these actors can keep up the pressure, is the real question.

Pic Courtesy-Davlat Nur at unsplash.com

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views of the CESCUBE.)