Arms Control in Crisis: The Collapse of Post-Cold War Security Architectures

The 21^st century has a more complicated world than the Cold War era, with greater violent disputes arising. The complexity of arms control during the Cold War was insufficient in their tactics and strategies for the new world order.[[1]] Arms control does not always imply that its goals are prohibition and abolition, while typically it aims to reduce the quantity of a specific weapon. During the Cold War, numerous non-proliferation treaties were negotiated to restrict arms control, even though they were ineffective at stopping the proliferation of weapons. Which raises the question of what particular shift in arms control occurred during and after the Cold War? In addition, did it prevent nuclear-armed superpowers from slowing down the arms race?[[2]]

The legacy of Arms Control after the Cold War

The only purpose of arms control during the Cold War was to limit the possibility of a nuclear arms race between the US and the USSR, and to maintain a mutual understanding for their strategic stability. Contrasted to other arms control agreements, the “Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty” (START I) is regarded as the most significant accomplishment, as it improved strategic stability and served the interests of both the US and USSR.[[3]] Even though arms control served to prevent nuclear war between the two countries at the end of the Cold War, their stockpiles of major weapons were growing. Additionally, START II was signed to further restrict the production of weapons, but it failed to change the strategic priorities of both countries. Further, the expansion of NATO made it more challenging to build mutual trust and an arms control framework.[[4]] Many things change for various reasons when discussing the post-Cold War arms control situation. After the fall of the Soviet Union, there was a huge economic disparity, which made Russia dissatisfied with the security design for negotiation. The global shift following the 9/11 attacks has made the US more concerned with the War on Terror and then China. With more weapons and different actors, the number of political elements has increased significantly, requiring more work to operate.[[5]]

The end of bilateral arms control and the crisis of multilateralism

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty

The European security situation changed in the mid-1970s when the Soviet Union began replacing its older intermediate-range SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with newer SS-20 missiles. The US negotiated the INF agreement, which was consulted by NATO members, limited both sides' access to nuclear-armed aircraft and medium-range missiles.[[6]] The INF treaty proposes on-site inspections of missiles and facilities during the elimination period in order to verify that the nuclear armed system has been eliminated in compliance. In accordance with the INF treaty, the US has also discontinued employing ballistic and cruise missiles that are launched from ground-based positions.[[7]] After Russia broke the agreement by creating and deploying forbidden intermediate-range missiles, the US formally withdrew from the treaty in August 2019.[[8]] The US may plan to launch surface-to-surface missiles and hopes to use the end of the INF treaty to characterise long-range missiles. The INF treaty did not deliver the long-term benefits for stability and important security information; such an agreement should assist in improving the diplomatic relations and foster greater trust.

New START

In order to continue verifying the nuclear weapons control between the US and Russia, New START replaced START I after it expired in 2009.[[9]] Without significantly updating the previous agreement, a modernised version of the new firm's ideas has been required to create a new agreement that both the US and Russia can agree. The suspension of on-site inspections due to COVID-19 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has effectively caused New START to collapse.[[10]] Even though New START has failed to meet its objectives, it did lower the nuclear weapons from an unreasonably high amount during the Cold War. Since nuclear weapons are now present in nations other than the US and Russia, the new arms control agreements should focus on multilateralism rather than bilateral agreements.[[11]]

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

JCPOA, also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal, is an agreement between Iran and several other countries, including the US.[[12]] Iran and the US have had a tense relationship since the 1980s and 90s, but under President Obama, a multilateral strategy has emerged, and the JCPOA agreement was signed. Iran’s nuclear aspects were addressed in the agreement, and the ‘International Atomic Energy Agency’ (IAEA) carried out the inspection. However, there was no mention of other missile development and Iran’s support for Islamist terrorism in the agreement.[[13]] There has been a significant repercussion on the regional geopolitics in the Middle East due to the JCPOA. The US did not take advantage of the JCPOA, despite the fact that it offers an ideal opportunity for arms control throughout the region. The revival of the JCPOA is important to avoid future regional conflicts.[[14]]

Can Arms Control be Revived?

As the world undergoes a more comprehensive transition to multipolarity, the growing military industry power has changed the geopolitical landscape. The development of weapons without any strict limitations fuels the regional rivalries, and many countries have violated the framework of arms control.[[15]] The multilateral organisations that deal with arms control are unable to handle the growing complexity and are having difficulties negotiating the agreements. The present armed conflicts around the world affect every nation. The government, multilateral organisations and other civil society stakeholders must be involved in the arms control framework in order to revive its present relevance.[[16]] A new framework is required for strategic nuclear arms control, states that possess nuclear weapons should be held accountable, and their prominence must be reduced.[[17]] They should also exhibit the three key components of more comprehensive deterrence measures of openness, adaptability and good faith.[[18]]

Conclusion

Arms control will not decline in the new era of multipolar strategic rivalry. The theoretical underpinning of arms control has remained largely consistent over time, even after the involvement of different actors. Arms control is vital, even though it is not the most crucial strategy for preserving both domestic and global security.[[19]] It may be more practical to concentrate on behavioural boundaries and norms-setting rather than the absolute drops in a single weapon type. Negotiations should concentrate on identifying the most likely route to nuclear use and avoiding unintentional expansion when it comes to less traditional arms control measures.[[20]] 

Endnotes

[[1]] “Next Up in Arms Control”, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. https://armscontrolcenter.org/nukes-of-hazard-home/next-up-in-arms-control/

[[2]] Avis T. Bohlen, “Arms control in the Cold War”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 15, 2009. https://www.fpri.org/article/2009/05/arms-control-in-the-cold-war/ 

[[3]] James Cameron, “Negotiating Primacy: Strategic Stability, Superpowers Arms Control, and the End of the Cold War”, Texas National Security Review, Volume 8, Issue 2, Spring 2025. https://tnsr.org/2025/03/negotiating-primacy-strategic-stability-superpower-arms-control-and-the-end-of-the-cold-war/ 

[[4]] Eugene Rumer, “A Farewell to Arms Control”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 17, 2018. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2018/04/a-farewell-to-arms-control?lang=en

[[5]] Ulrich Kuhn, “Why Arms Control is (Almost) Dead”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 5, 2020. https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2020/03/why-arms-control-is-almost-dead?lang=en

[[6]] Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, “Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty)”, U.S Department of State. https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm

[[7]] Kanwal Sibal, “INF Treaty: The Future and its Implications”, AIR POWER Journal, Vol. 14 No. 2, SUMMER 2019 (April-June). https://capsindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/kanwal-sibal.pdf

[[8]] Amy J. Nelson, “The death of the INF Treaty has lessons for arms control”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 4, 2019. https://thebulletin.org/2019/11/the-death-of-the-inf-treaty-has-lessons-for-arms-control/

[[9]] Xiaoden Liang, “New START at a Glance”, Arms Control Association, December 2024. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/new-start-glance

[[10]] Samuel Charap, Christian Curriden, “U.S. Options for Post-New START Arms Control with Russia”, RAND, July 30, 2024. https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA739-1.html

[[11]] Martin Russell, “The New START Treaty between the US and Russia”, European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), March 2021. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/690523/EPRS_BRI(2021)690523_EN.pdf

[[12]] Kali Robinson, “What is the Iran Nuclear Deal”, Council on Foreign Relations, October 27, 2023. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal

[[13]] Gold, Philip, PhD, “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran Nuclear Deal)”, EBSCO, 2024. https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/diplomacy-and-international-relations/joint-comprehensive-plan-action-iran 

[[14]] Seyed Hossein Mousavian, “What Losing the Iran Deal Could Mean for the Region”, The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, Fall 2022/Winter 2023. https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/what-losing-the-iran-deal-could-mean-for-the-region/

[[15]] Ece Dumanlar, “The New Arms Race: Emerging Powers in the Multipolar World”, Atlas Institute for International Affairs, June 18, 2025. https://atlasinstitute.org/the-new-arms-race-emerging-powers-in-a-multipolar-world/

[[16]] Michael Moodie, Jerry Zhang, “Bolstering Arms Control in a Contested Geopolitical Environment”, International & Regional Organizations (STIMSON), October 31, 2022. https://www.stimson.org/2022/bolstering-arms-control-in-a-contested-geopolitical-environment/

[[17]] Hugh Miall, “Exploring New Approaches to Arms Control in the 21st Century: Building Lessons from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs)”, Toda Peace Institute, November, 2018. https://toda.org/assets/files/resources/policy-briefs/t-pb-30_hugh-miall_inf-workshop-report.pdf

[[18]] Jacob Parakilas, “Can Arms Control Make a 21^st Century Comeback?”, The Diplomat, December, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/can-arms-control-make-a-21st-century-comeback/

[[19]] Dinshaw Mistry, “Arms Control”, Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict (Second Edition), 2008. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/B9780123739858000106

[[20]] Anna Peczeli, “Strategic Stability and the Future of Arms Control”, Per Concordiam (Journal of European Security and Defense Issues), July 12, 2023. https://perconcordiam.com/strategic-stability-and-the-future-of-arms-control/

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(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views of CESCUBE.