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Military December 27, 2021 6012 Reads

The history of Russian arms exports to India

S
By Sharath Kumar Kolipaka
Author • Centre for Security & Strategic Studies
The history of Russian arms exports to India
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS

Up until 1959 the Indian armed forces mostly depended on the western countries for military equipment, most of it came from the United Kingdom and the rest is from France the United States Germany Switzerland Japan and Sweden. after the Tib...

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In 1961 United states agreed to provide Pakistan with its F-104 starfighter aircraft, The subcontinent saw its first supersonic fighter in the region, to counter this grave disadvantage India evaluated the Swedish Draken, the French Mirage and the Soviet MIG-21 After you s government denied permission to the American manufacturer Lockheed for the transfer of technology to India due to Pakistan’s concerns, and the credit terms presented from Europe from the powers who are not acceptable to India, so the choice narrowed down to the MIG-21. This is a sophisticated aircraft, which the Soviet Union refused to share with its socialist neighbour China. The technology was transferred to India which is a non-socialist country it was a historically significant agreement. In 1963 India made another agreement with the Soviet Union to acquire more AN-12 transport aircraft's, MI-4 helicopters and surface to air missiles. The AN 12 aircrafts played a crucial role in India’s logistics operation to the forward areas.

A team headed by then defence minister Y.B. Chavan visited USSR in 1964 for a discussion on defence cooperation at the highest level at this meeting they concluded the Indian earth position of 130-mm medium guns PT 76-amphibian tanks and more MIG-21 squadrons and plant machinery for the new MIG factory. after this, the Soviet Union and India agreed on the modification of credit terms from 5 years to 10 years.

in 1965 the United Kingdom trained the Indian Navy team for submarines but refused to sell new submarines and instead offered 20-year-old second-hand submarines. India send a delegation to USSR, Where they received an invitation to take “what you will”. They concluded the visit by acquiring four F class submarines, 5 Petya class frigates, five missile boats and four landing ships. This led to one of the biggest country-country sales relationships and tightened the Indo Soviet military relationships. The missile boats and petrol boards awkward in this deal were used in the 1971 war with Pakistan, they played a key role in operations like “Operation Trident”. India received 30 MIG-21 fighter jets in 1995. With this India also achieved Mach-2 capabilities The sanctions imposed by the United States in 1965 further stimulated India to deepen its purchase deals with the Soviet Union for Russian arms. This large deal gave a boost to the defence ties between the two nations. These agreements not only secured arms for immediate security needs but also lay down a path for long term goals large defence production,  indigenization and defence industrial development.

After the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, India realised its need to procure more arms, in early 1966 India concluded an agreement that included procurement of the Sukhoi-7 fighter jets, T-55 medium tanks, 130-mm artillery, mobile radars. Soviets delivered 140 Sukhoi’s in 1968, these equipped six squadrons, the last units of these retired in 1986. The Su-7 was used extensively in the 1971 war with Pakistan. “It was the service's first combat aircraft with a full-fledged autopilot and also the first with a Jet Assisted Take Off ( JATO) facility.”[1] T54s and T55s were used extensively by the Indian army for the conflicts with Pakistan between 1970 to 1980. In 2012 Russia and India signed a defence deal for 42 new Sukhoi’s to be produced under licence by the Hindustani aeronautical which will add to the 230 Sukhoi’s which were bought from Russia. India used some Imported Russian systems for the defence equipment they are building in India. Eg: Godavari frigate. 

This agreement was followed by more agreements to supply four more submarines, Petya class frigates, Missile boats, Mi-4 and Mi-8 helicopters, which served the country well. Due to inaccurate estimations of India’s needs, India has to order Petya class frigates T55 tanks and submarines in instalments instead of establishing production lines which would have been cheaper and which would have led to a wider spectrum of technology transfer. The Soviet Union provided long term credit plans which are as long as 70 years, with a low rate of interest when compared to other options, they let India purchase the arms with Rupees. the soviet union accepted repayment in the form of exports as well, with that India was able to avoid a balance of payment issues. “the perceived low risk of embargoes or denial of technologies and spare parts, together with easy credit and barter arrangements, low price and competitive performance.”[2]The Russians sold the arms on “friendship Prices” to India. Indian military consisted of an estimated 70 per cent Russian arms by the end of the cold war.

India’s Defense and Research Development Organization (DRDO) created a joint venture Brahmos aerospace with Russia's NPO Mashinostroyenia to develop a supersonic cruise missile system. the sophisticated propulsion technology engine and seeker were developed by Russia while the guidance control system airframe and onboard electronics or developed by India.

With all these agreements and deliveries, buying Russian arms proved to be reliable and cost-effective. The geopolitical factors like the Sino-Soviet split and Sino-US détente also pushed India to tighten its ties with the Soviets. Soviets helped substantially in capacity building. The problem India faced with imported Russian arms is there is never the highest quality available in the market even though they are optimal compared to levels of western quality with 30 to 35% of low cost but they are simplistic in maintenance and robust performance. India also faced some problems with delays price revisions and cost row overruns and there were instances where the demands for advance payments were created which would have made India’s dependence on Russia more however some of these issues were resolved with a recent agreement which allowed India to manufacture the spare parts and other components domestically.

India procured the Kashin class destroyers (named Rajput class in India), Nanuchka class missile Corvettes, the T-72 tanks, SAM-6 missiles,  the BMP infantry combat vehicles, the MIG-21-bis, the MIG-23, and MIG-25 aircraft. The IAF has also chosen AN-32 as medium transport aircraft to replace Dakotas, Packets and Avros. India also received the s400 air defence system in 2018 and deployed them recently in the Punjab sector.

To transfer the defence technology to another country in the international market is not openly available. the countries need to share mutual strategic and political interests to make defence procurement agreements there are only 3 options for defence procurement that can meet India’s needs in terms of quantity and quality. The United States only transfer its defence technology to its military allies, at that time the United States have no interest in developing India's defence capabilities, France is not able to provide the long term credit that India looking for at that time, USSR shares the mutual strategic interest it has the resources to support the effort with necessary credits.India emerged as a development partner from a buyer-seller relationship, the Brahmos cruise missile joint venture, Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) and the Multirole Transport Aircraft (MTA) are good examples of India’s increased capabilities in defence research and development. India was able to develop these capabilities with Russian support in the early years after independence. India and Russia signed a 10-year agreement to further their military and technical cooperation which includes a wide range of activities like purchase of completed weaponry, joint development and production. In 2007 the joint development and production of prospective Multirole fighters was signed between two countries.

Moscow not only helped in India’s immediate security needs, but It also helped in the Indianization of the technology transferred from them. Currently, India is also expanding its imports to the US and Israel, Iran as well for different kinds of requirements where these countries can serve best to fulfil the needs. But a lot of India’s defence equipment is Russian. Because of Moscow’s economical need for foreign currency through defence export, they were more open to India's demand for license production and joint development on some of the advanced technological systems like cruise missiles fighter aircraft nuclear energy surface ships including an aircraft carrier and nuclear submarines.


Notes

[1]A Whale Of A Fighter: The Su-7 In IAF Service Rakshak, Bharat. "Su-7." 2009-12-30 at IAF History. https://web.archive.org/web/20091230183851/http://bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/Aircraft/Su-7.html

[2] Graham, “The Indo-Soviet MIG Deal,” 824, 828; and Dikshit, “India and Russia Revisiting,” 3


Pic Courstey-Indian Navy twitter handle

(The views expressed are those fo the author and do nto represent views fo CESCUBE.)

Sharath Kumar Kolipaka
About Sharath Kumar Kolipaka →

Sharath Kumar Kolipaka is doing a masters degree at Jindal School of International affairs, specializing in national security and peace and conflict studies.

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