Canada’s approach towards Indo-Pacific Construct

Canada for a long time now has suffered from the crisis of being called a “middle country”, or the one who is under the Chinese shadow. As a result, Canada has been planning to undertake a new Indo –Pacific strategy since 2019. It initiated free trade negotiations with Indonesia earlier and multiplied its engagement with the ASEAN. Yet, despite these efforts, it still appears apprehensive of out rightly owning up to its new claims. While the call has been quite clear that to sustain itself, Canada must diversify its base towards the new Indo Pacific construct, it has been restraining due to its relationship with China.

China-Canada relations have faced significant deterioration over the years. This was further recently aggravated when the Canadian authorities arrested Chinese technology giant Huawei, on US extradition request. Amidst this, with the emergence of the rules-based Indo Pacific order, Canada must and has begun to recognize the centrality of the region as the world’s geo-economic and geo-strategic focus. It is looking ahead to deepen its foothold in military involvement with the QUAD countries (Australia, Japan, India, and United States). This however proves to be quite contrary to the trajectory Canada has until now been following. The QUAD group aims to counter China’s growing influence around the Indian Ocean and the Indo Pacific. In the same scenario, we must also realize that Canada has not fully committed to the region or the cause. If not completely, but partially, it appears like Canada is minding its own business while enabling another. It has rarely backed up its stand with any real funding or support and has largely remained symbolically superficial in its actions. Canada has sometimes declined to attend major summits or other engagements in the region or has sent lower-level officials to events attended by ministers of other countries.

Considering its economic rationale, Canada as the 6^th largest global producer of energy has no clear incentive of engaging in the Indo Pacific. Even if had to still diversify its energy needs, its immediate next options turn out to be Japan and China, both of which are the part of East Asia and not the Indo-Pacific. However, even then, what lures it this side is India, which compounds a great potential for establishing an energy east type pipeline in which Canada is interested. Another appealing feature is the free and open nature of the Indo-Pacific itself, which seems to resonate with the country’s traditional and non- traditional approach concerns very well. It sounds beneficial to Canada’s interests especially since it is now more deeply invested in securing supply chain communication as a part of its economic integration with the CPTPP.

Even if it does comply with working towards its vision of an open and engaging role in the indo pacific, as President Trudeau mentioned during Abe’s visit to Ottawa in 2019, it is noteworthy to see how Canada does this. Features like its middle power identity and limited capabilities are much likely to form the ground of its way ahead. Canada must deliberate to work with the like-minded countries like Japan, USA, Australia, and its new Indo-Pacific allied interest- India, to develop a sustainable, meaningful, and resource-based footing in the region. In contrast to the “might is right” approach it earlier experienced with China, it is in Canada interest to emphasize for a rule-based consensus which provides it with support in dealing with issues such as climate change, terrorism, development etc.

While making a new Indo-Pacific identity and strengthening the previous one, it is essential Canada manages its Asian strategy as well. For a long time, it has been largely China oriented. While it would not be wise to do away with China’s sheer control and economic presence either, it cannot also continue to undermine its own strategic interests.  Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership is a great opportunity for Canada to diversify in Asia. Therefore, it must make sure to capitalize on that. A strong CPTPP holds enormous potential to portray Canada as a strong indo pacific contender given many of the large Asian economies have shown willingness to commit towards the CPTPP’s high standards. However, while carving out its new path in the Indo-Pacific, it is important that this time it does it differently. It no longer follows the US strategy but instead follows one based on its own economic and diplomatic ties with Australia, Japan, and India. This does not mean jeopardizing its position with the United States but prioritizing itself. Similarly on the front with China, since it already enjoys a relatively comfortable equation with China, it must try continuing doing that. Not to forget, China remains a reckoning force in the global order and the one that does not seem to be going away any soon. This requires Canada to make the most of its new opening while maintaining its former relationships.

A free and open Indo-Pacific strategy moldered the need for a long-desired platform for coming together of like-minded, or if we may say so like- interested nations to counter China’s destabilizing actions in the region. It does not mean engaging in a tiff with China but to only underline the common demand of the region for a free, rule based and transparent space facilitating trade and investment. It is necessary to locate the Indo-Pacific strategy not as an “Alliance politics” but a progressive coalition to further policy change.

Therefore, to fully engage in the region, Canada needs to make a more consistent effort at assimilation and absorption of the Indo-Pacific undertones. It must indulge itself in ways that go beyond trade and investment. This it can do through engaging in political-security issues such as disaster relief, maritime security, and nuclear non-proliferation.  A strong Canadian Indo -Pacific strategy would be a sum of why Canada must engage in the region and how is it a meaningful engagement for the region. Only when these dynamic gains clarity Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategy would make the headlines. 

References

1. 2020 National Opinion Poll: Canadian Views on Asia. (2020, november 25). Retrieved from Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada: https://www.asiapacific.ca/publication/2020-national-opinion-poll-canadian-views-asia.

2.Bhattacharyya, A. (2020, october 4). Eye on China, Canada formulates new Indo-Pacific policy. Retrieved from hindustan times: https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/eye-on-china-canada-formulates-new-indo-pacific-policy/story-r84Wr4uqJcBN5QM2StDBxK.html

3.Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations. (2021, february 12). Retrieved from Global Affairs Canada: https://www.international.gc.ca/news-nouvelles/arbitrary_detention-detention_arbitraire-declaration.aspx?lang=eng.

4. Berkshire Miller, S. N. (2020). Why Canada Must Embrace a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. the japan institute of policy affairs, 5.

5.Nagy, S. (n.d.). Canada in the Indo-Pacific. Retrieved from Canadian global affairs institute: https://www.cgai.ca/canada_in_the_indo_pacific

6.Reeves, J. (2020). Canada and the Indo Pacific. Asia Pacific Foundation Of Canada.

7.Snyder, J. (2021, May 28). Canada looks beyond China and quietly draws up new Indo-Pacific strategy. Retrieved from national post: https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/canada-looks-beyond-china-and-quietly-draws-up-new-indo-pacific-strategy

8.STEPHENS, H. (2020, November 18). Canada’s Indo-Pacific future. Retrieved from open canada: https://opencanada.org/canadas-indo-pacific-future/

Pic Courtesy-Sebastiaan Stam at unsplash.com

The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)