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Politics March 6, 2024 2621 Reads

Myanmar Junta and growing dissent from Ethnic Groups

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By Ridipt Singh
Author • Centre for Security & Strategic Studies
Myanmar Junta and growing dissent from Ethnic Groups
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS

Myanmar has historically witnessed perpetual battles with military junta, politico-civil upheaval, and weak governance for decades since gaining independence. The country’s stability was further fragmented by the military coup staged in Feb...

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The Coup of 2021:

The Myanmar military exercised political control over the country from year 1962 to 2011 when it implemented democratic reforms that marked the beginning of a return to civilian government. Prior to the coup, Myanmar was governed under the terms of the 2008 constitution whose framework allowed space for power-sharing between the civilian administration and the Tatmadaw. This arrangement ensured that the military never fell under civilian authority by reserving 25% of parliamentary seats, one vice-presidential position, and the three ministerial portfolios of defense, interior, and border security for the military. While the Tatmadaw held the view that this arrangement would maintain its political supremacy, following the November 2020 elections, the ruling civilian National League for Democracy (NLD) strengthened its poll lead, while the military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) had its poorest performance. In the weeks preceding the coup, Tatmadaw head Min Aung Hlaing showed rising support for the USDP's allegations of electoral fraud, although the Union Election Commission (UEC) found no evidence to support these assertions [2]. In February 2021, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and other military officials launched a coup whereby the junta, officially known as the State Administration Council, imprisoned and charged de facto civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi with corruption and other offenses further putting her fellow parliamentarians from the NLD, and other parties, as well as many activists, under house arrest [3].

Following the military takeover, the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, Myanmar's Union Parliament was abolished by the Tatmadaw. Amidst growing dissent and widespread protests against the junta, a group of elected Union Parliament members from the NLD formed the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH). They refused to recognize the military regime's cabinet, claiming that the military overthrow of the civilian government by force was a violation of Chapter 6 of the Criminal Law. After founding the CRPH, the NLD MPs informed the United Nations and other international bodies that they should contact the committee to discuss government business rather than the military junta stating that the CRPH would carry out the Union Parliament's usual functions [4].

Six months after seizing power from the elected government, Myanmar's military leader Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing named himself Prime Minister, stating that he would oversee the country under an extended period of emergency until elections are held in around two years. In a recorded televised speech, he announced that "we must create conditions to hold a free and fair multiparty general election," further adding that they need to prepare for a multi-party general elections without any impending hurdles to the process. He also stated that the state of emergency's goals would be met by August 2023. Later, in a second announcement, the military government referred to itself as "the caretaker government" with Min Aung Hlaing as the Prime Minister [5].

Aftermath of the Coup – Crackdown on Dissidents:

The staged coup of February 2021 and takeover of the government by force was followed by the Tatmadaw’s ruthless crackdown on civilians across the country showcasing their dissent against the military rule. This included the military committing mass killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, sexual violence, and other crimes against humanity alongside adopting "scorched earth" tactics and burning towns in Magway and Sagaing areas. These increased military operations have resulted in several war crimes against ethnic minority people in the Kachin, Karen, Karenni, and Shan states. [6]. While nonviolent opposition persisted against the military junta, the clash escalated between military forces and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), the People's Defence Forces (PDF) and other armed groups formed to oppose the coup, expanding to central Myanmar and previously unaffected areas. In response, the military pursued its "Four Cuts" approach, cutting off armed organizations from cash, food, information, and recruiting, with terrible effects on civilians. Later, on December 21, the UN Security Council issued its first resolution on Myanmar in over 70 years, expressing deep concern about the serious consequences of the military coup and calling for an end to the violence, the release of political prisoners, unrestricted humanitarian access, and respect for the rights of women and children [7].

Two years after the coup against the democratically elected government, UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk made the statement that the country’s political instability has deteriorated more than ever and its human rights records have gone to absolute decline. He stated that "Two of the crucial requirements agreed upon, namely the cessation of all violence and the provision of humanitarian access, have not been realized. In reality, we've witnessed the opposite. Violence has spiraled out of hand, and humanitarian access has been severely limited." His remark further highlighted that while Myanmar was one of the first UN members to support the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in its first year of independence, the current military rule is actively breaching its fundamental values and principles during the commemoration of the 75th anniversary of the Declaration's promulgation. Moreover, the High Commissioner pointed to the essentials for establishing a foundation for resolving the political crisis. This included the UN Security Council’s call to release the political prisoners including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint, inclusive dialogue with all parties involving both the ASEAN Chair and the UN Special Envoy, and allowing access to the UN Human Rights Office to monitor the situation [8]. By the third year following the coup, on March 16, 2023, Noeleen Heyzer, United Nations Special Envoy to Myanmar since 2021, stated that "the impact of the military takeover on the country and its people, has been devasting." while thanking the Member States for renewing the resolution to extend her mandate. She highlighted the atrocities caused by the spread of Martial Law to 47 different townships, as well as the Four-Cuts policy that is preventing access to food, cash, knowledge, and recruits. However, despite the violent crackdown on dissidents, widespread resistance has persisted. Ms. Heyzer stated that the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) has continued to highlight the brutality of military forces, simultaneously also warning the resistance militias not to indulge in inhumane acts themselves, adding that "With both sides intent on prevailing by force, there is no prospect for a negotiated settlement." [9]

Growing dissent and resistance against the Junta:

Myanmar's parallel government, the NUG, formed its armed branch, the PDF, on May 5, 2021, intending to defeat the military junta and has formed a strong military alliance with four long-standing EAOs known as the K3C: the Kachin Independence Organisation (K), the Karen National Union, the Karenni National Progressive Party, and the Chin National Front. They have also been working less publicly with other EAOs, mainly those with strong ties to China. Although even after two years of fighting, the military still controls the country's major cities and assets, resistance organizations have gradually acquired control of territories in the border areas, certain towns in ethnic states, as well as territories previously controlled by allied EAOs [10].

Myanmar's resistance against the junta has come out to be one of the world's most effective groups acting against any authoritarian regime despite limited international assistance and significant structural challenges. This could be attributed to the fact that unlike earlier pro-democracy movements in Myanmar, which involved segments of society, this has come off as a national revolt involving a wide range of actors who have shown a readiness to make significant sacrifices to oppose the regime. The resistance coordinated a nationwide military offensive in October 2023, which now poses a genuine threat to the junta's rule. Since October, more than 5,500 junta troops have been killed or captured, including 10 brigadier generals, and the resistance has taken over 30 towns. Overall, the junta has suffered casualties of around 30,000 soldiers marking a significant blow to its 150,000 troops. The woefully depleted military is now losing ground daily and has largely failed to regain it while its airstrikes and arson attacks against civilian populations have only served to reinforce the public's commitment to resist [11].

Conclusion:

The Tatmadaw’s staging of the coup occurred intending to secure a level of political supremacy in the country as the results of the 2020 elections clearly went against their will. However, their actions have pushed the country to an overall political crisis and have only made matters worse for themselves. Not only the dissent among the civilian population has persisted, but they have been successful in forming and operating a parallel government with a military wing claiming significant wins by regaining control over territories.

For now, there is just no turning back for an exhausted and stretched junta that is gradually losing its power to govern the population. Here, it should be noted that the resistance is fighting for its survival from atrocities incurred by the military, and in this light, the lack of concrete actions from the international community has allowed space for both sides to continue fighting leaving no space for a peaceful resolution which makes the possibility of a general election weak. Hence, Myanmar sits at a serious risk of spiraling into a perpetual state of civil war unless serious actions are taken on the Tatmadaw.


Endnotes:

1.     Lindsay Maizland, Myanmar’s Troubled History: Coups, Military Rule, and Ethnic Conflict, Council on Foreign Relations, 31 January 2022 https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/myanmar-history-coup-military-rule-ethnic-conflict-rohingya

2.     Dr Angela Clare, The Myanmar coup: a quick guide, Parliament of Australia, 02 uly 2021 https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp2122/Quick_Guides/MyanmarCoup

3.     Lindsay Maizland, Myanmar’s Troubled History: Coups, Military Rule, and Ethnic Conflict, Council on Foreign Relations, 31 January 2022 https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/myanmar-history-coup-military-rule-ethnic-conflict-rohingya#chapter-title-0-2

4.     Amid Coup, Myanmar’s NLD Lawmakers Form Committee to Serve as Legitimate Parliament, The Irrawaddy, 08 February 2021 https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/amid-coup-myanmars-nld-lawmakers-form-committee-serve-legitimate-parliament.html

5.     Myanmar's Military Leader Declares Himself Prime Minister and Promises Elections, NOR, 02 August 2021 https://www.npr.org/2021/08/02/1023782084/myanmar-military-leader-prime-minister-elections

6.     World Report 2023 – Myanmar Events of 2022, Human Rights Watch, 2023 https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/myanmar

7.     Myanmar 2022, Amnesty International https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/myanmar/report-myanmar/

8.     Two years after coup, Myanmar faces unimaginable regression, says UN Human Rights Chief, Press Release, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 27 January 2023 https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/01/two-years-after-coup-myanmar-faces-unimaginable-regression-says-un-human

9.     More than two years on, impact of Myanmar military coup ‘devastating’, United Nations, 16 March 2023 https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/03/1134682

10. Lian Bawi Thang, Rating the Progress of Myanmar’s Resistance Movement, The Diplomat, 30 August 2023 https://thediplomat.com/2023/08/rating-the-progress-of-myanmars-resistance-movement/

11. Priscilla A. Clapp, Billy Ford, Nang Raw, Jason Tower and Andrew Wells-Dang, Three Years After Coup, Myanmar’s Generals Face an Existential Crisis, United States Institute of Peace, 01 February 2024 https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/02/three-years-after-coup-myanmars-generals-face-existential-crisis


Pic Courtesy-Nandan B

(The views expressed are those of the author and

 

 


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About Ridipt Singh →

Ridipt Singh is currently pursuing MA. International Studies from Symbiosis School of International Studies, Symbiosis International University, Pune, Maharashtra (2021-23)

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