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Military August 12, 2021 1988 Reads

Russia’s military build-up in Central Asia

A
By Aman Kumar
Author • Centre for Security & Strategic Studies
Russia’s military build-up in Central Asia
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS

Central Asia has always remained a great strategic battlefield among various regional and international powers. From antiquity to the contemporary period the Central Asian Region has always found itself at the core of the international affa...

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Russia has always been a firm contester for its influence in the region. Moscow has always considered the Central Asian region as their area of influence and hence any shift in the distribution of power and influence in the region, against Russian interests, is strongly contested by the Russians. Russian influence has considerably declined after the five Central Asian Republics (CARs) proclaimed independence from the Soviet System and evolved as sovereign nations in the last decade of the 20th Century. Though Russia inherited most of the political prowess of the erstwhile Soviet Union but remained engaged in its problems owing to the weak economic system and unstable political system it inherited. But the arrival of Putin and the 9/11 terror attacks in the United States prepared the necessary ground for Russia to reclaim its influence in the region. The Russian response to the 9/11 terror attack was quick and humane which surprised many western scholars and leaders alike. Russia did not limit itself to condemning the attack but displayed clear intent to play a proactive role in the “War on Terror” in Afghanistan. The Russian leadership provided the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan with critical military hardware and supported the military campaign of the United States against the Taliban. Russia’s critical support helped the Northern Alliance to overthrow the Taliban regime. In 2005 Russia declared its intent to provide military hardware like helicopters worth $30 million to the military of Afghanistan. Twenty years after the American invasion of Afghanistan, Central Asia is once again in the limelight because of its crucial geostrategic location. Time has finally given the Russians the second chance to gain their lost influence in the region which has been traditionally considered by Moscow as its backyard.

The strategic significance of Central Asia is known to the whole world. Located at the heart of Eurasia it connects Asia with Europe and has been contested among several regional and international powers. Among all the contemporary stakeholders the Russians have been historically more engaged with the region. Central Asia is important for Russia for three primary reasons. Historically all the contemporary Central Russian Republics were first annexed by the Tsarist regime and then became part of Soviet Russia. The region is close to unstable Afghanistan and Russia has always feared the domino effect of the Islamic Extremism exported to its territory through Central Asia. Russia too has suffered the implications of militant Islam and remains a vocal adversary of global terrorism. Besides it also remains concerned about drug trafficking and inter-ethnic violence in the region. The third reason for Russia’s consistent interest in the region is its military deployments and commitments in the region.

2. Boots on the Ground

 The Cold War period saw a rapid expansion of military bases around the world by the two superpowers representing two conflicting ideologies. The military bases served two important purposes. First, to safeguard the interests of the allied nation while protecting their sovereignty from encroachments of the opposite camps. The second purpose was to build and maintain strategic influences of the two camps in different parts of the world. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union halted this race of military build-up but never ended this process. There is no doubt that the two post-Cold War camps (the United States and the Russian Federation represented the interests of the erstwhile Soviet Union) committed to reducing their numbers but the situation remains more or less the same. Even when the Soviet threat is no more present the United States keeps on operating roughly 800 military bases across the world while the Russian Federation is left with roughly 25 such bases. Currently, Russia is primarily operating its bases in Syria and in the countries which were once part of the Soviet Union. These include bases in Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. However, it is the bases being operated in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan which hold primary importance from the Russian point of view.

2.1 Kazakhstan

 Kazakhstan was the first country in the region which signed the Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance which also included military cooperation. Since then Kazakhstan has been the most important partner of Russia in the region. Their military cooperation lies in the joint formation of forces in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), joint military exercises, military training, weapons trade, common air defense system, and operating military bases.

Sary Shagan is one of the most important Russian military installations in Kazakhstan. Originally it was established to test anti-missile systems which were dismantled after the dissolution of the USSR. Currently, the site hosts six missile defense systems, 12 anti-aircraft missile system, seven types of missile defence along with radar system and other measuring equipment. Balkhash-9 is another military base located near the Balkhash River and is largely operates the Russian missile attack warning system. It is responsible for detecting potential missile attacks through its high-tech radar stations. The 929th State Flight Test Centre is another military facility largely facilitating testing of the Russian Air Force weapons. It also operates at least three missile defense systems besides conducting more than 200 tests every year and more than 1500 flights every year.

2.2 Kyrgyzstan

 Russia is paying roughly 4.1 Million Dollars every year to the Kyrgyzstan government for operating four military bases in the country. The Kant Military Airport, which is also the largest Russian military installation in Kyrgyzstan, has been in the country since 1941. It largely operated under the broader framework of the CSTO and is responsible for supporting the rapid deployment of CSTO forces. The Russian Navy’s 954th anti-submarine test facility based in the city of Karakol has been testing new deep-sea torpedoes. It also operates a Russian-Kazakh joint venture for testing serial torpedoes. Besides the Marevo naval base located in Kara-Balta act as a communication center and is designed to facilitate long-distance communication with ships and submarines. Russia has been also operating an autonomous Seismic Station which tracks remote nuclear explosions.

2.3 Tajikistan

 The Russian forces present in the country acted as a deterrent to the Mujahedeen of Afghanistan during 1992-2005. The Russian border guards checked infiltration and illegal trade of drugs. In 2004 Russian established the 201st Division which happens to be the largest Russian military presence outside Russia. As per an agreement signed between the two sides the Russian forces will remain in the country till 2042. The division works to prevent infiltration and drug trafficking in Central Asia and thus serving the interests of all the members of CSTO. Besides Russia also trains Tajik forces and also conducts an annual CSTO “Fighting Brotherhood” military exercise.

3.The Afghan Crisis: New Opportunities for Russian Military

The situation in Afghanistan began to deteriorate quickly after the US forces started their scheduled withdrawal. The secret withdrawal from the Bagram Air Base in the night (largest American base in Afghanistan) boosted the morale of the Taliban and since then Taliban has engaged the Afghan forces in fierce battles in the cities and the countryside. In a statement given in Moscow, the Taliban claimed control over 85 percent of the Afghan territory. The swift and effective Taliban takeover of several districts in Afghanistan was massive to the Afghan government and the Afghan military forces. As a result, in the first week of July, some 1000 Afghan soldiers crossed into bordering Tajikistan for shelter.   

Developments in Afghanistan rarely had any large-scale threat in the Central Asian region especially Tajikistan and Uzbekistan which share a large border with Afghanistan. But the recent upheaval in the northern provinces of Afghanistan has provided an opportunity for these nations to show off their military capabilities. On July 22, Tajikistan witnessed its largest ever military preparedness exercise in its post-Soviet history. Tajikistan has been working in tandem with its neighbouring countries and especially Russia to display its capabilities to deal with any fallout from the Afghan soil. Russia has been equally responsive to the developments in Afghanistan. While being a part of the Afghan Peace Process, the Russian have positioned themselves as a possible bulwark against any potential spillover from the Afghan soil. In a statement, Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu accepted that the Russian bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan could be used to defend the CSTO Borders in case a need arises for direct action. On 5th August, the Russian Military Chief of Staff visited Central Asia to oversee a military drill that Russia had to conduct with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In a statement after his meeting with his Uzbek counterpart, Gen. Valery Gerasimov highlighted the worsening Afghan situation as directly responsible for the drill and claimed that the drill prepared them to effectively deal with terrorist threats. He blamed the new developments in Afghanistan on US hasty withdrawal and also said that Russia has increased weapons supply to the region. Russia was participating in a joint military exercise with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan at the Kharb-Maidon training ground, located just 20 KM away from the Afghan border. Before that Russian troops were already part of a drill at Uzbekistan’s Termez training ground. Though Uzbekistan quit the Russian-led CSTO for the second time in 2012, it has increased its military bilateral cooperation with Russia. It has to be noted that Uzbekistan has the largest standing army in Central Asia.

4. Not in My Backyard

Many experts believe that often Moscow over-hypes the risks or threats emanating from Afghanistan to justify its rising military build-up in Central Asia. Russia has an entirely different aim here. It wants to keep the region under its area of influence and check the western influence. The rise of China in Central Asia owing to its economic and security commitments in the region is another cause of concern for Russia though it has largely tolerated Chinese expansion. But the question is: for how long? Between 2016 and 2020 Beijing raised its arms sale from 1.5 percent (between 2010-2014) to 18 percent. It not only established a military facility in Tajikistan without any formal announcement but has also committed to supporting Tajikistan’s border protection activities at the Tajik-Afghan border. This is a blatant encroachment into activities that have traditionally been undertaken by Moscow.

Russia continues to further its well-worn narrative of Central Asia as the region of political instability and organized crime and a potential route for the export of extremism into Russian territory. This national security risk emanating from Central Asia helps Russia to not just continue with its military build-up but often to aggravate it. In June 2020 Russia was guaranteed permission to deploy Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in its Kant base in Kyrgyzstan. Russia was also allowed to deploy at least two modernized Mi-8MTV5-1 helicopters while upgrading and strengthening its air and missile defense system.

Russia has been consistently testing its battle readiness through regular military exercises and further arming its military bases. Russian military base in Tajikistan has already been equipped with an S-300 anti-aircraft missile system. Moscow has intensified its attempts of strengthening its existing military bases since 2014 while also providing critical support to the Central Asian militaries. Arms sale, joint military exercises, training and assistance programs, and capacity building has been intensifying in recent days.

CSTO is another framework through which Russia has ensured its consistent military presence in the region. Russia has been offering incentives, discounts, and subsidies to the members of CSTO to facilitate the sale of Russian military equipment and thus to boost overall cooperation. CSTO is Russia’s tool to project its power and influence in the region and also to provide an alternative to NATO. This not just helps Russia to stop NATO’s operations in the region but also helps Russia to contain Chinese military ambitions in Central Asian Republics.

5. Conclusion

Russian ambitions in Central Asia are an open secret. Russia has considered the region its area od influence and under its security umbrella owing to historical reasons. Its military deployments in the region aims to not just secure Russia’s national security but also to continue with its influence. It military presence and rising military cooperation with the Central Asian Republics has helped Russia to devoid the region of any significant Western influence. The recent developments in Afghanistan has given new opportunities for Russia to evolve as a net security provider in the region. Owing to the offensive postures of Taliban and continued instability in Afghanistan it would not be a surprise if the CARs bordering Afghanistan themselves give large scale freehand to the Russian military for not only securing the border but also to providing them with critical military support in return for more Russian influence. 

 

For Further Reading

1.     https://www.csis.org/programs/europe-russia-and-eurasia-program/russia-and-eurasia/understanding-russian-military-today

2.     https://warsawinstitute.org/russia-strengthens-military-bases-central-asia/

3.     https://warsawinstitute.org/russia-strengthens-military-bases-central-asia/

4.     https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/russia-intends-to-help-central-asian-states-secure-their-borders-from-militants-2020-2-26-24/

5.     https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/04/19/reflecting-on-quarter-century-of-russia-s-relations-with-central-asia-pub-76117

6.     https://orbeli.am/en/post/470/2020-06-08/Russian+Military+Presence+in+Central+Asia?

7.     https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/08/05/russia-led-drills-begin-on-afghanistan-borderafp-a74707

8.     https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/afghan-neighbour-tajikistan-holds-largest-ever-military-exercise-2021-07-22/

9.     https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-afghan-crisis-serves-as-opportunity-to-show-off-military-might

10. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/08/05/russia-led-drills-begin-on-afghanistan-borderafp-a74707

11. https://www.evnreport.com/understanding-the-region/fact-sheet-what-is-the-collective-security-treaty-organization


Pic Courtesy-Abdullah Aydin at unsplash.com

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.) 

Aman Kumar
About Aman Kumar →

Aman Kumar has completed his Master's in International Relations and Area Studies from the School of International Studies, JNU. He has pursued his BA in Political Science from Delhi University. His research interests lie in contemporary geopolitics and emerging trends in the Indo-Pacific region. Other than Indo-Pacific, he is also interested in the Korean Peninsula and the Central Asian region. He has also been the founding editor of a student-led initiative, Ytharth that deals with contemporary events in international relations.

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