Hybrid Warfare Across Europe: Russian Sabotage, Disinformation and Espionage
Ever since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, European states have faced a growing wave of hybrid threats. These threats are not always visible or dramatic, but they are persistent and deeply disruptive. In this article, the author examines how Russia has used sabotage, cyberattacks, espionage, and influence operations across Europe since 2022. I argue that Russia’s hybrid warfare is designed to exhaust rather than shock. It targets the weak points between national and EU-level responses and fosters a constant sense of insecurity, yet all of this unfolds without ever crossing the line into full-scale conflict.
Understanding Hybrid Warfare as Strategy
To understand how this war is being waged, it is necessary to first move beyond traditional definitions of warfare. The tactics used by Russia since 2022 are not part of a conventional military campaign, but something far more elusive. They operate in the spaces between war and peace, where hostile actions are difficult to attribute, let alone respond to. Scholars have described this approach as hybrid or non-linear warfare. Frank Hoffman defines hybrid threats as the fusion of conventional and unconventional tools across domains, tailored to exploit the vulnerabilities of liberal states.¹ However, Russia’s model goes beyond this. Unlike conventional conflict, where escalation follows identifiable phases, Russia’s hybrid operations collapse those distinctions, creating a fog of war without formal hostilities. As practiced by the Kremlin, hybrid warfare is not a prelude to open conflict but a continuous and diffuse state of aggression.
The scope of operations taking place throughout Europe demonstrate this change. The Center for Strategic and International Studies reports that between 2023 and 2024, the number of hybrid attacks that are ascribed to Russia increased threefold. Around 27 percent of these targeted transportation systems, another 27 percent focused on governmental institutions, while others were aimed at energy infrastructure and private industries involved in supporting Ukraine.² These attacks include coordinated disinformation campaigns during European elections, bomb threats in Czech schools, suspected sabotage of underwater cables, and arson at Warsaw shopping malls. These incidents might not seem connected at first. When combined, however, they indicate a calculated tactic: a type of attrition that breaks up rather than intensifies. Even though each incident might not seem serious enough to justify a strong response, taken together, they strain national institutions and make it difficult to draw clear lines between international responsibility.
This cumulative pressure is no accident. It is shaped by a clear cost-benefit logic. For the Kremlin, hybrid operations are low-cost, difficult to attribute, and rarely trigger formal retaliation or NATO’s Article 5. In contrast, open military escalation would invite significant Western military responses and further sanctions. Instead, hybrid acts allow Russia to destabilize adversaries at a low risk, using their own bureaucratic and procedural caution against them. In this way, hybrid warfare becomes a space of asymmetric advantage, where ambiguity operates as both a weapon and a shield.
This ambiguity is not merely tactical. It is deeply rooted in Russian strategic thinking. Russian doctrine deliberately blurs the lines between peace and war, internal and external threats, and truth and falsehood.³ This manipulation of boundaries not only confuses attribution, but also weaponizes the legal and evidentiary standards of democratic regimes. In liberal democracies, where accusations must be backed by proof and proportional responses are the norm, Russia’s deniable actions thrive. As the RAND Corporation has emphasized, these subversive tactics are designed to stall timely responses by exploiting the very norms that underpin Western governance.
The structure of the Russian state and its intelligence services further enhances the effectiveness of this type of warfare. Layers of proxies, including criminal syndicates, private networks, and local actors with dubious connections to Moscow, are used by organizations such as the GRU.? Since arson, sabotage, and cyberattacks are frequently carried out by people or organizations that are somewhat distant from the Kremlin, direct accountability is practically impossible. This decentralization is a strategic asset rather than a flaw. The Kremlin increases unpredictability and decreases liability by distributing operational control. As a result, hybrid warfare is more like a vast ecosystem that thrives on complexity and opacity than a strictly regulated military strategy.
Strategic Use of Division & European Vulnerabilities
The inequity of Europe's institutional response to these operations makes them even more difficult to oppose. NATO's Cyber Defence Pledge and the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell both indicate increased coordination, but their reach and power are still constrained.? There are still significant differences in national capabilities. While nations like Germany and Spain are more restricted by political and legal constraints, Estonia, for instance, has created advanced digital defenses and monitoring systems. Collective action is still elusive in the absence of a common doctrine or standardized attribution thresholds. As a result, reactions are frequently reactive, dispersed, and too sluggish to keep up with Russian operations.
Russia benefits greatly from this fragmentation. Inefficiency is not the only issue. Russia actively takes advantage of this weakness. The Kremlin makes sure that responses stay domestic and isolated by choosing targets that are just below the radar of pan-European urgency. Even when they have regional ramifications, cases like disinformation campaigns in Slovakia or infrastructure sabotage in the Netherlands have mostly been handled within domestic frameworks. Thus, one of Russia's most effective targets is the European governance structure, which is split between sovereign states and supranational organizations.
Beyond institutions, hybrid warfare leaves a psychological mark. Its effects extend into the daily lives of European citizens, cultivating what might be described as a permanent state of ambient threat. Unlike traditional wars, which escalate and resolve, hybrid warfare lingers. The threat is constant but elusive, visible in bomb threats at schools, waves of online misinformation, or whispered doubts about government legitimacy. This persistent anxiety erodes public confidence and contributes to an atmosphere of exhaustion and mistrust.
Russia’s information operations lie at the core of its psychological strategy. These are not just campaigns to spread falsehoods. They are carefully designed efforts to shape how people think, feel, and behave.? Russian military theorists view information not as a neutral channel, but as a battleground in itself. In this framework, even half-truths, selective framing, or emotional triggers can be powerful tools. These narratives are often harder to detect and more effective at planting doubt than outright lies. By tapping into people’s fears or frustrations, this strategy does not just mislead; it slowly wears down social trust and divides communities from within.
The political effects of this are visible across Europe. In countries like France, Italy, and Germany, Russian talking points have found support on both the far-left and the far-right. In Central and Eastern Europe, Kremlin-aligned narratives echo through anti-EU and anti-NATO discourse. These campaigns rarely invent new tensions. Instead, they take existing divides—over immigration, national identity, or Western double standards—and stretch them wider. The aim is not to win hearts and minds. It is to make compromise harder, keep societies distracted, and weaken the shared ground on which democracy depends.
Conclusion
When taken together, these trends demonstrate that Russian hybrid warfare is a long-term philosophy rather than merely a collection of strategies. It substitutes slow erosion for shock and exhaustion for direct confrontation. Confusion, amplification of internal flaws, and making sure that European democracies are constantly playing catch-up are the keys to its success. To counter this, Europe cannot simply rely on defensive tactics, ad hoc coordination, or legal procedures. In order to recognize hybrid aggression as a long-term threat rather than a temporary disruption, it must adopt a more coordinated and proactive approach. The European Union can then begin to close the political and strategic gap that Russia continues to exploit.
Endnotes:
- Tad A. Schnaufer II, “Redefining Hybrid Warfare,” in Redefining Hybrid Warfare, NATO Defense College Research Paper No. 158 (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2019), 18.
- Seth G. Jones, “Russia’s Shadow War Against Europe,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2025, 1.
- Andrew Radin, Understanding Russian Subversion, RAND Corporation, 2020, 2–4.
- Jones, “Russia’s Shadow War,” 3.
- Andrei Kovalkov, “Hybrid Warfare in Contemporary Europe,” in Hybrid Warfare: Evolution and Policy Responses, ed. Michael D. Carpenter, NATO Studies Forum, 2025, 56–57.
- Timothy L. Thomas, “Information Weapons in the Russian Federation,” The Cyber Defense Review (2020): 126–127.
Pic Courtesy- Photo by Canva
(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views of CESCUBE.)
