Shifting Triangle in South Asia: Assessing the Potential of China-Pakistan-Bangladesh Cooperation

Introduction

a)   Background and Aim

South Asia contributes about 26.05% of the global population, which is highly asymmetrically distributed among nine nation states that take up only 4.61% of the world’s total landmass.^[i] In the ever-evolving global order, this demographically dense sub-continent has proven to be insulated from experiencing disruption in its regional status quo. Exceptions include some positive movements toward peaceful change in post–Cold War South Asia that could be observed in comparison with the Cold War era. During the Cold War, India’s material preponderance in the region and its neighbours’ response were exacerbated by identity-driven conflict and problems of state survival.^[ii] The mentioned insulation has materialised from conflicts and competition in the form pronlonged antagonised (and recently nuclearised) relations between India and Pakistan;   territorial disputes between India and Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh; and conflicts emerging from the complex interplay of identities, both cultural and political, arising from internal secessionisms, insurgencies, and religious/ethnic disputes primarily affecting parts of Pakistan and Bangladesh. Yet, no other region is as dominated by a single country as South Asia is by India.^[iii] This essay will explore how this hegemonic shadow can more recently give birth to a new cooperative triangle between China-Pakistan-Bangladesh. A triangle with corners reinforced by strategic hedging, economic aspirations, and a sense of belligerence, especially due to the recent regime change in Bangladesh. How do these cooperative measures hinder India’s vision of South Asian development, and how could New Delhi potentially tackle the same?

b)  Trilaterlism

States engage in a trilateral relationship when they all seek to protect at least one of three shared interests: national security, economic prosperity, and values and norms. Trilateral cooperation allows members to construct comprehensive plans for military contingencies. Activities like military exercises and intelligence gathering may be difficult or costly for any one nation to undertake on its own or with only one partner; coordination between three partners generates strength in numbers, resources, and geographic scope, ultimately enhancing long-term cost-effectiveness and preparedness. Further, trilateralism inherently requires internal collaboration and engagement among all three countries. If two members struggle with bilateral tensions, the trilateral arrangement allows the countries to work together. Trilateral members can also benefit economically and promote common values and norms through nontraditional security measures.^[iv] Applying these parameters of a functional trilateral partnership to the current geopolitical landscape of South Asia, the China-Pakistan-Bangladesh triangle could be a first of its kind quintessence for the same.

c)   Significance of China-Pakistan-Bangladesh in South Asia

Evident from the aforementioned potential of any trilateral relationship, South Asia could witness a paradigm shift in the regional power dynamics in the event of this cooperation succeeding, which could escalate the existing friction between India and the Sino-Pak partnership with the addition of Bangladesh. Concerns regarding territorial security, economic cooperation and overall stability of the region could further force India to either seek external involvement or take proactive measures to maintain the status quo, a tendency inherent when faced with the security dilemma, natural to a realist world view.

Historic and Strategic Background

To understand the pillars of this trilateral cooperation, it is imperative to draw its causality from the historical bilateral relations between the involved states and what those events have translated into contemporarily.

a)   Sino-Pak ties:

(i) The relation between China and Pakistan has acted as a very potent counterbalance to Indian hegemony in South Asia despite China's exclusion from the title of a South Asian state. Their partnership is often described as an “all-weather friendship” and “Iron Brothers,” courtesy of their deep-rooted mutual trust and strategic alignment. The genesis of this bond dates back to the signing of the 1963 border agreement.

(ii) With time this partnership has expanded beyond political and diplomatic ties to encompass a more comprehensive military-industrial complex as China rose to be Pakistan’s most reliable supplier of defense equipment and a key collaborator in joint research, development, and production of advanced weaponry such as the JF-17 jet fighters and the MBT-2000 Al-Khalid tanks.^[v] This military-industrial cooperation has been further reinforced by high-level exchanges, technology transfer agreements, and significant infrastructure projects under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)^[vi], like the Karakoram Highway.

b)  China-Bangladesh ties:

Since 1971, China's position towards Bangladesh has evolved from hostility to one of cautious acceptance, and finally to an acknowledged “strategic partnership” owing to China's policy of extensive economic support and the rising anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh. Over the decades, however, pragmatic economic interests and shifting geopolitical realities have driven both countries to accommodate each other. The current economic interaction between the states has become more elaborate and extensive.^[vii]

Table 1: China-Bangladesh Economic Engagement^[viii]

c)   Pakistan-Bangladesh Ties:

(i) The current Pakistan-Bangladeshi relations are an offspring of years of oppression and immense violence, but now shifting towards forgiveness, reparation and cooperation. Bangladesh was once a part of Pakistan but became independent after a nine-month war with Islamabad in 1971. Ms Hasina’s Awami League party was known to be vocal about such atrocities during the nine-month-long war, a victory Dhaka credits to the Indian effort.^[ix] Bangladesh claims around three million people were killed and approximately 200,000 women were raped by Pakistani soldiers. Pakistan rejects these claims and has never officially apologised.^[x]

(ii) This narrative and gruesome history have since been attempted to be covered up by the interim govt. as Bangladesh Foreign Secretary Md. Jashim Uddin at the recent bilateral meeting in Dhaka.

Contemporary Relations and Future Scopes:

The stability of these bilateral relations must show synchronism in various fields of common interest to establish a strong and reliable triad, which could crumble India's foothold over the sub-continent.

a)   Diplomatic Relations

(i) As explained above, the depths of Sino-Pak relations are the result of open and continued dialogue between the two nations. The latest in-person diplomatic interaction being Pakistan's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammad Ishaq Dar visit to China for talks with Chinese diplomat Wang Yi. This meeting held great importance, being in the aftermath of the latest Indo-Pak conflict. Since tensions started to rise between India and Pakistan, China has followed an objective and just position, urged the two countries to exercise calm and restraint, and avoid escalation to maintain a global image of a neutral, reliable stabiliser in the region.^[xi] While also evidently providing military aid to Pakistan during the conflict, aid which will only grow in the times to come, given that Pak FM Ishaq Dar’s three-day visit to China is expected to highlight both nations’ growing enthusiasm for deepening defence and security cooperation.^[xii]

(ii) Adding to Indian concerns regarding Bangladesh’s sudden and growing diplomatic amiability towards China could only be seen as an act of belligerent and counter-balance India’s perception as an oppressive power instead of a development and stability catalyst. During the Boao Forum for Asia conference, Bangladesh Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus’s remarks invited China to perceive India, Bangladesh and other neighbouring states as stepping stones for Beijing’s vision of South Asia. Presumably in the hopes of amplifying Bangladesh’s influence over the sub-continent over the region, being the self-proclaimed “guardian of ocean access.” Despite New Delhi’s indifferent stance on the matter, the regional leadership and opposition of India saw it as an act of insensitivity, as it highlighted India’s strategic vulnerability via the “Chicken’s Neck.”^[xiii]

(iii) Additionally, the recent regime change in Dhaka has led to a pivotal change in their foreign policy as Bangladesh Foreign Secretary Md. Jashim Uddin shakes hands with Pakistan Foreign Secretary Amna Baloch during their bilateral meeting in Dhaka, April 17, 2025.^[xiv] The Bangladeshi counterparts emphasised dealing with “the historically unresolved issues with Pakistan”, involving monetary reparations and an official apology for the 1971 atrocities. Regarding this, the Pakistan representative assured continued engagement while also discussing other aspects of their bilateral relations and their future.^[xv]

b)  Economic Cooperation

(i) Pakistan has continued to hold onto its reputation as a failing economy, which has been kept afloat on fragile threads of constant loan borrowing and strategic investments from Int. Orgs. and primarily China. The volume and extent of this support can be easily seen from the heavy reliance on Beijing in almost every aspect of the economic sphere.

Table 2: Sino-Pak Economic Involvement^[xvi]

(ii) Evident from Table 1 and Table 2 that China has bolstered itself as an indispensable pillar of economic cooperation and reliance despite having an alleged history of debt-trapping developing economies with the sub-continent (Sri Lanka). Unlike Pakistan, Bangladesh’s economy is not completely merged with China’s support, which offers them independence on the matter. This independence had, in the past, allowed them to use diplomatic hedging to receive balanced support from both Beijing and New Delhi.^[xvii] This dynamic has since been appearing to be lost as they continue to lean towards Chinese support, criticise India, accompanied by a lack of engagement from the Indian government. This gap between India and Bangladesh communication has since also led to the opening of new trade doors, joining Dhaka and Islamabad as, for the first time, a Pakistan National Shipping Corporation (PNSC) vessel carrying government cargo will dock at a Bangladeshi port, marking a significant milestone in maritime trade relations.^[xviii]

c)   Military and Strategic Ties

(i) The China-Pakistan military partnership, built on countering India since the 1960s (including the 1963 border agreement ceding territory in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to China) has become highly integrated, maturing from procurement and co-production to joint R&D, with China now supplying the majority of Pakistan’s arms imports (63% of China’s arms exports, 81% of Pakistan’s imports between 2020–2024). Recent events, such as India’s Operation Sindoor in May 2025 targeting terrorist infrastructure in Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan’s retaliatory Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos, demonstrated the depth of bilateral exchanges, including the use of Chinese-origin fighter jets, PL-15 missiles, drones, and advanced sensor-equipped vessels in the Indian Ocean, highlighting a two-front military threat to India. The cooperation extends to air defense, naval modernization (e.g., C-802 missiles, Type 039A submarines), BeiDou satellite navigation, multi-domain warfare (MDW) integration, and joint exercises (“Warrior,” “Shaheen,” “Sea Guardians”), with interoperability and standardization enhancing joint operational plans against India. China’s support emboldens Pakistan’s military capabilities and will to challenge India, while potential PLAN basing at Gwadar port could further alter regional power dynamics, urging India to strengthen its strategic posture and engage with partners like the US for deeper operational insights.^[xix]

(ii) Following the dramatic ousting of Bangladesh’s long-serving Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, the establishment of a new interim government has triggered major internal and external aftershocks, prompting Dhaka to reassess its foreign relations with neighbours like India and Myanmar amid heightened regional uncertainty. China, leveraging its decades-long military cooperation with Bangladesh based on shared experience with Chinese equipment from the Pakistan era and formalised by a landmark 2002 Defence Cooperation Agreement, has become the country’s largest arms supplier, similar to Pakistan, currently providing two-thirds of Bangladesh’s military hardware:^[xx]

• Ming-class submarines
• Shadhinota-class corvettes
• MBT-2000 and VT-5 tanks (making Bangladesh’s tank inventory now entirely Chinese-made)
• HQ-7 missiles
• F-7BGI fighters
• The recent inauguration of the BNS Sheikh Hasina submarine base
• Joint military drills such as “Golden Friendship-2024,”

As Western exports face delays and Bangladesh’s defence budget shrinks, China continues to offer other future purchase prospects for Dhaka, such as:^[xxi]

• J-10C fighters, Z-10 helicopters
• Wing Loong drones, HQ-9 missiles
• Yuan-class submarines
• Type 054 frigates.

 The Bangladesh-China defence nexus not only supports Dhaka’s military modernisation and counterterrorism efforts but also serves as a strategic counterweight to India’s influence, with China poised to expand its influence further as Bangladesh seeks to balance its geopolitical pressures and address security challenges from both state and non-state actors.^[xxii]

d)  People to People Engagement

The year 2025 continues to build on India's insecurity of losing regional cooperation and leadership as Bangladesh and China celebrate 50 years of diplomatic relations in 2025, this enduring relationship stands on the firm foundation of centuries-old people-to-people bonds. During Chief Adviser Professor Muhammad Yunus's official visit to China, a joint press statement was released on March 28, 2025, to commemorate this significant milestone by declaring 2025 the "China-Bangladesh Year of People-to-People Exchanges." This initiative aims to deepen bilateral cooperation across various sectors, including culture, tourism, media, education, healthcare, youth exchanges, local government collaboration, and think tank partnerships.^[xxiii]

Domestic Influence

a)   Bangladesh’s Interim Govt.

All the aforementioned measures taken by the new Interim government in Dhaka were under the leadership of Muhammad Yunus. An economist and Nobel laureate, he became the chief adviser to Bangladesh's interim government after former leader Sheikh Hasina was forced to step down amid a deadly student-led uprising in August 2024.^{[xxiv] [xxv]} His actions could be seen as proactive steps to further bolster this new regime’s support from the people, even though the Indo-Sino balancing act under Sheikh Haseena had begun to show signs of collapsing.^[xxvi] Yunus’ recent “fruitful” visits to Beijing and talks with Islamabad have completely tipped over the remaining balance, as an attempt to wipe an traces of the last government. As a result, China has lost any hesitation towards their loan lending programs to Bangladesh, given the absence of “absolute loyalty” to India by Sheikh Haseena. Hence, in the current Indian strategic outlook, they have suffered a double loss: a loss of a trusted ally and the addition of a beligerent/ antagonist neighbour, abundantly evident in Muhammad Yunus’ extremely critical words towards Indian involvement:

“When it comes to student demonstrations, you said this is an internal affair. I said, well, your neighbour’s house is burning and India is saying it is their internal affair. But when our elections are held, you rush to make sure that it is held according to their wishes and manipulate everything… all these elections took place because India was very eager to make the result according to their choice,” Yunus said.^[xxvii]

b)  Post-Imran Pakistani Diplomacy

The Pahalgam attack and the consequent escalation likely have their roots in the regime change that took place in Pakistan three years ago. Following the toppling of Prime Minister Imran Khan, the new leadership faced constant unrest and protests by the public. The one “tried and true” method for gaining legitimacy was a clash with India.^[xxviii] On the other hand, Pakistan presents a different outlook to bilateral relations when dealing with Bangladesh, as explained by the Pakistani High Commissioner, Syed Ahmed Maroof. That all bilateral relations should be insulated from any third party’s involvement, and should be pursued without the antagonisation of the third party. Yet such a naive approach cannot hold its ground considering that Pakistan and Bangladesh ties have only flourished under this interim govt. which has explicitly antagonised Indian involvement and has also shown an all-time high engagement with Pakistan’s biggest supporter—China.

Implications for India

a)   Diplomatic and Economic

(i) This strategic triangle could escalate the pre-existing shift in the geopolitical landscape in South Asia. Bangladesh’s de facto govt. led by Yunus, has made little effort to restore relations with India, or even address India’s two primary concerns: empowerment of radical forces and the rise of anti-Hindu violence, but instead has worked hard to improve relations with Pakistan. The recent meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif at the D-8 Summit in Cairo in December 2024. Yunus called for a resolution of issues relating to 1971, perhaps a call for resolution for Bangladesh’s lingering grievances. Sharif agreed to investigate the matter and called for more strategic relations between the two “brotherly nations.”^[xxix] Indicating towards India’s regional primacy is being eroded. The previously established image of a regional hegemon has added to this effect of regional belligerence from smaller states, who are then relying on China effectively presenting it as a more reliable source of development and security partner, undercutting India’s soft power in South Asia.

(ii) The Indo-Sino friction over the role of the “Voice of the Global South” dates back to the Asia-Africa Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955. Attended by nations apart from those contemporarily included in the ‘Global South’, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Turkey. In this meeting, the non-alignment approach towards the Cold War was adopted by member states, giving rise to the Indian and Chinese aspirations to lead.^[xxx] A China–Pakistan–Bangladesh alignment could present a unified bloc in South Asia that challenges India’s narrative of leadership within the Global South. Ultimately, this helps solidify Beijing’s role as the de facto offerer of economic stability and policy leadership in Asia, making it harder for India to assert equivalent regional influence.

(iii) Another multilateral platform where India would lose primacy is the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Despite it being frozen for almost a decade, the 8 member states, namely Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri-Lanka, have shown no signs of stagnation in their regional alignment. As of 2025, China has continued engaging Sri Lanka and the Maldives in the China-Indian Ocean Forum and the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. It has also involved them in new initiatives like the Global Security Initiative (GSI), the Global Development Initiative (GDI), and the Global Civilisational Initiative (GCI). The Maldives recently implemented its free trade agreement (FTA) with China on 1 January 2025, and China is also discussing an FTA with Sri Lanka.^[xxxi] Additionally, between India and China, Beijing is the only state that maintains official and positive diplomatic relations with the current Afghan leadership. Out of these 8 member states, at least 5 have proven to be leaning towards Beijing. Hence, in the case of SAARC being revived, it would just become a Chinese echo chamber, giving India no regional say or control.

(iv) Economically, this trilateral bloc could translate into various unfrivolous outcomes. The Indian counterpart to the BRI project, now called the MAHASAGAR initiative, would face reluctance from other states, given their increasing reliance on China. Even if this reliance in some states was born out of debt trapping and predatory lending practices, the MAHASAGAR initiative yet lacks the proactiveness or effectiveness to be considered a viable option in this shifting landscape.^[xxxii] Furthermore, the emergence of alternative connectivity corridors that bypass India (e.g., CPEC extensions, Chattogram-to-Kunming corridor) could isolate India from regional supply chains, leading to further economic backlash.

(v) Ever since the regime change in Bangladesh, their intentions and allegiance have exceeded the ambit of a regional issue, as the USA has shown keen interest in gaining their loyalty before as well. An article published by the US Naval Institute, a non-profit, independent forum, has detailed the military importance of Bangladesh to the US, arguing that the country could be a key logistics node for the US Navy or help blockading operations supporting broader US Navy goals in the Indo-Pacific region. The United States also commended the Bangladeshi Army for its restraint during the transition, signalling Washington’s interest in a stable and peaceful process that avoids military intervention in politics. Stability in Bangladesh is crucial for U.S. interests in South Asia, given the country’s strategic location near the Bay of Bengal and its proximity to key maritime routes.^[xxxiii] Beyond governance, the U.S. maintains significant economic interests in Bangladesh. The two countries have ongoing and future cooperative activities, including trade, investment, and development programs. The U.S. sees the regime change as an opportunity to strengthen bilateral relations and support Bangladesh’s economic growth, provided the new government upholds democratic norms and fosters an open investment climate.^[xxxiv]

b)  Strategic Implications

(i) A China-Pakistan-Bangladesh bloc could naturally instigate an encircled cognition in the Indian strategic leadership. The rise of PLAN presence throughout the IOR, complemented by the influence over Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and the Maldives, marks a fundamental shift from India-centric maritime dominance to intense maritime competition. This expanding PLAN footprint, a.k.a. “String of Pearls” strategy, is designed to secure Chinese sea lanes and energy routes stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Strait. This opens up India’s threat spectrum beyond the two-front scenario (China–Pakistan), as it would now include potential threats emerging from Chinese-equipped Bangladeshi naval/logistics facilities. China’s presence near critical choke points like the Bay of Bengal or Hambantota could limit India’s operational freedom, complicate naval planning, and reduce its deterrence effect in the eastern IOR. India has traditionally been viewed as the resident power in the IOR, underpinned by a strong Navy, maritime partnerships (e.g., U.S., Australia, Japan), and regional initiatives to maintain open sea lanes. However, the growth of Chinese naval infrastructure and diplomatic inroads with China?aligned littoral states challenge this dominance: Building ports, research vessels docking, and logistics ties in Bangladesh (e.g., submarine base, ship visits) erode India’s maritime influence and invite Chinese ISR and fleet activity close to India’s eastern flank.^[xxxv]

(ii) In the intricate geopolitical landscape of South Asia, the region with the utmost strategic vulnerability is India’s Siliguri Corridor. referred to as the Chicken’s Neck, just about 22 kilometres wide at its narrowest point, this strip of land connects mainland India to its eight northeastern states, threading between Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh. It is the lifeline for nearly 45 million people in India's northeast, the transit route for military logistics, and a key axis of national integration.^[xxxvi] China’s strategy of encircling India is not new, whether through CPEC, its deepening ties with Sri Lanka and Nepal, or now, its renewed engagement with Bangladesh. The possible development of Lalmonirhat airport near the Siliguri Corridor raises immense strategic concerns for the Indian govt.. While ostensibly a civil aviation project, its dual-use potential for military operations is significant. A coordinated act of aggression in the case of a conflict could lead to a second dual-front war over the Siliguri Corridor.^[xxxvii]

(iii) Concerns regarding Islamic radicalisation seeping across Bangladeshi borders into India were raised during the 55th Director General-level border coordination conference (held 16-20 February 2025) between the Border Security Force (BSF) and Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB). Additionally, it was established that the India-Bangladesh border is further vulnerable to exploitation by radical Islamic outfits and transnational criminal networks for infiltration and smuggling. Stretches of the border are sensitive due to the activities of Salafist elements. Bangladeshi Islamic preachers regularly visit the interiors of bordering districts like Malda, Murshidabad, and North 24 Parganas in West Bengal and participate in religious discourses. An additional cause of concern is the presence of over 1.3 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh following the regime change in this bordering state. The criminal activities of Rohingyas within Bangladesh have increased.^[xxxviii] As of Dec 2024, 11 militant (many backed by Pak) groups are operating out of Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh, which include the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), and Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA). RSO is suspected to have partnerships with Al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-continent (AQIS) and JeI. These outfits have recruited young orphans (some as young as six years of age) from Rohingya camps in Bangladesh and are training them to fight when they turn teenagers. As reported on September 8, M. Gafuruddin Chowdhury, Chairman of the Ukhiya Panglakhali Union Parishad, noted that, since the fall of Sheikh Hasina's government, Rohingya infiltration had increased daily due to the lack of law enforcement, with brokers charging BDT 20,000 to BDT 30,000 per person to assist their entry into Bangladesh.^[xxxix] Further, Rohingya refugees in crowded camps seeking better living conditions often attempt to escape from Cox’s Bazaar and Bhashan Char Island through maritime and land routes, including by infiltrating into India via Tripura, Assam, and West Bengal.^[xl]

Policy Suggestions

a)   Tier 1: Least Ambitious & Most Feasible

(i) Bangladesh Oriented “Neighbourhood First 2.0” Diplomatic Policy

It is now imperative for India to be cautious while plotting the future trajectory of India-Bangladesh relations. Until now, New Delhi’s unwavering support for the Sheikh Hasina government despite allegations of her repeatedly obstructing fair and inclusive elections has served India well strategically.^[xli] But now, India must ensure that India-Bangladesh relations are more based on state-to-state interaction rather than personal connection.

Recommendation:

• Capitalise on the differences developing between the BNP, Jamaat, and the fringe parties on one side and the interim government on the other.
• With Dhaka tilting diplomatically toward China and reopening formal channels with Pakistan, India must shift from elite-only diplomacy to people-centric engagement, particularly targeting students, young professionals, media, and religious/civic leaders.
• This can be achieved through more welcoming and generous exchange programs between institutes of education, information, and religion.
• Other tools of public/ civil diplomacy should be utilised, given the targeted demographic being the youth, such as: cultural diplomacy, media outreach, digital diplomacy and narrative building

(ii) Linient Trade Terms and Joint Cross-Border SEZs

Bangladesh’s exports to Northeast India (NEI) have grown from $24.3 million in FY17 to $91.7 million in FY23, with ready-made garments (RMG), refined soybean oil, fish, PVC products, and processed foods among the top exports. However, several non-tariff barriers (NTBs) such as conformity assessments, para-tariffs, and customs inefficiencies continue to burden Bangladeshi exporters.^[xlii] Furthermore, the strategic trade potential of Chattogram and Matarbari ports for NEI-bound Indian goods must be utilised, with emphasis on the benefits of shifting from a single-port dependency (Akhaura) to a multi-port strategy (Sheola, Tamabil, Bibir Bazar, Sonahat). These can serve as natural gateways for Indian SEZs in Tripura, Assam, and Meghalaya.^[xliii]

Recommendations:

• Reduce or harmonise state-level para-tariffs (e.g., excise and VAT) on Bangladeshi consumer and construction goods entering NEI.
• Provide preferential access under SAFTA Plus or a special sub-regional trade framework focused on BBIN.
• Set up joint cross-border Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Tripura and Meghalaya that source intermediate goods from Bangladesh’s low-cost manufacturers.
• Pilot India–Bangladesh SEZ clusters with coordinated customs, shared power grids, and integrated logistics hubs.

(iii) Enhance BSF deployment along the India–Bangladesh border

As of late 2024, the BSF’s Eastern Command recently initiated an “Ops Alert” across the entire 4,096?km India–Bangladesh border, including riverine and unfenced segments, intensifying day-and-night patrolling ahead of significant national events and given Bangladesh’s internal turmoil.^[xliv] The following recommendations on the matter leverage existing institutional capacity (BSF, Water Wing, Assam Rifles), require minimal new investment, just policy-level decisions and operational continuity, and send a clear security signal to both domestic and regional stakeholders at low political risk.

Recommendation:

• To maintain elevated alert levels beyond periodic operations, convert them into a standing posture with no-leave directives and “quick reaction” teams positioned near vulnerable points (riverine stretches, the Siliguri Corridor).
• Integrate the BSF’s Water Wing and floating outposts, as planned in the Sundarbans, to bolster surveillance in the delta areas.
• Deploy intelligence-led policing alongside Assam Rifles, especially near infiltration-prone districts, to pre-empt cross-border smuggling or radicalisation.

(iv) Deploy intelligence-led policing and anti-radicalisation programs in border states

India's Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has a well-established Left Wing Extremism (LWE) Division, responsible for coordinating counter-insurgency operations, intelligence sharing, CIAT (Counter Insurgency and Anti-Terrorism) schools, and developmental schemes in high-risk zones. The organisational capacity and infrastructure developed under the LWE framework, including special forces training, e-Samiksha tracking, and administrative coordination, can be repurposed or extended to the India–Bangladesh border, especially in West Bengal and Assam, where radicalisation risks are rising.^{[xlv] [xlvi]}

Recommendation:

• Set up dedicated Counter-Radicalisation Units under state police with CIAT-trained personnel.
• Capitalise the SIS (Security-Related Expenditure) Scheme to fund local-level surveillance tech and police–community partnerships.
• Collaborate with Assam Rifles and BSF to identify radical preacher networks, online recruitment, and narco-terrorism cells.
• Use the MHA’s existing tools (CPGRAMS, e-Samiksha) for citizen feedback and real-time intelligence reporting.

b)  Tier 2: Moderately Ambitious, Medium-Term Feasibility

(i) Fast-Track BBIN and BIMSTEC Infrastructure Projects

India's economic, strategic, and connectivity stakes in the BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal) and BIMSTEC corridors are growing, particularly as China advances its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the region. To counterbalance this and secure supply chains in Northeast India, India should expedite the completion of key connectivity and energy grid projects.^[xlvii] Some of these key projects are:

• NH-8 and NH-37 upgrades linking Silchar–Agartala–Sabroom and Karimganj–Sutrakhandispur (crucial for access to Bangladesh via Tripura)
• India-funded four-laning of the Bhanga–Benapole Highway in Bangladesh
• The Akhaura–Agartala rail link
• The Protocol Inland Water Routes, especially Dhubri–Chilmari, Jogigopha–Bahadurabad
• The Dhirasram ICD near Dhaka
• Kaladan Multimodal Transit Project

(ii) Establish a joint Eastern Theatre Command

The current Indian game plan under Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan includess finalising the frame work for three “adversary-specific” theatre commands: Northern Command (against China, based in Lucknow), Western Command (against Pakistan, likely in Jaipur), Maritime Theatre Command (covering the Indian Ocean, based in Thiruvananthapuram).

 It alienates raising, training, and sustaining (RTS) functions from operational command, allowing more focused deployment and joint operations. By placing Army, Navy, and IAF assets homogenously under a dedicated theatre commander.^[xlviii] It fosters a “joint culture” and strengthens multi-domain warfare capabilities, something which has been recognised to be a prolonged shortcoming for the Indian Armed Forces in the past.^[xlix]

Recommendation:

• Fast-track the Northern/Eastern Theatre Command, especially along the Siliguri Corridor, a strategic “chicken’s neck” vulnerable to two-front threats. With the command HQ in Lucknow, as planned, to streamline coordination across the Indo–Bangladesh border.
• The theatre commander must be empowered with doctrinal authority, cross-service logistics, and real-time surveillance capabilities.
• Encourage cross-posting of officers, shared training exercises, and integrated intelligence under the Inter?Services Organisations (Command, Control and Discipline) framework, which became operational in May 2025.

c)   Tier 3: Ambitious, Difficult but Impactful

(i) Involve Bangladesh in Quad+ Issue-based Coalitions

While Bangladesh has consistently avoided formal alignment with security groupings like the Quad (U.S., India, Japan, Australia), its Indo-Pacific Outlook (IPO) released in April 2023 signals clear alignment of interests on non-traditional security issues, such as: Climate resilience, Disaster risk reduction, Maritime safety, Health and food security, Technology transfers and digital norms. This alignment, while deliberately framed in non-aligned language, offers India and its Quad partners an opening to involve Bangladesh through functional, low-political-cost issue-based coalitions that don’t trigger alignment anxieties.^{[l] [li]}

Recommendations:

• Invite Bangladesh to join Quad+ climate security forums, focusing on coastal resilience, flood early warning systems, and post-cyclone recovery efforts.
• Encourage Dhaka’s inclusion in Quad maritime SAR (Search and Rescue) drills or capacity-building missions under the label of “humanitarian coordination.”
• Co-host a Quad+ India–Bangladesh Tech Dialogue focusing on: Open 5G architecture, cross-border cybersecurity protocols and disinformation resilience and digital literacy initiatives
• Promote joint working groups under UN frameworks (avoiding direct branding as Quad-derived).

(ii) Operationalise Andaman & Nicobar Command as a Forward Maritime Base

Currently, the INS Kohassa (NAS Shibpur), commissioned in January 2019, provides a Forward Operating Air Base in North Andamans with joint capacity for Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, and civilian use. The runway is slated for expansion to 3,000?m to accommodate large aircraft and jets.^[lii] Additionally, Lt Gen Dinesh Singh Rana was appointed as CINCAN on June 1, 2025, highlighting a joint-services commander presiding over Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard assets.^[liii]

Recommendation:

• Finalise Phase II runway expansion at INS Kohassa and allocate budget by 2026.
• Deploy and operationalise BrahMos/ELINT-equipped drones by 2027.
• Develop a Tri-Service Maritime C2 centre within ANC for unified planning and response.
• Formalise annual “Andaman Strategic Exercise” involving Indian services and partner navies.

Conclusion

As of June 2025, there exists no formal trilateral alliance mechanism between China, Pakistan and Bangladesh in any form or manner. However, the existence of informal and indirect alignments between the three and the overlapping bilateral goals makes such a mechanism a possibility. The initial segments have presented a comprehensive list of proofs acting as an evident causality for the formation of a China-Pakistan-Bangladesh triad. The newly instated govt. Bangladesh has set up an ideal condition for this trilateral alliance to flourish. Not only is it explained by realist bandwagoning, which was earlier prominently observed among European states.^[liv] It also resonates with the Chinese identity of challenging the status quo. The Indian govt. and Armed Forces have hence been provided with triverging paths, which at their core are to either reconcile with Bangladesh through economic reparations and diplomatic communication, incentivising Dhaka to revert to their power-balancing strategy. The other end, in layman’s terms, is to accept Bangladeshi loyalty to be a lost cause for the time being and pursue an offensive realist approach of power-maximisation and therefore adding another contender to the regional arms race.^[lv] The middle path is to establish similar relations to those of China or Pakistan, isolating areas of cooperation, compromise and conflict to maintain a bare minimum of regional peace while leaving the region in diplomatic ambiguity. Irrespective of the path, a matter of such magnitude requires proactive steps of analysing, reforming and acting.

Endnotes:

^[i] Southern Asia Population 2025.” World Population Review, n.d., www.worldpopulationreview.com/continents/southern-asia. Accessed 8 June 2025.

^[ii] Basrur, Rajesh, and Kate Sullivan de Estrada, 'South Asia’s Limited Progress toward Peaceful Change', in T. V. Paul, and others (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Peaceful Change in International Relations (2021; online edn, Oxford Academic, 8 Oct. 2020), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190097356.013.40, accessed 8 June 2025.

^[iii] “International Relations of South Asia.” South Asia Centre, University of Oxford, n.d., www.southasia.ox.ac.uk/international-relations-south-asia. Accessed 8 June 2025.

^[iv] “The Benefits, Challenges, and Necessity of Triangular Diplomacy.” National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), n.d., www.nbr.org/publication/the-benefits-challenges-and-necessity-of-triangular-diplomacy/.

Accessed 8 June 2025.

^[v] Kosar, Farhana. “Pak-China Relations: An Analysis.” Pak. Journal of Int'L Affairs, vol. 4, no. 2, 2021. https://pjia.com.pk/index.php/pjia/article/download/289/210/314

^[vi] https://cpec.gov.pk

^[vii] Menon, Saranya. “Economic Ties Between China and Bangladesh.” ORCA Asia, n.d., orcasia.org/article/589/economic-ties-between-china-and-bangladesh. Accessed 8 June 2025.

^[viii] Ibid

^[ix] “Bangladesh Demands Genocide Apology from Pakistan.” Genocide Watch, 21 Apr. 2025, www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/bangladesh-demands-genocide-apology-from-pakistan. Accessed 8 June 2025.

^[x] Ibid

^[xi] PTI. “China Backs Lasting Ceasefire: FM Wang Meets Pakistan's Dar Amid India-Pak Tensions.” Deccan Herald, 19 May 2025, https://www.deccanherald.com/india/china-says-it-will-play-constructive-role-for-lasting-ceasefire-between-india-and-pakistan-as-fm-dar-arrives-for-talks-with-wang-3547511. Accessed 8 June 2025.

^[xii] Chen, Alyssa. “China, Pakistan FMs expected to discuss security cooperation, to India's chagrin.” South China Morning Post, 20 May 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3311019/china-pakistan-fms-expected-discuss-security-cooperation-indias-chagrin. Accessed 8 June 2025.

^[xiii] “Timing and Location on Bangladesh Chief Adviser’s Remarks and China Visit.” The Hindu, 9 Apr. 2025, www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/timing-and-location-on-bangladesh-chief-advisers-remarks-and-china-visit/article69404315.ece. Accessed 8 June 2025.

^[xiv] Express Web Desk. “First talks in 15 years: Bangladesh seeks Pakistan's apology for 1971 atrocities.” The Indian Express, 18 April 2025, https://indianexpress.com/article/world/bangladesh-seeks-pakistan-apology-for-1971-atrocities-43-billions-in-asset-9950387/. Accessed 8 June 2025.

^[xv] IExpress Web Desk. “First talks in 15 years: Bangladesh seeks Pakistan's apology for 1971 atrocities.” The Indian Express, 18 April 2025, https://indianexpress.com/article/world/bangladesh-seeks-pakistan-apology-for-1971-atrocities-43-billions-in-asset-9950387/. Accessed 8 June 2025.

^[xvi] Huld, Arendse. “China-Pakistan Trade, Investment, and Strategic Partnership.” China Briefing, 24 March 2025, https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-pakistan-relations-trade-investment-strategy/. Accessed 8 June 2025

^[xvii] Divya, Aparna, and Salman Ali. “The Bangladesh-Pakistan-China Triangle and India's Strategic Dilemma – South Asian Voices.” South Asian Voices, 25 April 2025, https://southasianvoices.org/geo-c-co-r-bangladesh-pakistan-china-tri-4-25-2025/. Accessed 8 June 2025.

^[xviii] “Pakistan, Bangladesh Resume Direct Trade.” The Hindu, 22 Feb. 2025, www.thehindu.com/news/international/pakistan-bangladesh-resume-direct-trade/article69257101.ece.

Accessed 8 June 2025.

^[xix] Pant, Harsh V., and Rahul Rawat. "How China and Pakistan Work Against India." Observer Research Foundation, https://www.orfonline.org/research/how-china-and-pakistan-work-against-india.

^[xx] Rejwan, Khandakar Tahmid, and Scott N. Romaniuk. “Why Bangladesh-China Defense Ties Are Poised to Strengthen After the Monsoon Revolution.” The Diplomat, 17 October 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/10/why-bangladesh-china-defense-ties-are-poised-to-strengthen-after-the-monsoon-revolution/. Accessed 8 June 2025.

^[xxi] Ibid

^[xxii] Ibid

^[xxiii] Galib, Mostak Ahamed, and Bulbul Siddiqi. “How our youth can leverage Bangladesh-China ties.” The Daily Star, 11 April 2025, https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/views/news/how-our-youth-can-leverage-bangladesh-china-ties-3868301. Accessed 8 June 2025.

^[xxiv] “Muhammad Yunus – Biographical.” NobelPrize.org, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2006/yunus/biographical/.

^[xxv] Rahn, Wesley. “As Bangladesh builds ties with China, India looks on – DW – 03/31/2025.” DW, 31 March 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/as-bangladesh-builds-ties-with-china-india-looks-on/a-72098343.

Accessed 8 June 2025.

^[xxvi] Khasru, Syed Munir. “Why Bangladesh's India-China balancing act is becoming increasingly difficult.” The Indian Express, 12 July 2024, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/bangladesh-indo-china-sheikh-hasina-9448869/.

Accessed 8 June 2025.

^[xxvii] Das Gupta, Moushumi. “Bangladesh a Free Country Now: Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus on Hasina’s Resignation.” ThePrint, https://theprint.in/world/bangladesh-a-free-country-now-nobel-laureate-muhammad-yunus-on-hasinas-resignation/2209254/. Accessed 8 June 2025

^[xxviii] Pethiyagoda, Kadira. “After Pahalgam: Why Pakistan's foreign affairs matters for India's security.” The Indian Express, 15 May 2025, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/why-pakistans-foreign-affairs-matters-for-indias-security-10008282/. Accessed 8 June 2025.

^[xxix] Khan, Muqtedar. "Bangladesh and Pakistan Are Changing South Asia’s Geopolitical Landscape." The Diplomat, 31 Jan. 2025, thediplomat.com/2025/01/bangladesh-and-pakistan-are-changing-south-asias-geopolitical-landscape. Accessed 15 June 2025.

^[xxx] Pandey, Shibani. "The Battle for Global South Leadership." Council on Foreign Relations, 11 June 2024, www.cfr.org/article/battle-global-south-leadership.

^[xxxi] Shivamurthy, Aditya Gowdara. "The Changing Nature of Chinese Influence in Sri Lanka and Maldives." Observer Research Foundation, 15 Jan 2025, www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-changing-nature-of-chinese-influence-in-sri-lanka-and-maldives

Accessed 15 June 2025

^[xxxii] "Here’s How India’s MAHASAGAR Initiative Is Reshaping Naval Dynamics In the Indian Ocean – Analysis." Centre for Land Warfare Studies, 2025, claws.co.in/heres-how-indias-mahasagar-initiative-is-reshaping-naval-dynamics-in-the-indian-ocean-analysis/. Accessed 15 June 2025

^[xxxiii] Institute of Chinese Studies (ICWA). "U.S. Interest in Bangladesh After the Recent Regime Change." Institute of Chinese Studies, 10 Sep 2024, https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=11768&lid=7167. Accessed 15 June 2025

^[xxxiv] Ibid

^[xxxv] Dutta, Suyesha, and Suvolaxmi Dutta Choudhury. “India's Competition with China for Dominance of the Indian Ocean.” Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 24 April 2024, https://www.asiapacific.ca/publication/balancing-tides-indias-competition-china-dominance-indian. Accessed 15 June 2025.

^[xxxvi] The Economic Times. “A chicken with two necks: India's strategic counter to Bangladesh.” The Economic Times, 26 May 2025, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/a-chicken-with-two-necks-indias-strategic-counter-to-bangladesh/articleshow/121410309.cms?from=mdr. Accessed 15 June 2025.

^[xxxvii] Ibid

^[xxxviii] Lakshman, Kanchan. "The Upsurge of Radical and Fundamentalist Islamic Elements in Bangladesh." Observer Research Foundation, 24 Mar. 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/english/expert-speak/the-upsurge-of-radical-and-fundamentalist-islamic-elements-in-bangladesh. Accessed 15 June 2025.

^[xxxix] South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Terrorism Assessment, Bangladesh.” South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2025, https://www.satp.org/terrorism-assessment/bangladesh. Accessed 15 June 2025.

^[xl] Ibid

^[xli] Banerji, Esha. "Bangladesh Protests: Sheikh Hasina Was India’s Best Bet, but Now Is the Time for a Backup Plan." Firstpost, 5 Aug. 2024, https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/bangladesh-protests-sheikh-hasina-was-indias-best-bet-but-now-is-the-time-for-a-backup-plan-13801233.html. Accessed 15 June 2025.

^[xlii] Roy, Anirban. Enhancing Trade Connectivity between Northeast India and Bangladesh. Asian Confluence, Mar. 2024, https://www.asianconfluence.org/publication/study-3-enhancing-trade-connectivity-between-northeast-india-and-bangladesh. Accessed 15 June 2025.

^[xliii] Ibid

^[xliv] SINGH, BIKASH. “BSF deploys 11 battalions & 1 water wing on high alert along Indo-Bangladesh Border.” The Economic Times, 6 August 2024, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/bsf-deploys-11-battalions-1-water-wing-on-high-alert-along-indo-bangladesh-border/articleshow/112324931.cms?from=mdr. Accessed 8 June 2025.

^[xlv] Ministry of Home Affairs. Left Wing Extremism Division. Government of India, www.mha.gov.in/en/divisionofmha/left-wing-extremism-division. Accessed 8 June 2025.

^[xlvi] Ministry of Home Affairs. Organizational Chart of Left Wing Extremism Division. 8 May 2025. https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/2025-05/ChartLWEEng_08052025.pdf. Accessed 8 June 2025.

^[xlvii] Bose, Sohini, et al. The BIMSTEC Master Plan for Transport Connectivity: A Stocktaking. ORF Occasional Paper No. 439, Observer Research Foundation, June 2024. https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-bimstec-master-plan-for-transport-connectivity. Accessed 15 June 2025.

^[xlviii] Pandit, Rajat. “Theatre Commands: India's Proposed Integrated Theatre Commands Plan | India News.” Times of India, 5 September 2024, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/indias-proposed-integrated-theatre-commands-plan/articleshow/113074831.cms. Accessed 8 June 2025.

^[xlix] Pandey, Lt Gen D. P. “Reorienting Towards a Joint Services Organisational Culture.” Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS), 18 Mar. 2024, cenjows.in/reorienting-towards-a-joint-services-organisational-culture/. Accessed 8 June 2025.

^[l] Bose, Sohini. Continuity and Change in Bangladesh’s Indo-Pacific Outlook: Deliberating Post-Election Scenarios. ORF Occasional Paper No. 424, Observer Research Foundation, Jan. 2024. Accessed 15 June 2025.

^[li] Bhattacharjee, Nilotpal. “China’s Warning to Bangladesh on the Quad.” The Diplomat, 18 May 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/05/chinas-warning-to-bangladesh-on-the-quad/. Accessed 15 June 2025.

^[lii] Ghoshal, Debalina. “Securing the Straits: A Look at India's Military Presence in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands - IADN.” IADN, 2024, https://iadnews.in/securing-the-straits-a-look-at-indias-military-presence-in-the-andaman-and-nicobar-islands/. Accessed 8 June 2025.

^[liii] Ministry of Defence. “Press Release:Press Information Bureau.” Press Release:Press Information Bureau, 1 June 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2133190. Accessed 8 June 2025.

^[liv] Cladi, Lorenzo. “Persevering with Bandwagoning, Not Hedging: Why European Security Cooperation Still Conforms to Realism.” Defence Studies, vol. 22, no. 4, 2022, pp. 624–643. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2110476. Accessed 8 June 2025

^[lv] Offensive Realism and Power Maximisation: https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/internationalstudies/abstract/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-304?print#:~:text=For%20offensive%20realists%2C%20states%20maximize,become%20the%20most%20powerful%20state.

 Pic Courtesy- Photo by Perplexity.ai

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views of CESCUBE.)