India-US Defence Exercises and the China Factor

The exercise includes activities planned in a way that the militaries of both nations can operate together in any scenario. From the Indian side, the forces will be displaying their strategies for high-altitude warfare and their American counterpart will be displaying technologies that are used in such battle scenarios. This way both sides can enhance their interoperability for high-altitude warfare scenarios. The exercise will also include the Indian Air Force in a key role to foster greater integration between ground and air assets [1]. While India has hosted such annual military exercises before in Uttarakhand, those were conducted more than 300 km away from the borders in the foothills.

India-US defense partnerships:

The military ties between India and USA have been enhanced in the past few years with the USA designating India as a "Major Defence Partner" in June 2016. The past few years have marked multiple pacts being signed between India and USA in the defense and security domain. In 2016, the two nations signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA). This pact facilitated the use of each other’s military bases for purposes like replenishment of supplies and repair providing deeper cooperation. Later in 2018, the two countries signed the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA). As per this agreement, the sale of high-end technology from the US to India will be facilitated along with interoperability. In 2020, both nations signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), further boosting the bilateral military ties by facilitating logistical support, high-end technology, and geospatial maps [2].

The dispute at LAC:

The Line of Actual Control commonly, or the LAC, as a term was coined in 1959 in a letter by former Chinese premier Zhou Enlai to then India’s Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. This term was accepted late in 1991 by India following which the Agreement of Peace and Tranquillity was signed in 1993. The present-day LAC is close to the borders claimed by China and therefore serves a huge disadvantage for India which led to India’s insistence that China must revert to locations that it held as of 8 September 1962 and that the position should be held on a delineation basis while negotiations can continue regarding the final settlement of border. Since the delineation has not been done on the basis of accepted norms which was mentioned in the 1993 agreement, there are multiple areas with differing perceptions serving as the root cause of conflicts at the border. Further, China has also altered the lines it has earlier claimed and pushed it further toward India, and has developed infrastructure in the areas claimed by India [3].

China Factor:

This edition of the Yudh Abhyas will be conducted amidst tensions with China. The rise in tensions between USA and China can be traced back to the Trade War between both nations. The recent visit by US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan has also led to increased tensions resulting in China conducting military exercises around Taiwan. Since then, China has reiterated the one-China policy and vocally blamed the USA for escalating the tensions. China had even stated that the USA will have to take responsibility for any consequences that may follow. For India, the tensions at the border have increased ever since the military standoff at Galwan. Presently, the tensions between India and China are fuelled by the border dispute and growing political rivalry. Additionally, the military infrastructure build-up of Chinese armed forces at the LAC is a major security concern for India.

The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) presence at the LAC has undergone some major upgrades since the incident at Galwan. These upgrades include vast troop accommodation in the Western sector, air defense systems, long-range artillery and rocket systems, hard blast pens for fighter aircraft along with expanded runways. All these upgrades have taken place on the Chinese side within 100 km of the LAC. As per sources, the 4^th and 6^th divisions of the PLA were deployed during the military confrontation in 2020 and were rotated with the 8^th and 11^th divisions in 2021. In 2022, the 4^th and 6^th divisions, as part of the rotation practices have been redeployed. These divisions are undergoing the process of being converted to a Combined Arms Brigade (CAB) with an almost complete equipment upgrade. A ZTQ 15 third-generation modern light tank has been inducted into the 4th Division as part of their armored regiment. Further upgrades include two mechanized brigades operating wheeled Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) upgraded to the latest ZTL-11 APCs and induction of the CSK series of assault vehicles similar to the Humvees used by the U.S. Army. The airbases on the Chinese side have undergone significant upgrades like extended runways and blast pens at Gargunsh, Lhasa, and Guangzhou. From the Indian side, there has also been an expansion of military infrastructure like the Smerch MLRS and BrahMos cruise missile systems being deployed in Arunachal Pradesh closer to the LAC [4]. Recently, the PLA tested an advanced Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) near the LAC. The test was conducted at an altitude of more than 5,300 meters and could be able to hit key Indian military bases. This PHL-16 MLRS is expected to be stationed in the Himalayas [5].

Lt Gen Rana Pratap Kalita, GOC-in-C of the Indian Army Eastern Command said that "Basically, all activities the Chinese PLA is undertaking to develop infrastructure is to ensure that they are in a better position to respond to any emerging situation and mobilize forces in a short time.” He further stated that operational capabilities on the Indian side are also being enhanced focusing on new weapons, technology, and equipment. Lt Gen Kalita also mentioned that the weather conditions have been impacting the infrastructure development on the Indian side and in comparison, to terrain, the northern side of Tibet is a rolling plateau while the Indian side has difficult mountains and dense forests [6].

Military infrastructure development on the Indian side:

Developments on the Indian side include multiple roads under construction and some already operational under Phase 11 of the Indo-China Border Roads project. Additionally, 47 new border posts for the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) are created along with 12 staging camps [7]. As per sources, as part of infrastructure development plans, the construction of helipads for movement within the valley, fibre optic cables being laid out closer to the LAC, the establishment of an adequate communication network, and additional civil mobile towers are some of the plans under discussion. Further discussion includes the transfer of certain construction tasks to the Military Engineer Services (MES) and an increase in the utilization of local resources for the repair and recovery of vehicles. All these would engage the locally available labour which would further boost employment in the border areas [8].

Conclusion:

Since the military confrontation between India and China, there has been significant troop mobilization and infrastructure build-up on both sides of the border. On the other hand, military talks to resolve the border dispute have largely been unsuccessful. In light of these developments, conducting joint military exercises so close to the border might be perceived as a power projection or escalation. However, it must be noted that the chosen location for exercise is to stimulate a high-altitude battle scenario for the troops. This edition of the Yudh Abhyas will be very crucial for both India and the USA as there will be sharing of battle strategies as well as showcasing of relevant technologies. The military developments by the Chinese at their side of the border add more significance to this edition of the Yudh Abhyas. Therefore, the location of the bilateral military exercises suggests that this edition of the Yudh Abhyas is influenced by the China factor. 

Endnotes:

1.      Snehesh Alex Philip, “India-US to hold high-altitude military exercise near LAC amid rising tensions with China”, The Print, 03 August 2022 https://theprint.in/defence/india-us-to-hold-high-altitude-military-exercise-near-lac-amid-rising-tensions-with-china/1067250/

2.      “Yudh Abhyas: India, US to carry out mega military exercise in Uttarakhand in October”, 04 August 2022 https://www.freepressjournal.in/india/yudh-abhyas-india-us-to-carry-out-mega-military-exercise-in-uttarakhand-in-october

3.      Maj Gen Ashok Kumar (retd), “India-China border dispute: Why current day LAC is a huge disadvantage to New Delhi | VIEWS”, India Today, 16 August 2022 https://www.indiatoday.in/news-analysis/story/india-china-border-dispute-why-current-day-lac-disadvantage-new-delhi-opinion-1988456-2022-08-16

4.      Dinakar Peri, “China upgraded firepower on LAC: official source”, The Hindu, 27 June 2022 https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/china-upgraded-firepower-on-lac/article65567560.ece

5.      “China tests a rocket near LAC that can hit critical Indian Army bases”, Live Mint, 22 July 2022 https://www.livemint.com/news/india/china-tests-a-rocket-near-lac-that-can-hit-critical-indian-army-bases-11658447491890.html

6.      Prabin Kalita, “China constantly building LAC infra: Army commander”, The Times of India, 17 May 2022 https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/china-constantly-building-lac-infra-army-commander/articleshow/91604911.cms

7.      Bharti Jain, “Major upgrade for India infrastructure along LAC: Parliamentary panel report”, The Times of India, 15 March 2022 https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/47-new-itbp-border-outposts-being-created-along-china-border/articleshow/90211881.cms

8.      Amrita Nayak Dutta, “As Army Prepares for Summer at Simmering LAC, India Plans Long-term Infra Boost in Eastern Ladakh, N-E”, News 18, 22 April 2022 https://www.news18.com/news/india/as-army-prepares-for-summer-at-simmering-lac-india-plans-long-term-infra-boost-in-eastern-ladakh-n-e-5028883.html

Pic Courtesy-Toxic Player at unsplash.com

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)